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Introductory Chapter 
 
‘An Indian will, on average, be twice as well off as his grandfather; a Korean 32 times … I 
do not see how one can look at figures like these without seeing them as representing 
possibilities. Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the 
Indian economy to grow like Indonesia's or Egypt's? If so, what, exactly? If not, what is it 
about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so? The consequences for human welfare involved 
in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is 
hard to think about anything else.’ 
 
Lucas Jr (1988) pp.4-5 
 
Introduction 
This quote summarises the major motivation for studying economic development, namely improving human 
welfare. In general, people in richer countries live longer, are more educated, and they experience lower levels 
of child mortality. Each of these factors in turn is known to increase the quality of life. Income in itself is a tool, 
since increased income, in general, leads to increased human welfare in the long run.1 Economic growth, meaning 
the increase in income/production, is therefore a major field of economic research.  
East and Southeast Asia, from 1950 until the present, is in many ways the Holy Grail in research on 
economic growth. In no other region has economic growth and human welfare improved more rapidly.2 Economic 
growth is traditionally measured as the increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Table 1 summarises 
the improvements in income level for different regions measured with this indicator. In Asia, GDP per capita in 
2010 was more than six times that of 1960. This increase was twice as high as the growth in the next highest 
growth region, Western Europe. 
 
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP 1990 Int. GK$) per capita, 1960 and 2010 
 Western Europe Western Offshoots Latin America Asia Africa World 
GDP per capita 1960 6,806 10,961 3,130 1,026 1,055 2,764 
GDP per capita 2010 20,889 29,564 6,767 6,307 2,034 7,814 
2010 relative to 1960 3.07 2.70 2.16 6.15 1.93 2.83 
Source: Bolt and van Zanden (2013); the Western Offshoots are Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. 
 
Table 2 shows the relative income of a number of East and Southeast Asian economies compared to the US. The 
US is the world’s largest economy, has been among most advanced in the post-1945 period and is therefore a 
natural choice for making comparisons. In 1960, the living standard in China was only 6% of the living standard 
in the US whilst it was 26% in 2010, meaning that living standards relative to the US improved more than fourfold. 
However, China has not seen the most dramatic change, as South Korea’s relative performance has been even 
more spectacular with a more than sixfold increase in relative living standards compared to the US. 
 
 
                                            
 I am grateful for valuable comments from Stig Tenold, Ola Honningdal Grytten, Ingelin Orten, Karl Rolf Pedersen and Ragnhild Wiik. 
1 My claim is not that these are perfectly correlated, since a high income level can co-exist with large income inequalities including a low living 
standard for much or most of the population. However, as most high-income countries also have a high living standard, the link is sufficiently 
strong to assume a close relationship between the two. A broader indicator of welfare, the Human Development Index (HDI), is also correlated 
with higher levels of GDP, which is partly so because GDP is a part of the HDI; see for instance UNDP (2013). See Wolff et al. (2011) for a criticism 
of the HDI measure. 
2 Not all East and Southeast Asian economies have had high growth rates. For instance, North Korea has stagnated and remains a low income 
economy. For the sake of simplicity, I focus on the high-growth economies of East and Southeast Asia, which means China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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Table 2: GDP per capita relative to the US, 1960 and 2010 
 China Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore S. Korea Thailand 
1960 6 % 9 % 35 % 14 % 20 % 11 % 10 % 
2010 26 % 15 % 72 % 33 % 95 % 71 % 31 % 
2010 relative to 1960 4.5 1.7 2.0 2.5 4.7 6.6 3.2 
Source: Based of figures from Bolt and van Zanden (2013) 
 
To improve our understanding of the process of economic growth, this PhD thesis focuses on one of the main 
drivers of long-term economic growth, namely, technology.3 In its simplest definition, technology is the process 
through which labour, capital and raw materials produce output. Technological progress allows this process to 
be more efficient, thereby producing more or allowing new products to be produced. Without such progress, 
economic growth becomes unsustainable and will eventually stagnate. This PhD thesis has two interrelated 
research questions: 
 
1. What was the importance of state support in promoting technological progress and increased value-
added in individual sectors in selected East and Southeast Asian countries? 
 
2. How does technological progress affect economic growth in resource-abundant countries in East and 
Southeast Asia and beyond? 
 
To answer these two questions, I have divided the thesis into two subthemes. The first subtheme is industrial 
policy, which focuses on the promotion of technology and the increased value-added of the production structure. 
In particular, the thesis conducts a number of case studies of successful industrial policy. I use the term 
‘successful’ in the sense of managing to establish internationally competitive industries. I am aware of the 
selection bias, and I do not claim that industrial policies work under all circumstances. The aim is primarily to 
understand why industrial policy was successful in the cases analysed. Three essays (1, 2 and 3) consider how 
industrial policy has worked in various industries in East and Southeast Asia, while essay 4 focuses on an area 
where industrial policy could potentially be used, but is not explicitly discussed. 
The second subtheme is natural resources, and how natural resources can either hinder or bolster an 
economy’s technological progress. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are resource-rich and have 
achieved high economic growth rates. As the ‘resource curse’ literature highlights, being rich in natural resources 
does not always lead to an automatic improvement of economic conditions, whereas in these countries, it 
seemingly has. Increasing our understanding as to why this is the case yields potential lessons for other developing 
countries. Three essays (2, 3 and 4) focus on natural resources and their relationship to technological progress. 
This introductory chapter consists of five main parts. First, it elaborates on technological progress, and 
its relationship to economic growth. This part relates to economic growth in East and Southeast Asia over the 
past 50 years. Second, the relationship between industrial policy and technological progress is discussed. In the 
third part, the focus is on the relationship between natural resources and technological progress, with a specific 
focus on East and Southeast Asian resource-led growth. Fourth, the different methodologies of the various essays 
of this thesis are presented. Finally, I present a brief summary of the four essays of the PhD thesis. In the 
conclusion, a brief summary of the broader contributions of this PhD thesis is presented. 
 
                                            
3 Obviously, there are other determinants of economic growth, including institutions. This also needs to be considered when judging economic 
performance. In the PhD essays in which cross-country comparisons are made in essays 3 and 4, institutions are a part of the analysis. 
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1. Economic Growth, Technological Progress and Structural Change 
There is a near consensus among economists that long-term economic growth is determined by technological 
progress. The neoclassical growth model claims that long-term growth is determined by exogenous technological 
progress.4  New, or endogenous, growth theory instead focuses on how technological progress is determined and 
how this in turn affects economic growth. Some of the determinants of technological progress mentioned are (i) 
Externalities; (ii) Human Capital; and (iii) Research and Development (R&D). 5  Other theories, focusing on 
structural change as a cause of economic growth, emphasise how barriers to structural change must be overcome 
for economic growth to occur.6 
Despite the view that long-term economic growth is determined by technological progress, the nature 
of the growth process in East and Southeast Asia has been an issue of debate. There are two main views. The 
first view, often referred to the accumulation view, argues that economic growth in East and Southeast Asia has 
been driven primarily by increased factor accumulation; in effect, increased labour and capital. This means that 
the residual, called total factor productivity (TFP), is small. Mankiw et al. (1992), using an augmented Solow 
model, argue that nearly 80% of the variations in cross-country incomes can be explained by differences in 
physical and human capital.  
In the case of East and Southeast Asia, similar results were found by Young (1992; 1994; 1995), and 
Krugman (1994), who claimed that East and Southeast Asian economic growth could almost exclusively be 
explained by increases in investments and a decreasing population growth.7 In other words, no large improvement 
in productivity was observed—implying that from 1966 to 1990, technological progress was limited. Krugman 
(1994) argued that East Asian growth was primarily an input-driven process and that decreasing marginal returns 
would eventually set in. He even went as far as comparing the economic growth in East and Southeast Asia to 
the early stages of growth in the Soviet Union, which had more to do with increased investments than 
improvements in technology. 
However, the accumulation view is associated with a number of problems (Madsen and Islam, 2012). 
First, it assumes that technology is easily codified and can easily be adopted regardless of the existing level of 
technology. This assumption is most likely false, as the costs of adopting already existing technology are high. 
Second, technological progress can also be endogenous to the level of investment, which might lead to increasing 
returns, as highlighted in endogenous growth theory. If true, the assumption of decreasing marginal returns of 
capital would be false, which will have implications for how TFP is estimated. Finally, the empirical results are 
highly sensitive to a number of underlying assumptions regarding the capital stock and the factor income.8 Capital 
stock figures prior to 1960 are often non-existent, and estimates of the appropriate measures of the true capital 
stock, in general, yield large differences based on the assumptions underlying the estimations. Factor income is 
also highly uncertain at the level of the total economy, as the government is not included and markets are not 
free as assumed in the Solow model. Estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) are in turn highly sensitive to 
the factor shares used. Consequently, the claim that the productivity increase is small in East and Southeast Asia 
is problematic.  
                                            
4 The Solow-Swan model states that the long-term growth rate is determined by the exogenously generated technological progress. See Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956). Mankiw et al. (1992) expand the Solow-Swan model by including human capital. 
5 See for instance Romer (1986, 1990, 1993), Grossman (1993), Jones (1995, 1999), Aghion et al. (1998), Strulik (2005) and Acemoglu (2009). 
6 The link between economic growth, technological progress and structural change is one of the most established, and is in large part based on 
the seminal work of Schumpeter (1934). See Aghion and Howitt (1992) for a formal Schumpeterian model. 
7 The age dependency ratio is the share of people aged 0-14 and 65 and over relative to the people aged 15-64, which are most likely to be a 
part of the labour force. People aged 0-14 and over 65 do not contribute to the labour force, but still have basic needs, meaning that a high 
share of young or old people can be a fiscal burden. With a decreasing population growth, the share of people aged 15-64 increased relative to 
those ages 0-14, meaning that were more workers per young people, thereby decreasing the potential fiscal burden, and providing a demographic 
‘bonus’ (Crafts, 1998). 
8 The factor income is the share of the production attributed to capital and labour if one assumes perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale. 
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The second view is called the assimilation view, which claims that the assimilation of technology 
increased productivity and was, in turn, the primary cause of economic growth in East and Southeast Asia. A 
number of studies have emphasised that most of the economic growth within a country is caused by increases in 
TFP (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997, Prescott, 1998, Hall and Jones, 1999, Easterly and Levine, 2002, Caselli, 
2005). For instance, Madsen and Islam (2012) assume that capital is endogenous to the state of technology. 
Expected returns increase if the level of technology is higher, meaning that the incentives to invest are higher 
with improvements of technology. East and Southeast Asian economic growth was, according to them, driven 
primarily by increased technological progress. The main channel was through increased human capital and R&D, 
which caused increases in productivity. However, the assimilation view, similarly to the accumulation view, relies 
heavily on the assumptions of the researcher. 
The assimilation view, however, gives a more accurate picture of East and Southeast Asian economic 
growth. There have been huge improvements in various technology indicators, such as education, patents, and 
research and development, indicating an East Asian convergence, not only in income, but also in terms of 
technology. There is a common perception that when developing countries are far from the technological frontier, 
the primary driver behind technological progress is the adaptation of already existing technologies from advanced 
economies. When a country is close to—or even at—the technological frontier, new technologies have to be 
invented and applied, meaning that invention and innovation become the primary drivers of technological 
progress. If true, the degree of innovation should increase with the level of technology. 
As a measure of technology input, one can use research and development (R&D) expenditure as a share 
of GPD. R&D is both used to apply existing technology to domestic purposes (learning) and to develop new 
technologies (innovating). Figure 1 presents R&D (as a share of GDP) compared to the US level: 
 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑈𝑆(%) =
𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃)
𝑅&𝐷 𝑈𝑆𝐴 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃)
 (1) 
   
 
Figure 1: Percentage Share of R&D as a Share of GDP (US Share = 100) 
Source: Castellacci and Natera (2011) 
 
Figure 1 shows that Japan has had a higher expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP than the US since 1985. 
Singapore R&D expenditure has also been growing steadily over the period, while Chinese R&D is increasing at a 
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fast pace. However, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand invest a considerably smaller share of GDP in R&D than the 
US. 
To measure innovation, figure 2 shows the share of patents per capita compared to the US:9 
 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑈𝑆(%) =
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑈𝑆𝐴
 (2) 
 
Figure 2 shows that Japan lies well ahead of the other East and Southeast Asian economies. In 2008, Japan had 
more US patents per capita than the US itself. Singapore and South Korea also made huge advances, with 
especially the latter increasing the number of patents relative to the US. However, figure 2 also indicates a huge 
gap within East and Southeast Asia, with China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand lagging (the four are virtually 
overlapping in figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage Share of Patents per Capita 1980-2007 (US Share = 100) 
Source: Castellacci and Natera (2011) 
 
The evidence for the assimilation view is therefore quite strong. This thesis therefore assumes that the 
assimilation view holds. The analysis in the present thesis considers the relationship between technological 
progress and the upgrading of the production structure. One popular theory of East and Southeast Asian 
development has been the ‘flying geese formation’ of development originally developed by Akamatsu (1962).10 
The flying geese theory states that there is a lead goose, a technological leader, while the other countries follow 
the technological leader like a formation of flying geese. In the flying geese theory, late-comers successfully 
enter new sectors using technology imports from mature economies to upgrade their production structure. The 
industry typically has a declining advantage in the mature economy from which the technology is being imported 
(Rana, 1990, Geda and Meskel, 2008). There are two interrelated processes present. 
The first process is at the micro-level and involves an industry going through three phases; (i) Import, 
(ii) Production and (iii) Export (there might also be a potential fourth phase, Re-import). The second process is 
on the macro-level in which industries become increasingly more diversified, with an upgrade occurring over 
time from simple consumer goods, to capital goods and further, to more sophisticated goods. The flying-geese 
                                            
9 Patents are measured as US patents. 
10 For more recent contributions see for instance Kojima (2000), Ozawa (2002) and Cutler et al. (2003). 
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theory, with its dynamic comparative advantage, is different from the traditional static comparative advantage 
of the Heckscher–Ohlin model. The flying geese theory has more in common with the product cycle theory of 
Vernon (1966) and is compatible with the new trade theory of Krugman (1991).  
Empirically, there is strong evidence to suggest that the export structure of a country’s economy is 
important for its subsequent economic growth. Hausmann et al. (2006) found that a higher value-added content 
of exports was a clear predictor of subsequent economic growth. They also found that globalisation since 1990 
had increased specialisation into countries’ comparative advantage, as traditional trade theory suggests. This 
increasing specialisation might, however, have slowed economic growth in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The reason, suggested by Hausmann et al. (2006), was that Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa had a 
comparative advantage in agriculture, and an increased specialisation in agriculture led to an export structure 
consisting of lower value-added products leading to a decline in economic growth. Geda and Meskel (2008) argued 
that increased diversification of the export structure was important for East Asian economic growth. In particular, 
they concluded that vertical diversification was more important than horizontal diversification in explaining the 
differences between East Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries.11  
A country’s export structure can therefore be thought of as a function of the level of technology. If one 
assumes that the level of technology is given by the symbol A, one can schematically classify the East Asian 
economies as having gone through three different phases as illustrated in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Minimum Level of Technology for Different Types of Export 
 
Figure 3 shows that a country needs to reach certain thresholds of technology to be able to be competitive in 
the international market. To be able to compete in labour-intensive exports such as textiles, a country needs to 
reach a technology level of A1. As highlighted by Amsden (1989), to be able to compete in labour-intensive 
manufacturing exports, one does need a level of technology that is beyond the present reach of many developing 
countries. To be able to be competitive at capital-intensive and technology-intensive production, countries need 
even higher levels of technology, which few countries outside the Western economies have managed. In fact, 
apart from the Western economies, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are currently the only countries 
that truly have gone beyond the first stage.  
 
2. Industrial Policy 
The first major subtopic of this PhD thesis is industrial policy. As mentioned, technological progress occurs 
through industrial upgrading. It is important to understand whether this upgrading happens through a market-
                                            
11 Horizontal diversification broadens the number of products which have a similar value-added, while vertical diversification broadens the 
products with different degrees of value-added. 
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driven process, or if such upgrading requires government assistance in the form of industrial policy. One key 
feature in most East and Southeast Asian countries has been the use of industrial policy to a varying degree. 
It is important to understand the meaning of industrial policy. No universally accepted definition of 
industrial policy exists. One common view is to use ‘industrial policy’ to describe the government intervention 
to promote certain manufacturing sectors with the explicit aim of increasing the value-added activities of 
production to defy an economy’s comparative advantage (Amsden, 1989, Chang, 2002, Lin and Chang, 2009). 
Others attempt to differentiate so-called ‘selective’ industrial policy from ‘functional’ industrial policy (Lall, 
2004, Naudé, 2010). Selective policies promote certain industries, while functional policies might increase the 
entire supply side of the economy.12 A third view is that industrial policy is a ‘dialogue’ between the private 
sector and the state in how to overcome barriers to economic growth (Rodrik, 2008). The definition employed in 
this context is that employed by Pack and Saggi (2006, pp.1-2): ‘any type of selective government intervention 
or policy that attempts to alter the structure of production in favour of sectors that are expected to offer better 
prospects for economic growth that would not occur in the absence of such intervention.’ In table 4, I provide a 
summary of the main focus of industrial policy loosely based on Naudé (2010). 
 
Table 4: Industrial Policy 
Focus Purpose Examples of instruments 
Technology 1. Promoting science and innovation 
2. Increase learning and technological capabilities 
3. Improve productivity 
- Funding of research activities 
- R&D subsidies 
- Education and training policies 
- Incentives for foreign direct investments 
- Upgrading of economic infrastructure 
- Creation of venture capital funds 
Market 1. Economic signals and incentives 
2. Selective industrial policy 
3. Selection mechanisms 
- Price regulations 
- Intellectual property rights 
- Imposition of import tariffs 
- Providing export subsidies 
- Entry and exit regulations 
- Preferential access to finance 
Communication Distribution of information - Marketing of export industries 
- Encouraging firm cooperation 
- Dissemination of successful experiences 
Source: Partly based on Naudé (2010) 
 
Industrial policies caused a large debate in the 1980s and 1990s, and whether East and Southeast Asian countries 
grew because of or in spite of their industrial policies. The general view today is that industrial policy probably 
did help to promote economic growth in East Asia. However, critics have pointed out that industrial policies 
might not be an adequate solution for other developing countries, as industrial policies in Latin American and 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s to 1970s have failed. The reason for this, as claimed by those in favour of 
industrial policies, is that the types of industrial policies conducted were inadequate for these economies. 
The critics of industrial policy have been more subdued in recent years. One reason is the failed attempts 
at market liberalisation in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Another reason is the increased realisation that 
developed countries themselves engage in industrial policies, both in the past and presently (Chang, 2002). Great 
Britain used industrial policies during the industrial revolution to promote its industries. Likewise, starting in the 
1850s, Germany and the US used industrial policies to catch up with Great Britain. 
Even today, advanced economies continue to use industrial policies. The US is among those that 
frequently use industrial policies. This involves both so-called ‘disguised’ industrial policies, such as the 
promotion of industries through government contracting, and the more direct industrial policies, for instance, 
                                            
12 In practice, differentiating between functional and selective industrial policy is problematic. If the government attempts to construct a 
functional industrial policy, for instance, by promoting tertiary education, the main beneficiaries will be industries that are human capital 
intensive at the expense of industries that employ mainly workers with lower levels of education. In practice, most functional industrial policy 
will benefit certain industries better than others (Lin and Chang, 2009).  
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government support to Boeing (Chang, 2009). The evolution of the debate regarding industrial policy is crudely 
summarized in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the Evolution of Theory and Practice of Industrial Policy 
Phase Industrial Policy and Technology Representative contributors 
1940s to 1960s - Industrialization is necessary for development 
- Industrial policy needed, particularly infant industry protection, state-ownership and coordination 
- Imitation of advanced countries will increase the level of technology 
- Economies-of-scale important  
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) 
Myrdal (1957) 
Hirschman (1958) 
Prebisch (1959) 
1970s to 1990s - Practical obstacles to industrial policies are considered significant 
- Trade liberalisation necessary for increased technological progress 
- Free market the optimal solution for increasing efficiency and thereby long-term economic growth 
Baldwin (1969) 
Krueger (1971; 1990)  
Pack (1993; 2000) 
2000s to present - Market and government failures are both present 
- Institutional setting matters but design difficult: Need to understand political context 
- Flexibility in the practice of industrial policy is important 
- Differences exist with respect to the extent to which comparative advantage needs to be defied 
- Innovation and technological upgrading should be a central objective of industrial policy 
Amsden (1989) 
Nelson (1993) 
Chang (2002; 2003; 2009) 
Lall (2004) 
Rodrik (2008) 
Cimoli et al. (2009) 
Lin and Chang (2009) 
Robinson (2009) 
Source: Partly based on Naudé (2010) 
 
If one takes a crude view of the level of technology, similarly to that of figure 4, a developing country’s level of 
technology might be below the sufficient level to be able to compete in manufacturing products. If a country 
should start to export labour-intensive exports, it must reach the level A1; industrial policies can be used as 
illustrated in figure 4. South Korea began exporting labour-intensive manufacturing exports such as textiles in 
the 1960s. According to Amsden (1989), South Korean exporters did not have a sufficient level of technology to 
be competitive in the international market. Instead, the government pursued an active industrial policy through 
subsidies, trade barriers and export targets to increase South Korean exports. The foreign currency earned was 
used to purchase capital goods that increased the level of technology of South Korean producers. 
 
 
Figure 4: Increase in Technology to Reach Minimum Levels for Various Exports 
 
The present thesis analyses various instances of such upgrading to better understand how industrial policy has 
worked. Essay 1 focuses on the industrial policy during the establishment of the shipbuilding sector in South 
Korea, 1970-1990. The literature contribution of the essay lies in its focus on the interplay between domestic 
and international factors. Essay 2 focuses more specifically on the industrial policy in the Malaysian palm oil 
sector, and the period 1970-1990 in which the higher value-added segments of the palm oil sector were 
established. Essay 3 highlights how differences in industrial policies in similar resource-based manufacturing 
sectors can lead to different outcomes. It adds to the literature by analysing whether industrial policies in 
resource-based sectors have comparable effects for Indonesia and Malaysia 1960-2010, as it did for Finland and 
Sweden 1860-1910. 
 
3. Natural Resources 
The second major subtopic is natural resources and its relationship with technology. A key difference between 
the Northeast Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and the Southeast Asian economies of 
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Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand is that the former are resource-poor while the latter are resource-rich. 
Economic growth, technological progress and industrial upgrading have been faster in Northeast Asia than in 
Southeast Asia. 
The question is to what extent this difference can be attributed to natural resources. If South Korea had 
Malaysia’s natural resources, would South Korea have had a growth rate similar to Malaysia? The answer is most 
likely ‘no’. Institutions, the colonial heritage, the cold war support, the ethnic composition and their 
geographical location all differ, and all of these factors are mentioned in the literature as having aided South 
Korea’s economic growth. To ask whether Malaysia could have been a new South Korea is therefore fruitless, 
since such questions are impossible to answer. It is more fruitful to analyse whether natural resources have 
contributed to economic growth in Malaysia. 
Much research has focused on the link between economic growth and natural resources, with a new 
wave of interest following Sachs and Warner (1995) who indicated that resource-abundant countries might have 
achieved lower economic growth. Still, there is considerable debate about whether natural resources affect 
economic growth positively or negatively.  The evidence depends on: (i) how natural resources are measured; (ii) 
the time period for analysis; and (iii) the econometric specification, in particular, whether cross-section or panel 
data is used. 
Equally debated are the potential economic mechanisms associated with natural resources. One of the 
most popular early explanations was the long-term decline in terms of trade of primary goods exporters. Other 
much-researched effects were the so-called Dutch disease effects. Natural resources lead to higher wages, an 
appreciation of the exchange rate and in some models, a decline in productivity.  The literature has greatly 
increased since the 1990s, with more mechanisms coming into consideration. In order to illustrate these different 
mechanisms, I present some of those proposed in the resource literature in table 6. 
Technology is an important part of a number of these mechanisms. Some advanced countries had a large 
degree of natural resources and managed to generate high economic growth in the late 19th century. The US is 
the most studied example, and economic historians emphasise that the emergence of the US as the world’s 
leading manufacturing producer is a result of its abundance of natural resources (Wright, 1990 and David and 
Wright, 1997). These studies claim that successful resource-led growth came through an upgrading of the level 
of technology. Furthermore, Wright and Czelusta (2006) claimed that the mechanisms that drove resource-led 
growth in the 19th century are still present today, and that the failure of some resource-abundant countries to 
achieve economic growth lay not in the natural resources themselves, but in the failure to upgrade the level of 
technology. 
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Table 6: Some Economic Mechanisms Proposed in the Resource Curse Literature 
Key Mechanism Focus 
Dutch disease Van Wijnbergen (1984): The presence of a natural resource sector increases the demand for labour and increases wage rates and the 
increased natural resource exports make the exchange rates appreciate. The increasing wage rates and exchange rate leads to fewer 
exports in the ‘traditional’ export sector. 
 
Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason (2001): Natural resource sectors have lower productivity growth and less 
technological learning than the manufacturing sector and the labour and capital diverted to the natural resource sectors lowers the 
overall productivity of the economy and reduces economic growth in the long-term. 
 
Economic policy Sachs and Warner (1995): Natural resources lead to more protectionist policies and increased protectionism impedes economic growth. 
 
Manzano and Rigobon (2006): Government debt increases in times of commodity price booms, as the government treats an upward 
shift in prices as permanent and increases their debt by borrowing abroad. Once the commodity prices decline, the government cannot 
repay the debt leading to a macroeconomic crisis. 
 
Auty (2001) and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003): Those that control the natural resources promote anti-developmental policies by 
protecting their own interests. 
 
Exploitation 
pattern 
Auty (1997): Type of land hold system (plantation or small-holder) crucial for how resources affect the political system. 
 
Ross (1999): Government ownership over resources could have adverse effects on economic growth. 
 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), Isham et al. (2005) and Stijns (2006): Agriculture/Mineral and Point/Diffuse resources with different effects 
on economic growth. 
 
Export 
diversification 
Hausmann et al. (2006) and Lederman and Maloney (2006): The real problem is not natural resources per se, but the lack of export 
diversification that results from natural resource exports which leaves natural resource exporting countries more sensitive to demand 
and price conditions in world commodity markets. 
 
Institutions Leite and Weidmann (2002): Rent-seeking institutions could cause a resource curse as revenues are not re-invested in the economy but 
consumed by those in control of the institutions. 
 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Bulte et al. (2005), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Norman (2009): ‘Bad’ institutions defined and 
measured in various ways, causing revenues to be poorly utilised. 
 
Human capital Gylfason (2001): More natural resources lead to less investment in education because the natural resource sectors are less knowledge-
intensive than manufacturing. 
 
Stijns (2006): More natural resources lead to increased government spending on education. 
 
Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006): Large stocks of human capital could offset the negative effects of the resource curse. 
 
Linkages Hirschman (1958), Seers (1964) and Baldwin (1966): If the natural resource sectors expanded, it would have less of an impact on the 
economy because of their enclave structure, thereby an economy would experience a lower growth rate compared to a situation with a 
similar expansion in manufacturing. 
 
Roemer (1970), Lewis Jr (1989) and Cramer (1999): Processing of natural resources is a feasible and desired way forward for many 
developing countries. 
 
Political stability Baland and Francois (2000); Le Billon (2001); and Collier (2005): Increased presence of natural resources might cause more political 
instability, which hampers economic growth. 
 
Prices Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950): Long-term price decline of primary goods relative to manufacturing leads to decreasing terms-of-
trade for primary goods exporters.  
 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), Bleaney and Halland (2009) and van der Ploeg (2011): High volatility of primary good prices leads to 
unstable income, which might lead to unpredictability of long-term fiscal policy. 
 
 
The industrial policy literature rarely explicitly includes natural resources, and natural resources do not feature 
in the flying geese theory of structural change. However, it is easy to extend the flying-geese argument to 
Malaysia, for instance, which hopes to industrialise in the phases illustrated in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Resource-Intensive Exports as a Preliminary Stage 
 
Prior to 1985, much of the economic growth in Malaysia was resource-led, with industrial policy promoting 
increased processing in a number of resource-based industries such as forestry, palm oil and rubber, which could 
be a part of the preliminary stage in figure 5. From 1985 and onwards, Malaysia increasingly started to export 
labour-intensive exports such as textiles, as is indicated in ‘stage 1’ in this diagram. Rather than a ‘big push’ 
from A0 to A1, a country might have two ‘smaller pushes’, from A0 to AR and from AR to A1 as indicated in figure 
6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Increase in Technology to Reach Minimum Levels for Various Exports 
 
The increased income from resource-intensive exports could provide increased foreign currency, which can be 
used to import more advanced technology though licences and machines, which in turn would increase the level 
of technology. Therefore, resource-based industrialisation could potentially be the first stage of a country’s 
industrialisation path. However, resource-based industrialisation need not be seen as an earlier stage, but rather, 
an alternative or a complementary path to industrialisation, as indicated in figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: Two alternative ‘routes’ to higher value-added production 
 
Page | 12  
 
 
It is not clear whether the level of technology needed to process natural resources into resource-based 
manufacturing products is lower or higher than the technology level needed for labour-intensive manufacturing 
products. As figure 7 indicates, a resource-abundant country might skip the stage of labour-intensive exports and 
move directly to stage 2. The increased presence of China in international markets for labour-intensive goods 
such as textiles means that other possibilities for increased technological upgrading might, in fact, be welcome. 
Natural resources can, according to this model/scheme, potentially provide the basis for 
industrialisation. Essay 2 takes a micro-perspective and analyses how the Malaysian palm oil sector became a 
good example of successful South-South trade. This essay attempts to add to the literature by analysing the link 
between the productivity of the natural resource sectors and the higher levels of processing explicitly, which has 
not been done previously in the literature. Essay 3 explores this further by analysing how natural resources aided 
structural change and increased value-added activities in Finland and Sweden in the period of 1870-1910, 
explicitly comparing these processes with Indonesia and Malaysia 1970-2010. No study, to my knowledge, has 
conducted a similar analysis across periods. Essay 4 explores the contribution of natural resources and technology 
to economic growth. This essay contributes to the literature by analysing how the effect of natural resource can 
vary based on the level of technology and vice versa.  
 
4. Methodology 
The thesis uses different methodologies for the various essays. Essay 1, co-authored with Stig Tenold, analyses 
the shipbuilding industry in South Korea. The analysis is divided into three main parts. In the first part, the 
international market conditions are analysed, and are compared to the period when other leading countries 
established their shipbuilding industries. In the second part, the approach to upgrading is studied in detail, in 
particular, the sources of the technology acquired. Finally, these two parts are put together to examine how the 
combination of international market conditions and the technological upgrading worked together. 
Essay 2 is a case study in which the palm oil sector in Malaysia is analysed. The essay examines the 
development of productivity over time for palm oil plantations. The standard method for a sector productivity 
analysis is to employ a total factor productivity analysis, but data quality limitations did not allow such an 
approach. The methodology in this essay is a partial productivity analysis using (i) Land; (ii) Labour; and (iii) Unit 
costs. The official productivity measure, the oil yield, was found to have a number of inconsistencies, and was 
subsequently re-estimated. 
In essay 3, where two sets of countries in different periods are analysed through a simple time-series 
approach and a cross-country comparison of different cases of resource-led growth. The two methods are 
intended to complement each other. 
Essay 4 applies econometrics, employing both a cross-sectional and a panel data approach. The objective 
is to make the analysis more robust by using different estimation techniques. The essay employs both a pooled 
OLS and a fixed-effects approach in the panel data analysis, the latter to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
5. Thesis Essays 
Essay 1: Shipbuilding South Korea13 
The South Korean shipbuilding sector is the largest in the world, and can be seen as a symbol of the rising 
economic presence of East Asia in the world economy. However, its establishment was, and to some extent still 
is, controversial because South Korea did not have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive exports, but 
decided to promote shipbuilding nevertheless. In hindsight, the industrial policy was successful but remains 
                                            
13 This essay is already published, see Bruno and Tenold (2011). 
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controversial mainly because it defied the market signals. The promotion of the shipbuilding sector was part of 
the Heavy and Chemical Industries’ (HCI) drive to increase the value-added activities of the South Korean 
production structure by targeting six industries. 
The timing of the promotion of the shipbuilding industry in the 1970s coincided with a global shipping 
crisis with falling demand for ships worldwide. Intuitively, such a crisis should make establishment more difficult. 
Essay 1, however, asks the question whether South Korea actually benefitted from establishing themselves in a 
declining market. 
Emphasis will be on the industrial policy part of the PhD thesis. In particular, the focus is on why the 
industrial policy was successful, and whether the international market conditions helped rather than hindered 
establishment. The essay also highlights the role of industrial policy in the establishment of the South Korean 
shipbuilding sector and discusses whether it is feasible for a shipbuilding sector to be established without 
industrial policy, especially as shipbuilding receives much state support in Japan and in a number of European 
countries. In addition, the technological learning and the importance of catching up with the industry’s 
technological standards are emphasised. 
This essay adds to the literature in at least two ways. First, it explicitly considers how international 
demand conditions may be important for the establishment of sectors with higher value-added production. 
Second, it looks at the combination of international market conditions and industrial policy. 
 
Essay 2: Productivity growth in the Malaysian palm oil sector 
The Malaysian palm oil sector has been a massive success story in terms of a developing country managing to 
establish not only a world leading agricultural product, but also a world leading food-processing industry. The 
strong industrial policy is most likely a reason for the success of the palm oil sector. These policies included tax 
incentives, an export tax on crude palm oil and a focus on technological upgrading that led to the establishment 
of a large refinery sector, which produced the higher value-added processed palm oil. 
However, the productivity growth at the plantation level, the first stage of production, has been 
stagnant since the 1970s, according to official figures. This is puzzling, as an increase in value-added activity 
intuitively should have been preceded by an increase in productivity at the lower stages of production. This essay 
discusses how productivity at the plantation level affected the growth of the higher-valued added production in 
the Malaysian palm oil sector. 
Within the framework of the PhD thesis, this essay looks explicitly at the link between productivity 
growth and increased value-added activity. The focus is mainly to obtain a clearer picture of how productivity 
evolved in the 1970-1990 period, and how this development affected the establishment of higher value-added 
production. The essay also looks at the industrial policy used in the Malaysian palm oil sector, and the importance 
of this policy in the establishment of the higher value-added segment. In addition, the essay highlights how an 
agricultural product can be used as a part of a resource-based industrialisation. 
The essay adds to the literature in five ways. First, it re-estimates the official productivity figures, 
which are inconsistent or implausible when compared with other official data.  Second, to my knowledge, no 
study on the Malaysian palm oil sector has analysed the labour and cost productivity in this period explicitly. 
Third, no study has studied the link between plantation productivity and the establishment of the Malaysian palm 
oil sector explicitly. Fourth, it adds to the resource curse literature as an example of how a plantation crop can 
contribute to economic growth. Finally, it adds to the resource-based industrialisation literature by analysing 
the determinants of increased domestic processing of agricultural goods in the Malaysian case. 
 
  
Page | 14  
 
 
Essay 3: Resource-Led Growth Past and Present 
This essay asks the question whether natural resources have the same effect on economies today as they did in 
the late 19th century when the present-day advanced countries were industrialising. This essay elaborates on the 
different links between natural resources and economic growth and compares these with four different resource-
abundant countries. Finland and Sweden (1860-1910) are compared to Indonesia and Malaysia (1960-2010). 
This essay fits the overall framework of the PhD thesis by looking at the process of resource-based 
industrialisation in two different periods. Resource-based industrialisation increased the value-added of the 
production and export structure, and thereby contributed to technological progress in Finland and in Sweden. 
Regressions also indicate that the main natural resource sectors contributed positively and that the resource 
share in GDP was important for economic growth. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, natural resources had positive impact on the economy. However, the share 
of the natural resource sector in GDP was not correlated with increased economic growth, indicating that natural 
resources were less important than for Finland and Sweden. In addition, the international market in the two 
periods differed, which probably affected the countries in question. 
This study adds to the literature in at least three ways. First, it adds to the industrial policy literature 
as no study, to my knowledge, explicitly explores difference in industrial policy in resource-based sectors across 
time periods. Second, it adds to the economic history literature by showing which processes are similar and 
dissimilar in the two periods. Finally, it adds to the resource curse literature by showing that factors at the 
micro-level might help explain to what extent countries manage to exploit their natural resources. 
 
Essay 4: Natural Resources, Technology and Production 
Essay 4 asks the question whether technology affects production in a resource-abundant country. This link is 
analysed by adopting an econometric approach, using both cross sectional and panel data. To limit the scope of 
the study, only fuels and minerals were considered, since these resources are the ones most associated with the 
so-called resource curse. 
The findings indicate that resource abundance is positively correlated with GDP per capita in some 
specifications, while natural resources lower the effect of technology on GDP. No such links were found for 
resource dependence, which was not statistically significant. 
Within the PhD thesis framework, this essay explores the link effect of natural resources and technology 
on GDP per capita. There are few stylized facts in the literature on this link, and the results of this essay indicate 
that in resource-abundant countries, technology contributes less to GDP per capita than in resource-poor 
countries. Given the positive contribution of natural resources to GDP per capita and the findings in essay 3, it 
is likely that these results are caused by the decreasing relative contribution of natural resources (or technology) 
when the other increases. This means that natural resources becomes less important for GDP per capita when 
the level of technology is high and vice versa.  
Industrial policy is not explicitly explored in this essay, but can easily be drawn into the discussion as 
the findings support the idea that a higher level of technology both increases GDP per capita and lowers the 
effect of natural resources on the economy. This gives support to the general claim that the government should 
improve the level of technology in the economy. 
The study adds to the literature in at least three ways. First, it adds by conducting an explorative study 
of the relationship between natural resources and technology. No previous study has used several indicators of 
the level of technology when measuring the effect of resource abundance. Second, differences between the 
effect of technology on resource abundance and on resource dependence is explored, which no study as I am 
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aware of has done. Finally, the essay adds to the literature on resource-based industrialisation, as it highlights 
the fact that the contribution of natural resources and technology might be interdependent. 
 
Conclusion 
This PhD thesis studied two interrelated questions: (i) What was the importance of state support in promoting 
technological progress and increased value-added in individual sectors in selected East and Southeast Asian 
countries?; and (ii) How does technological progress affect economic growth in resource-abundant countries in 
East and Southeast Asia and beyond? 
It is obvious that both questions are too large to tackle in one PhD thesis, and my aim is merely to 
contribute to answering them, rather than providing the definitive solution. 
Regarding the first question, state support was vital for technological progress and industrial upgrading. 
For the natural resource sectors in Indonesia and Malaysia, the increase in productivity and linkages is a vital 
component of successful resource-led growth. The state played a vital role in providing the institutional 
framework and conducting an industrial policy with the explicit aim to contribute to the establishment of 
resource-processing manufacturing sectors. 
This goes especially for the Malaysian palm oil sector, in which both the increased productivity at the 
plantation level and the industrial policy conducted were crucial for the establishment of the food-processing 
industries. In addition, the South Korean shipbuilding sector was crucially dependent on state support, and it is 
unlikely to have been established without this support. 
The contribution of this thesis in relation to the first question is that state support is a vital component 
for our understanding of how East and Southeast Asia improved its level of technology and thereby had such high 
economic growth rates. In addition, it is found that industrial policy was as vital in the resource-based 
manufacturing sectors studies as other manufacturing sectors. 
Regarding the second question, the thesis attempts to identify key determinants of successful resource-
led growth, and focused explicitly on technology as a key potential component. The presence of natural resources 
is found to be positively correlated with GDP per capita, and so is technology. The contribution of natural 
resources was also lowered with a higher level of technology. This finding suggests that improving the level of 
technology is a potential way to reduce the importance of natural resources in the economy. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, this pattern is also present as natural resources were found to be relatively 
less important than for Finland and Sweden a century ago. As technological upgrading is faster, because of a 
larger potential catch-up effect to the US, for instance, natural resources would therefore play a lesser role. 
However, natural resources were still found to be important in absolute terms, meaning that the promotion of 
resource-based industries such as the Malaysian palm oil sector can still be important for present-day resource-
abundant countries. 
The literature contribution of this PhD thesis with regard to the second question is achieved by an 
examination of the interplay between natural resources and technology more closely than previous studies. Most 
likely, there is a connection between the two and this interrelationship warrants more study. 
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Essay 1: The Basis for South Korea’s Ascent in the Shipbuilding Industry, 1970–1990 
 
Lars Bruno and Stig Tenold 
 
Abstract 
The last 50 years have seen a dramatic shift in the hegemony of the shipbuilding industry. 
Today more than 90 per cent of the world’s new building orders have been placed at yards 
in South Korea, China and Japan. South Korea emerged as a major shipbuilding nation in the 
period from 1970 to the late 1980s, when world shipping was in crisis. The aim of this paper 
is to explain how the country managed to gain this position. 
After a presentation of world shipbuilding in general, and South Korean shipbuilding 
in particular, the paper analyses domestic and international factors that can explain South 
Korea’s growing market share. At the domestic level, we consider the interplay between 
the country’s comparative advantages, technological learning and a conscious industrial 
policy aimed at escalating shipbuilding capacity. At the international level, we suggest that 
the severe crisis in shipping and shipbuilding might in fact have been beneficial for South 
Korea’s ability to grab market shares. 
 
Introduction 
One of the most striking features of Asia’s increasingly important position in the global economy is the region’s 
crucial role in the shipbuilding market. Today, more than 90 per cent of the world’s orders for new ships have 
been placed with Asian yards, more specifically with shipbuilders in China, Japan and South Korea. When Japan 
became the world’s leading shipbuilding nation in 1956, European yards still held a market share of around 75 
per cent. Subsequently competition from Japan, then South Korea and latterly China seriously eroded and then 
ended Europe’s once leading position. Whereas the declining fortunes of the European shipbuilding industry – 
and to some extent the rise of Japan – are well-covered in the literature, the rise of South Korea has received 
little attention.14 
This article looks at the formative period of South Korean shipbuilding, the period from 1970 to 1990, 
which appears to be an unlikely time for the escalation of shipbuilding activities. The period was initially 
dominated by a major crisis in world shipping and shipbuilding consequent upon first, the tripling, and then 
quadrupling, of oil prices by OPEC in 1973/4 and the consequent slump in demand, and in its later stages resulted 
in massive yard closures in Europe. Our main question is how South Korean yards managed to build up a substantial 
market share in a period where the shipbuilding industry was in distress. Our explanations are based on both 
international and domestic factors, with specific emphasis on the role of state policy and technological learning. 
There is a substantial body of literature looking at the promotion of the heavy and chemical industries 
(HCIs) in South Korea, but few studies have focused solely on shipbuilding. Cho and Porter looked at the entrance 
                                            
 We thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
14 The overall shift in shipbuilding market shares is eminently discussed in D. Todd, Industrial Dislocation: The case of global shipbuilding (London, 
1991) and, with a specific focus on the shift to Asia, D. Todd,‘Going East: Was the shift in volume shipbuilding capacity from Britain and 
continental Europe to the Far East and elsewhere during the latter half of the twentieth-century inevitable?’ Mariner’s Mirror 97:1 (2011), 259–
61. For a concise analysis, see D. S. Cho and M. E. Porter, ‘Changing Global Industry Leadership: The Case of Shipbuilding’, in M. Porter, 
Competition in Global Industries (Boston, 1986). More comprehensive presentations of the decline of European shipbuilding can be found in B. 
Stråth The Politics of De-Industrialisation: The Contraction of the West-European Shipbuilding Industry (Beckenham,  1987) and, on Britain, L. 
Johnman and H. Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918: A political economy of decline (Exeter, 2002). The rise of Japan is covered 
by T. Chida and P.N. Davies, The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries: A History of Their Modern Growth (London, 1990). With regard 
to the growth of the South Korean shipbuilding industry, two works stand out: A. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization 
(New York, 1989) and G. Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea: A Comparative Study (Stockholm, 1995). 
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of South Korea in the world shipbuilding market. Amsden used Hyundai Heavy Industry (HHI), the main South 
Korean company exporting ships during the 1970s, to analyse the breakthrough of the country’s shipbuilding in 
the international market. However, the most comprehensive analysis is the study by Jonsson, where South 
Korea’s experience is compared with developments in Japan, the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
The three studies above emphasize four factors that enabled South Korea to become an important 
producer of ships: government support, low labour costs and the repression of labour, favourable access to 
international and domestic funds, and assistance in technology transfer. This paper adds to the literature by 
introducing two new dimensions. First, we put the development of South Korean shipbuilding into a wider 
international context. Second, we address the question whether the difficult conditions in the markets for ships 
and shipbuilding may in fact have been an advantage for the ascendancy of South Korean shipyards. 
 
1. South Korean and world shipbuilding, 1970–90 
South   Korea’s advance within shipbuilding in the period 1970 to 1990 was spectacular. The period was turbulent, 
as the shipping crisis led to a dramatic decline in demand for new tonnage from the middle of the 1970s onwards, 
sparking a global shipbuilding slump. The response in Western Europe was based on a number of ingredients; 
nationalization, rationalization, subsidization, specialization and, ultimately, massive disinvestment and 
downscaling. By 1990 the Western European merchant ship completions had been reduced by around 75 per cent 
relative to the peak of the mid-1970s – from more than 12 million gross register tons (grt) in 1975 to less than 3 
million grt in 1990. The South Korean completions on the other hand multiplied by a factor of more than eight 
over the same period.15 Indeed, while South Korea’s production in 1975 was less than a sixth of West Germany’s, 
by 1990 its output was larger than that of all European yards put together. 
The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s was a watershed in the post-war shipping market. Following the OPEC 
oil price increases, the rapid growth of tanker demand was replaced by stagnation and then absolute reduction. 
When the market collapsed, there was a substantial overhang of ordered, non-delivered vessels, and the second 
half of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s were characterized by overcapacity,  substantial lay-ups and a 
massive reduction in the amount of new tonnage launched.16 As a result of huge demand for tonnage and long 
order books, the production capacity of the world’s shipyards had increased tremendously in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Ironically, when the production capacity reached a historically high volume, the market collapsed. 
Historically problems in the shipping industry have rapidly spilled over into the shipbuilding sector. 
Owing to the strong growth of the fleet before the freight market breakdown, from 1974 onwards, new orders 
were virtually absent and large amounts of tonnage were cancelled. Figure 1 shows the fluctuations in tonnage 
completed, as well as South Korea’s increasing market share. The more than ten-year glut and the massive South 
Korean expansion are evident from the data. 
                                            
15 Unless otherwise stated, data on shipbuilding are taken from Lloyd’s Statistical Tables, various years, and refer to vessels completed, measured 
in gross register tons. 
16 See S. Tenold, Tankers in Trouble – Norwegian shipping and the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s (St Johns, NL, 2006) for an overview of the 
problematic period 1973–87. 
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Figure 1 Tonnage completed (million grt) and South Korea’s share (per cent), 1969-89 
Source: Lloyd’s Statistical Tables, various years 
 
The basis for South Korea’s growth in the shipbuilding market should be sought in a combination of international 
and domestic elements. Although these are closely intertwined, this article looks at the two factors separately. 
However, we initially indicate why it is necessary to take both aspects into account, and why we have taken a 
‘two-stage’ approach in our analysis. 
Few sectors are as ‘international’ in their character as the shipping industry. The majority of shipowners 
sell their services in a global market, where the nationality of the service provider for all practical purposes is 
irrelevant, and purchase their ships in an international market as well, either second-hand or as new buildings. 
While there are some links between shipping and shipbuilding at the national level, this is far more important 
with regard to, for instance, warship building, than with regard to merchant shipping. 
The fact that the shipyards’ customer base is international does not imply that the influence of national 
governments is unimportant. On the contrary, governments in all major shipbuilding nations have interfered with 
the market mechanism, providing direct subsidies, easy financing, preferential orders, etc.17 Thus, while the 
state of the international market is undoubtedly important, the domestic dimension has to be considered in order 
to understand fully the rise and fall of shipbuilding nations.  Conditions in the international market determine 
the room to manoeuvre, but domestic policies and possibilities determine the actual movement. 
Table 1 is a schematic presentation of the factors underlying the ascendancy of the three nations that 
have been leaders within world shipbuilding. This table is testament to the relative strength of the dominant 
shipbuilding nations across time. Since the second half of the nineteenth century there have only been three 
market leaders in peace-time: Great Britain, Japan and South Korea.18 However, the factors on which their 
positions were based varied along several dimensions. The table presents elements that were particularly 
important when the countries gained large market shares. As the countries’ shipbuilding industries matured, 
other factors gained prominence. 
  
                                            
17 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 14 refers to government efforts to secure ship-building activity as ‘the “obscure jungle” of subsidies’. 
18 The role of US shipbuilding during periods of war, and their immediate aftermath, should of course be mentioned. However, during periods of 
uninterrupted market conditions, the triumvirate above have an impressive pedigree. Britain was the world’s main shipbuilder from the mid 
nineteenth century until the late 1950s, before Japan established the dominant position it held until eclipsed by South Korea around the turn of 
the millennium. Exactly when South Korea overtook Japan, depends on the measure; gross tonnage, compensated gross tonnage, tonnage 
launched, tonnage completed or the size of the order book. For the rise of Asian shipbuilding, see Todd, ‘Going East’. 
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Table 1: Advantages of leading shipbuilders during their initial period of growth 
 Great Britain Japan South Korea 
 1850s-1880s 1950s-1970s 1970s onwards 
Demand factors    
Shipping market Booming Booming Volatile 
Shipbuilding market Increasing Increasing Declining (temporarily) 
Market focus Domestic Initially domestic Export market 
Supply factors    
Relative labour costs High Low Low 
Unionization Limited Repressed Repressed 
Technology Domestic Foreign Foreign 
Resources Iron & coal Steel Steel 
State support Limited (indirect) Yes Yes 
 
Both Great Britain and Japan established their positions in periods where demand for transport and ships was 
growing rapidly, while South Korea progressed under more difficult demand conditions. Moreover, while British 
yards had the advantage of a large home market and Japan used domestic owners as a base for subsequent export 
orders, the South Koreans relied on foreign demand. 
The differences are evident when we look at the supply factors as well, although here the two Asian 
nations share the same properties, with different timing. Great Britain’s supremacy was built on bespoke 
production, entailing relatively high labour costs, but initially occurred in a period where labour unionism was 
limited. The dominance within shipbuilding technology and marine engineering gave an advantage that was 
enhanced by abundant supply of iron and coal. Direct state support was very limited, compared with the post-
war period, but the role of the Empire, and the country’s position in international trade had important indirect 
effects. Moreover, postal subventions to liner shipping companies and Admiralty support also helped British 
shipbuilding.19 
The initial phases of Japanese and South Korean shipbuilding growth were characterized by relatively 
low wages and repressed unions. Moreover, production technology was ‘imported’ – and only subsequently refined 
– while the role of the state was substantial. The authorities had detailed plans for the expansion of the industry, 
working closely with major business interests to ensure that the goals were met. 
 
2. The international development 
The world shipbuilding glut weighed down the industry, affecting all major shipbuilding nations adversely. Some 
countries – France, Norway, Sweden and the UK – reached a peak in the mid 1970s, after which shipbuilding fell 
by 90 per cent or more. The Netherlands and Spain experienced lower, but still substantial, decline. Only 
Denmark, Germany and Japan saw acceptable production figures, at least in relative terms, though even here 
output in 1990 amounted to as little as 35 to 40 per cent of the peak production. 
The massive decline happened despite substantial efforts at maintaining activity. A huge arsenal of 
support was employed; financial credits and direct transfers to yards and shipowners, tax concessions, equity 
from state funds, naval and other public orders, etc. Nevertheless, the forces of the market were so strong, and 
the overcapacity so large, that a downscaling was inevitable. Intuitively, this makes South Korea’s performance 
even more remarkable. However, as we will argue later, South Korea might have had some benefits from entering 
a sector in which the market mechanism was strangled and a return to ‘normalcy’ appeared impossible. 
Table 2 shows some support measures20 put in place to secure employment at the yards in the major 
shipbuilding countries. In addition to the nation-specific measures mentioned below, the period saw the closure 
                                            
19 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918, 1. 
20 For a concise introduction to strategic measures, see for instance J. Oakes, ‘Shipbuilding in W. Europe’, Seatrade, July/August (1986), 19–24. 
For development in individual countries, see, for Denmark, R. T. Poulsen and H. Sornn-Friese, ‘Downfall delayed – ownership structures and 
maritime deindustrialization in Danish shipbuilding, 1975–2009’, forthcoming, Business History (2011), for Germany and the Netherlands, see, C. 
de Voogd, ‘Shipbuilding in West Germany and the Netherlands, 1960–1980’, International Journal of Maritime History 19:1 (2007), 63–86, and for 
Britain, Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State. 
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of several yards, capacity reduction in others and massive lay-offs in most countries. More than a hundred yards 
were closed, and employment was halved in Western Europe and Japan between 1975 and 1987. In 1975 more 
than 325,000 people were employed at shipyards in Western Europe. By 1983 the figure was down to around 
155,000.21 There was a substantial reduction of employment in Japan as well, from 150,000 in 1975 to 85,000 in 
1983.22 
 
Table 2: Production 1975 and 1990 ('000 grt) and strategic support measures 
 1975 1990 Change Strategic measures 
Denmark 969 407 -58 % Tax concessions, owners’ orders 
France 1,149 63 -95 % Massive subsidies, specialization 
Germany 2,499 874 -65 % Restructuring, mergers, state owners, naval orders 
The Netherlands 1,028 184 -82 % Massive subsidies, the RSV-scandal 
Norway 1,052 88 -92 % Offshore focus, subsidies, specialization 
Spain 1,593 367 -76 % Restructuring, nationalization, naval orders 
Sweden 2,188 27 -99 % Subsidies, nationalization, full withdrawal 
United Kingdom 1,169 127 -89 % Nationalization, privatization, naval orders 
     
Japan 16,991 6,661 -61% Rationalization, cross-subsidization 
South Korea 410 3,440 +740% Capacity increase, state support 
     
World 34,203 15,995 -54%  
 
Most support measures were futile and only contributed to prolonging the decline of European shipbuilding. The 
fundamental problem, lack of competitiveness, was not properly addressed. European costs, in particular wages, 
were too high, and the strategic measures did not lead to a sufficiently large improvement in productivity and 
production costs. In addition to South Korea, Brazil and Taiwan tried to break into the market, as seen in figure 
2. In 1979 and 1980, the Brazilian output even exceeded that of South Korea. 
 
 
Figure 2 New competitors: tonnage completed in Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan, 1970-90 
Source: Lloyd’s Statistical Tables, various years 
 
The Brazilian drive imploded in the first half of the 1980s: as Pires noted, ‘The shipbuilding industry is now almost 
totally idle’.23 Taiwan was a more viable competitor, but never managed to get the volumes that South Korea 
                                            
21 Data from Institute of Shipping Economics, Shipping Statistics, 28:5 May (1984), 47. Considering shipbuilding only, and excluding ship repair 
and conversion,  employment in the European Union countries declined from 209,000 in 1975 to 65,700 in 1991; see D. Glen, ‘Sh ipbuilding 
disputes: the WTO panel rulings and the elimination of operating subsidy from shipbuilding’, Maritime Policy & Management 33:1 (2006), 5. 
22 The Japanese data refer to the members of the Shipbuilding Association of Japan, which includes the 23 leading shipbuilding companies. 
23 F. M. Pires, ‘Shipbuilding and shipping industries: net economic benefit cross-transfers’, Maritime Policy & Management 28:2 (2001), 157. 
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gained. The basis for the emergence of the three developing country producers was more or less the same – an 
initial focus on price competitiveness, helped by strong government support. However, South Korean shipbuilders 
appear to have succeeded better in the second phase of the shipbuilding drive, when low wages could no longer 
be the only means of competition. 
The competitive costs of South Korean and Taiwanese yards, and the low productivity of Brazilian 
shipyards, are evident from table 3. The table is based on data on production, measured as compensated gross 
tonnage (cgt), which take into account variations in the labour necessary to construct different vessels. The 
table, based on data for production and employment 1979 to 1981, coupled with compensation per worker in 
1982, shows dramatic differences in productivity. For instance, the average shipyard worker in Great Britain 
produced only marginally more than the average South Korean, but received more than three times the 
compensation. 
 
Table 3: Productivity – Annual output and compensation, 1982 
 Output cgt Workforce Output/worker Comp./worker Comp./ cgrt 
Northern Ireland 47,625 5,769 8.26 11,451 1,387 
Belgium 119,917 5,904 20.31 21,860 1,076 
Brazil 398,333 30,000 13.28 12,800 964 
Great Britain 355,414 20,982 16.94 14,039 829 
Portugal 62,808 9,233 6.80 5,524 812 
Italy 239,370 14,483 16.53 13,313 805 
Germany 719,334 24,819 28.98 20,079 693 
Denmark 279,836 10,127 27.63 18,577 672 
AWES 4,427,142 194,697 22.74 15,130 665 
France 434,709 17,067 25.47 16,543 649 
Spain 557,082 33,507 16.63 10,665 641 
Norway 436,318 14,480 30.13 18,548 616 
Finland 464,739 16,600 28.00 14,860 531 
Sweden 409,708 12,300 33.31 17,478 525 
Netherlands 300,282 9,426 31.86 16,384 514 
Taiwan 148,924 12,000 12.41 5,185 418 
Japan 4,461,282 115,598 38.59 15,209 394 
Poland 405,688 43,650 9.29 3,190 343 
South Korea 469,200 31,053 15.11 4,600 304 
Note: AWES is an acronym for the Association of West-European Shipbuilders. Data from Nederlands Economisch Instituut, reprinted in Institute of Shipping 
Economic (1984 p.47) 
 
South Korea succeeded in establishing a position as a low-cost provider of new tonnage. According to Graham  
Day, CEO of the nationalized British Shipbuilders plc: ‘if […] a Japanese shipbuilder […] said the price was 10, all 
you would have to do is produce that to a South Korean yard and they will bid 9 without looking at the 
specification or anything else’.24 
By the mid 1980s, South Korea had become the most important competitor to Japan in the high-volume 
shipbuilding market. Some European yards focused on more advanced purpose-built vessels, but in aggregate, 
European shipbuilding was dramatically reduced. For the largest vessels, it was now a two-horse race between 
Japan and South Korea. In the mid 1980s currency fluctuations improved South Korea’s competitiveness further. 
The appreciation of the yen eroded the Japanese advantage of higher productivity; ‘the price differential with 
the Koreans this time a year ago was between 5–10%. Now, though, since the won is linked to the dollar, the gap 
is anything up to 50%’.25 
 
3. Domestic development 
South Korea’s road to dominance of the world shipbuilding industry had a meagre starting point. Although the 
country had more than a hundred shipyards in the 1960s, only nine were producing steel vessels.26 The major 
                                            
24 Johnman & Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918, 231. 
25 P. Bartlett and H. Asami, ‘Japanese report’, Seatrade, July/August (1986), 133. 
26 Our presentation of the early shipbuilding industry in South Korea draws heavily upon Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea. 
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yard in 1970 was the state-owned Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation (KSEC), which received its first 
international orders for six tankers in the 20–30,000 ton range from Gulf Oil in 1970 and 1971.27 Although KSEC 
thus was responsible for South Korea’s first stab at the international market, the real expansion came through 
Hyundai. 
Hyundai Construction Company (HCC) applied for a licence to construct ships in June 1970 and the 
government approved it in September. The construction of Hyundai’s huge shipyard at Ulsan commenced in March 
1972 and was completed in June 1974.28 HCC established the shipbuilding company Hyundai Heavy Industries 
(HHI) on 23 March 1972. The establishment and early operations of HHI depended upon state support. In brief, 
the state supported HHI by giving access to domestic and foreign funds with preferential interest rates; helping 
in obtaining and providing  financial guarantees; making complementary investments in facilities and 
complementary industries, such as steel; and providing support for technology acquisition. It is a testimony to 
the rapid expansion that HHI became the world’s leading shipbuilder in 1983, only one decade after its 
establishment. This position is still held today. 
The entries of two other chaebols (family-owned conglomerates) Daewoo and Samsung into shipbuilding 
were also based on state support. In December 1978 the Daewoo group took over a 25 per cent completed 
shipyard at Okp’o, originally built by KSEC, and following complementary investments by Daewoo the shipyard 
was finally finished in January 1981. 29  Samsung acquired Geoje Shipyard through the purchase of Koryô 
Shipbuilding, the operations of which started in September 1979. 
Table 4 shows the production of the four big shipyards from 1973 to 1986. Hyundai dominates in the 
1970s, while Daewoo and Samsung increase their market shares in the 1980s. In the crucial years 1979 to 1985 
production increased more than five-fold, marking South Korea’s transition from a developing shipbuilder to a 
leading player. South Korean shipyards, especially the big four, were favourably positioned to exploit the short-
lived international boom in 1979–80 to fill their order books. 
 
Table 4: Principal shipbuilders’ production (grt) 1973-1986 
Year Hyundai KSEC Daewoo Samsung Big four (BF) Total BF/Total 
1973 126,000 2,980 0 0 128,980 163,474 78.9 % 
1974 451,700 2,980 0 0 454,680 561,870 80.9 % 
1975 512,000 75,400 0 0 587,400 612,460 95.9 % 
1976 573,500 52,450 0 0 625,950 683,973 91.5 % 
1977 505,568 76,322 0 0 581,890 648,523 89.7 % 
1978 614,790 116,694 0 0 731,484 775,800 94.3 % 
1979 383,763 103,060 0 0 486,823 555,639 87.6 % 
1980 518,565 60,448 0 13,858 592,871 684,931 86.6 % 
1981 907,040 137,655 21,500 52,000 1,118,195 1,219,932 91.7 % 
1982 861,206 186,988 148,329 126,000 1,322,523 1,479,367 89.4 % 
1983 864,782 129,573 128,270 73,400 1,196,025 1,328,246 90.0 % 
1984 1,320,904 152,781 571,800 123,974 2,169,459 2,313,565 93.8 % 
1985 1,423,378 124,484 929,600 273,074 2,750,536 2,813,920 97.7 % 
1986 1,262,478 186,535 722,101 378,100 2,549,214 2,730,147 93.4 % 
Note: G. Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea: A Comparative Study (Stockholm, 1995), 83 
 
Two factors, one economic and one political, motivated the authorities to promote heavy industries in general, 
and shipbuilding in particular.30 The economic argument was that light manufacturing exports could not be 
sustained in the long run, and South Korea had to gain a competitive edge in more heavy manufacturing to 
                                            
27 H. Nam, Building Ships, Building a Nation: Korea’s democratic unionism under Park Chung Hee (Seattle, 2009), 201. 
28 According to figures from Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 78, South Korea’s total production capacity measured in grt increased from 
187,000 ton in 1970 to 250,000 ton in 1973, followed by huge leaps to 1,100,000 ton in 1974 and 2,390,000 ton in 1975. 
29 Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 82. 
30 S. C. Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-1979)’, in L. J. Cho and Y. H. Kim (eds), Economic Development in the 
Republic of Korea: A Policy Perspective (Honolulu, 1994), 438, adds a third; the confidence the government got from successful planning in the 
1960s. President Park had a high regard for the Japanese model which he saw as a rough blueprint of how to develop South Korea. 
Page | 26  
 
 
maintain economic growth. The basis for the reduced competitive advantage within labour-intensive production 
was increasing labour costs, increased international competition and growing trade restrictions on textiles.31 
The political motive was national security. In 1971 Nixon withdrew one third of all US troops from South 
Korea. Five years later, the Carter administration announced a full troop withdrawal.32 The decreased US military 
presence, along with the communist military threat from China and North Korea, forced South Korea to upgrade 
their own military. President Park Chung-Hee (1917–79), who had come to power a decade earlier in a military 
coup d’état and had nationalized the banks and the steel industry, therefore saw the promotion of the defence 
industry as a necessary step in maintaining national security. Park’s dogged promotion of the heavy industries in 
the late 1970s, with an overheated economy and clear signs of overcapacity, indicates that political concerns 
might have dominated economic ones. 
In the 1980s state support was less extensive, but could be easily defended, as long as shipbuilding was 
expanding. However, towards the end of the decade, several shipbuilding companies started to struggle and the 
state provided bailouts as they believed the crisis was temporary. This indicates that shipbuilding had become 
both an economic and politically sensitive sector and could be considered to be too big to fail. 
Shipbuilding generally depended on the state for at least three reasons. First, high fixed costs make the 
establishment of shipbuilding capacity virtually impossible without government support, especially as 
competitors from other countries also rely on subsidies. Second, shipbuilding companies are important employers 
in regions where job opportunities are limited. If shipbuilding is a declining domestic industry, restructuring is 
costly as employment is substantial and sector specific capital stock, with few alternative purposes, is high. 
Finally, the shipbuilding sector is sensitive partly because of national security. National companies are thus 
sometimes forced to choose more expensive domestically built ships. A supportive government is a major 
component in successfully establishing and maintaining a viable shipbuilding industry.33 
South Korea’s first attempt to promote shipbuilding was the Shipbuilding Promotion Law from 1958, the 
scope of which was increased in 1967.34 The main vehicle of promotion had been the then state-owned KSEC, but 
progress was slow. The 1969 Nixon doctrine and the 1972 Yushin constitution, which suspended democracy and 
gave Park more direct power, made more aggressive promotion possible. 
The first detailed reference to the future expansion of the HCIs was in the Third Five Year Development 
Plan (1972–6).35 The real promotion of the HCI sectors came with the HCI plan in 1973. As part of that, the 
Shipbuilding Development Plan was announced in March 1973 by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The 
plan had several objectives. First, South Korea would be self-sufficient in vessels by 1980. Second, shipbuilding 
exports should reach 1 billion US$ (3.2 million grt) by 1980 and 2 billion US$ (6.2 million grt) by 1985. Third, nine 
shipyards should be constructed by 1980 and another five by 1985. The main means of production would be 
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI).36 
The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1977–81) included several objectives for the shipbuilding sector. 
One was the commencement of the production of shipping components domestically. Another was the Planned 
Shipbuilding Programme, which gave guidelines to the sector. Much of the finance would come from the National 
Investment Fund and foreign loans. Also, government procurement would be used to overcome depressed 
                                            
31 See W. McClenahan, ‘The Growth of Voluntary Export Restraints and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1956-1969’, Business and Economic 
History 20 (1991), 189, and Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan’, 438. 
32 Carter’s policy was eventually suspended in July 1979; see L. Niksch, ‘U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past Shortcomings and Future 
Prospects’, Asian Survey 21:3 (1981). 
33 For a good introduction to this topic, see Cho and Porter,  Changing Global Industry Leadership. 
34 Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 70–4. The Shipbuilding Promotion Law  from  1958 included subsidies of 40 per cent of construction costs, 
and allowed for generous loan repayments. The availability of public funds was limited, and shipbuilding output only grew from 4,525 grt in 1959 
to 4,674 grt in 1961. The 1967 Law established an inquiry commission and set up a plan to provide capital and implement government-aid projects. 
However, previous subsidies were abolished, repayment periods shortened and interest rates increased. 
35 An overview of the HCI policies is provided by Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan’. 
36 Park’s close ties with Hyundai’s owner Chun probably played a major part when Hyundai became the instrument of promotion of the South 
Korean shipbuilding industry. 
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international shipping markets. The plan also made the first major revisions in shipbuilding targets following the 
shipping crisis: the number of planned shipyards was reduced from nine to two. 
The HCI drive provided shipbuilding and other preferred sectors with capital incentives, complementary 
investments, trade incentives and tax holidays. The capital incentives included preferential rates from state-
owned banks with low nominal rates. Due to high inflation real interest rates were negative for most of the 1970s. 
A related method for capital access was government guarantees for foreign loans; see table 5. The government 
complementary investments included large infrastructure programmes for new facilities, both industrial 
complexes for shipbuilding at Ulsan, Okp’o and Chukdo, and the steel industry.37 
 
Table 5: Major Commercial Projects, Shipbuilding, 1971-1985 
Loan Recipient Projects Country Providing Loan Contract Value 
(Million) 
Year of Contract 
Validation 
     
Hyundai Heavy Industry Ulsan Shipyard construction 
UK, Germany, Spain, 
France & Sweden 
50 USD 1971-72 
     
Daewoo Shipbuilding & Heavy Machinery 
Okp’o Shipyard construction 
and machine purchase 
UK, Sweden, Denmark & 
Finland 
30 USD; 3 SEK 1978 
     
Daewoo Shipbuilding & Heavy Machinery 
Okp’o Shipyard construction 
and machine purchase 
Hong Kong 30 USD 1980 
     
KSEC Construction of export ships Hong Kong 31 USD 1981 
     
Note: Based on data from Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, p.80 and T. Harrori, ‘Chaebol-style enterprise development in Korea’, The Developing 
Economies 35:4 (1997 pp.460-463). 
 
Following the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in mysterious circumstances in October 1979 and the 
ascendancy of the Chun regime in May 1980, the economic policy changed. Selective targeting was replaced by 
a more functional industrial policy, with support given to research and development (R&D) and training. Moreover, 
the protection of shipbuilding was reduced, but did not disappear. In 1986, the Industry Development Law 
replaced the Shipbuilding Promotion Law from 1967.38 
State support in shipbuilding was often targeted at the company level. The government played a large 
role in the establishment of South Korea’s most important chaebol, Hyundai Heavy Industries.39 One important 
element was the government’s guarantees for foreign loans for the construction of the Ulsan shipyard. The 
construction of which required a budgeted 67 million US$, with 40 million supplied through foreign loans. Foreign 
lenders were sceptical, but the South Korean government was able to raise 50 million US$. The basis for this was 
HCC’s proven ability in construction, with projects completed both domestically and abroad, and the fact that 
Hyundai had managed to get a first customer in Greek shipowner, George Livanos and could start production as 
soon as the facilities were constructed. 
Government support was important in winning the first order from Livanos in 1971. The order was for 
two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) of 259,000 dead weight tons (dwt) each. The ships were sold at a price 16 
per cent below the world market price and were exact replica of a ship that had been built at the Scott Lithgow 
shipyard in Scotland.40 The learning-by-doing and the implementation of foreign technology were useful, but 
problems in production delayed delivery of the ships. After Livanos, and Japanese and Hong Kong shipowners 
                                            
37 H. Kang, ‘The Development Experience of South Korea – The Role of Public Policy’, in P. K. Wong and C. Y. Ng, Industrial Policy, Innovation 
and Economic Growth: The experience of Japan and the Asian NIEs (Singapore, 2001), 353. 
38 The 1986 Law called for ’balanced development’ with promotion of technology, increased productivity, efficient allocation of resources, 
training of labour and higher self-reliance. This was partly due to foreign pressure regarding state support, where shipbuilding had to follow 
OECD guidelines. 
39 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, 275. 
40 For Scott Lithgow, see, L. Johnman and H. Murphy, Scott Lithgow: Déjà vu all over again. The rise and fall of a shipbuilding company (St John’s, 
NL, 2005). 
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cancelled orders, the government assisted in the establishment of the Hyundai Merchant Marine Company in 1976, 
which took over the ships. 
The state also intervened directly in the 1980s when Daewoo and KSEC had severe losses and were 
threatened by bankruptcies. The government arguments for supporting Daewoo rested on protecting jobs and 
communities. KSEC was eventually bought by the conglomerate Hanjin in May 1989 and renamed Hanjin Heavy 
Industries. The intervention was based on the government’s expectancy that the recession in the world 
shipbuilding market would be short-term. The government, as it turned out, were right and shipbuilding markets 
started to recover in the 1990s. 
 
4. Technology 
The South Korean shipbuilding sector was technology-dependent in the 1970s, but managed to learn quickly and 
over time became a technologically innovative market leader. Technological development is a key component in 
explaining South Korea’s importance in the world shipbuilding market. Three factors are particularly important: 
first, technological learning and adoption, in particular HHI’s learning by doing at an early stage. Second, 
development of human capital, and third, the building of networks, in terms of better vertical integration with 
suppliers and the sharing of technology among shipbuilders. 
South Korean shipbuilding in the 1970s lacked the technological know-how to be competitive in 
international markets and therefore sought foreign technological assistance.41 HHI got four types of technological 
assistance from abroad for the Ulsan yard: dockyard designs from the English company, A&P Appledore; ship 
designs and operating instructions from Scott Lithgow; European shipbuilders who  worked for HHI during the 
first three years of operations; and production know-how from Kawasaki Shipbuilding.42 Hyundai had to pay 1.7 
million US$ to Appledore and Scott Lithgow for the technology acquired. The link between the South Koreans 
and Scott Lithgow went back to a previous order of South Korean ships at the yard, ‘so we [Scott Lithgow] were 
the logical choice when Hyundai and their consultants looked around for help. They bought the plans of our 
current quarter-million-tonner and signed a contract to train their key men.’43 
At HHI, production know-how improved relatively fast, while design technology took longer to master. 
Production know-how increased, again, through learning-by-doing in producing multiple types of ships. As the 
market for VLCCs collapsed in 1974, HHI received orders for medium and small sized vessels and managed to 
accumulate production know-how in the building of crude oil tankers, roll-on–roll-off ships, multipurpose cargo 
vessels, bulk carriers and container ships. Regarding design technology, HHI was dependent on foreign designs 
for most of the 1970s although the company started to acquire basic design abilities from as early as 1974.44 In 
1978 a Basic Design Department was set up within the company. HHI’s first self-designed ship was a 25,000 dwt 
bulk carrier ordered by Hyundai Merchant Marine in 1979. From 1978 to 1983, Hyundai was actively purchasing 
ship designs from other companies to improve their technology; see table 6. 
  
                                            
41 Y.-H. Bae,’Shipbuilding Technology Development in Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (HHI)’, in Y.-H. Bae et al., Case Study on Technological 
Innovation of Korean Firms (Seoul, 2002) claims that Hyundai initially wanted to establish a joint venture with Mitsubishi in January 1969, but 
could not agree on the terms. Hyundai also sought joint ventures with the Aker group from Norway and Pan Maritime from Israel in October 1969, 
but these efforts eventually failed. 
42 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, 276. 
43 Glasgow University Archives, Scott Lithgow company magazine, no. 10 (1972), 18. The previous order was for two 130,000 dwt tankers, Gold 
Star and King Star for Samyang Navigation Company originally placed in May 1967 for delivery in 1969, however, contractual negotiations rumbled 
on and delivery was put back until 1970 and 1971, see Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, 183, 192 and 198. 
44 Bae, ‘Shipbuilding Technology Development in Hyundai Heavy Industries’, 144–5. 
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Table 6: Hyundai’s purchased design technology from abroad 
Design technology Purchased from Time of purchase Price 
    
80,000 dwt tanker Naiereorm (Germany) 02/1979 281,000 DM 
    
40,000 dwt bulk carrier and 130,800 dwt bulk carrier B&W (Denmark) 03/1982 11,110,000 USD 
    
45,000 dwt OBO B&W (Denmark) 10/1982 51,000 USD 
    
170,000 dwt bulk carrier and 80,000 dwt bulk carrier BWS (Denmark) 11/1983 100,000 USD 
    
Multipurpose cargo carrier NVLaskey (Canada) 11/1983 60,000 USD 
Note: HHI (1992), 549–50; paraphrased from Bae, ‘Shipbuilding Technology Development in Hyundai Heavy Industries’, 145. 
 
As one company representative pointed out, ‘Hyundai Heavy Industries has made strenuous efforts to develop 
specific expertise and technology for the construction of gas carriers, and since 1978 has made license 
agreements with consultant companies to enhance its technological capability in cargo tank systems’.45 Other 
shipbuilders also chose licences as a mean for acquiring technology, see table 7 for Samsung. In all 159 licences 
were purchased by South Korean shipbuilders in the period 1962 to 1987, at a total of 117 million US$.46 
 
Table 7: Samsung’s purchased technology licences from abroad 
Technology/Areas Partner Period Details 
    
Managing shipyards B&W (Denmark) 3/78-12/84 Management 
    
Managing shipyards B&W (Denmark) 3/81-12/87 Techno. consulting/ Design contract 
    
Managing shipyards IEC (Japan) 9/87-11/90 Management of production process 
    
Design/Manufacturing AUTOKON (Norway) 10/82-11/90 Computer programmes for design 
    
Design/Manufacturing MARCON (Germany) 4/83-8/89 Design technology 
    
Design/Manufacturing MONNECKE (Japan) 4/83-1/92 Design technology 
    
Design/Manufacturing IHI (Japan) 6/86-6/89 Consulting production technology 
    
Design/Manufacturing Sanoyath (Japan) 12/86-12/96 Technological Training 
    
Note: R. Hassink and D. H. Shin, ‘South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry: From a Couple of Cathedrals in the desert to an Innovative Cluster’, Asian Journal of 
Technology Innovation 13:2 (2005 p.145). 
 
The internal organization of HHI also improved. The Department of Quality Control was established in 1973. By 
1983 HHI had managed to get three quality assurance certificates, respectively from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 
Det Norske Veritas and the American Bureau of Shipping. Internationally, only four shipyards were approved by 
Lloyd’s and only two shipyards were approved by Veritas at the time. HHI’s quality standard had therefore 
reached an internationally accepted level. In November 1983 the Hyundai Welding Research Institute was set up 
to improve production technology. Another 1983 establishment was the Hyundai Industrial Research Institute 
(HIRI which aimed at improving productivity and quality and conducted research on, for instance, material 
processing and protective coatings. In 1984 a tank experiment station was set up to allow in-house testing and 
Hyundai Merchant Research Institute was established to research core technologies, for instance ship resistance; 
propulsion and manoeuvring; engine combustion, performance and durability; and hull form. 
The second element crucial to technological development was human capital. An increase in the number 
of engineers is considered vital for technological catch-up. As Amsden and Jonsson show, the number of 
shipbuilding engineers had been growing since the 1950s, but many of these were not employed in shipbuilding. 
Despite having sufficient unskilled workers in the 1970s, there was a shortage of skilled workers. HHI, however, 
could recruit shipbuilding engineers from KSEC, obtained skilled labour from similar positions from Hyundai 
                                            
45 C. H. Lee, ‘Advanced gas tankers’, Shipbuilding Technology International 4:1 (1989), 20-1. 
46 B. Gomes-Casseres and S. J. Lee, ‘Korea’s Technology Strategy’, Harvard Business Case Study 9-388-137, (Bosten 1989), 18. 
Page | 30  
 
 
Construction Company and Hyundai Motors, and managed to find shipbuilding engineers that were ‘under-
employed’ elsewhere. This was, however, not enough to meet HHI’s demand at that stage. 
There were however, three main sources for the increase in human capital. One was expatriates, such 
as the European engineers who worked at Ulsan in the first three years of operation. This included the Dane, 
Kurt J. Schou from Odense shipyard, who became the first president of the shipyard. In addition to numerous 
European engineers, there were also more than 30 Japanese engineers from Kawasaki Heavy Industries.47 
A second way to increase human capital was to send personnel abroad for training. In accordance with 
the deal signed with Appledore and Scott Lithgow, 60 engineers and administrative staff received overseas 
training in shipbuilding technology and management abilities.48 This was particularly useful, as the Livanos order 
was built on the basis of a Scott Lithgow blueprint.49 In addition HHI dispatched personnel to learn design at the 
Sakaiide shipyard and shipyard construction technology at Kashima Construction in Japan. Given that Japan had 
‘state-of-the-art’ technology, HHI could leapfrog others and acquire global competitiveness quickly. 
A third way to increase human capital was by in-house training of personnel at HHI. In the short-term, 
engineers from various backgrounds came to the yard and brought with them their own standards and procedures. 
A small training centre was set up, and foremen were sent there for one to three months to increase uniformity.50 
In September 1972 the company opened up a training centre and Robert L. Wilson from Appledore 
became the director.  Upon opening, HHI trained 324 people in welding and cutting, plumbing, sheet metal work, 
electrical work, heavy and light machinery work, technical drawing and management. By the end of 1975 a total 
of 3,636 personnel had been trained, and by 1990 the total was an impressive 35,234.51 
Another South Korean example of human capital development was at Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy 
Machinery (DSHM), which in 1987 was plagued by falling demand and substantial labour unrest. Heavy losses led 
to government assistance. However, the effects of the 1987 labour dispute, in hindsight, might have speeded up 
technological development. New labour measures were implemented, improving technological learning, labour 
cohesion and management-worker relationships. 52  Small groups of 10 to 15 workers went through training 
programmes and were sent to Japanese manufacturers to learn more efficient production. Labour schedules were 
reorganized to increase flexibility, which improved efficiency. 
The building of industrial linkages was also important for technology promotion. Companies either 
created their own backward linkages or used subcontractors. In the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s, most 
key components were imported; towards the end of the 1990s between 70 and 80 per cent of the supply was 
purchased domestically.53 One example was the Hyundai Engine and Heavy Machinery Manufacturing Company 
(HEMCO), established in 1978 to make engines and other components for ships.54 HEMCO learned through foreign 
technical assistance, overseas training and licences. Moreover, while most shipyards have to buy their electronics 
ship navigation systems in the market, Samsung, with a strong electronics division, was able to purchase these 
components from within the group. 
In the 1980s private R&D increased, both through increased policy loans and through changes in the 
internal organization of shipbuilding companies. This led to increased technological co-operation between South 
Korean shipbuilders, universities, other research institutions and suppliers. Moreover, South Korean shipbuilders 
formed their own trade association. The Korea Shipbuilders’ Association (KOSHIPA) was founded in 1977 and 
functioned as an organized lobby group to promote shipbuilders’ interests. 
                                            
47 HHI (1992), 344; paraphrased from Bae, ‘Shipbuilding Technology Development in Hyundai Heavy Industries’, 150. 
48 Bae, ‘Shipbuilding Technology Development in Hyundai Heavy Industries’, 151. 
49 Scott Lithgow company magazine, no. 10 (1972), 18. 
50 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, 281. 
51 Bae, ‘Shipbuilding Technology Development in Hyundai Heavy Industries’, 152. 
52 D. Upton and B. Kim, ‘Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery’, Harvard Business School Case Study 9-695-001 (Boston, 1994). 
53 Hassink and Shin, South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry, 146–8. 
54 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, 279–80. 
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5. Rising in a sunset industry 
What was the basis for the success of the South Korean shipbuilding industry? Three important points emerge 
from the analysis above. First, South Korea managed to acquire a large share of the world shipbuilding market, 
expanding rapidly in a period when capacity was reduced in all major shipbuilding nations. Second, the influence 
of the State was substantial, with the industry placed prominently in government plans for long-term economic 
development. Third, South Korea managed to continuously develop and upgrade production processes, sustaining 
initial cost advantages through rationalization and innovation. We can combine these elements to discuss to 
which extent the shipping glut and the plight of the yards in traditional shipbuilding nations might have been 
beneficial for the South Korean shipbuilding industry. 
Four elements are likely to have affected the ascendancy of South Korean shipbuilding beneficially. First, 
the shipping crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s led to increased emphasis on the price of new ships. Second, the 
crisis enabled South Korean yards to gain market shares by offering novel financing solutions. Third, the large 
amount of subsidies prevalent in Western Europe strained the willingness of the authorities in traditional 
shipbuilding countries to compete with the newcomers. Finally, the crisis improved the South Korean yards’ 
access to technology and know-how. 
Subdued freight rates in the shipping market preoccupied owners in reducing costs. During a shipping 
depression, the market for ships is a buyers’ market. Low freight rates implied that shipping companies could 
not justify paying extra for tonnage from old business relations, making it easier for newcomers to enter. 
Moreover, price was the one factor that determined where shipowners ordered vessels, an element that helped 
South Korean yards. Similarly, uncertainty regarding yards’ ability to deliver the ships on time is something 
shipowners are willing to pay a lot to avoid during booms. In a depressed market delays are much less costly for 
shipowners, thus again having an adverse effect on the owners’ willingness to pay extra to order at established 
yards. 
The difficult financial situation of many shipping companies made novel financing solutions a necessity. 
Several owners were able to acquire new tonnage by entering into bareboat charters with South Korean yards 
(the legal owners of the vessel), and combine this with a purchase option. Thus, the owners’ need for financing 
was limited, but they controlled the tonnage and could purchase it ‘properly’ when the market and the financial 
situation had improved.55 An added bonus for shipowners was the fact that the ships could utilize low-cost foreign 
labour, which would have been impossible in several European countries. Table 8 shows that such arrangements 
were fairly common. 
 
Table 8: South Korean vessels on bareboat charter with purchase options, 1984 
 General cargo Container ships Log carriers Bulk carriers Chemical tankers Oil tankers Sum 
Number 21 6 4 20 4 4 59 
Grt 176,882 80,420 14,819 359,436 6,163 364,607 1,002,327 
Note: Institute of Shipping Economics, Shipping Statistics 28:5 May (1984). 
 
The subsidizing of Western European yards by governments at the earlier stages of the crisis was enormous. This 
is important for three reasons: first, the support stifled efficiency improvements and enabled European yards to 
maintain their relatively low productivity. Second, the expensive subsidies occurred against a backdrop of 
reduced activity, and cash-strapped governments were unlikely to provide even more financial support to the 
sector. Third, extensive use of subsidies in traditional shipbuilding nations implies that criticism of government 
support in South Korea was much more muted than would otherwise have been the case. Moreover, the crisis 
                                            
55 A. Thowsen and S. Tenold, Odfjell: The history of a shipping company (Bergen 2006), 447–8. 
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may have hindered South Korean costs from escalating, as the low price of new buildings led to a clear focus on 
productivity.56 
Finally, the availability of technology and competence may have been improved due to the crisis. 
European yards, unable to build ships at a profit, were able – and willing – to sell their services. As such, 
technology transfer from traditional yards might be considered a reflection of the fact that although they were 
unable to secure orders for new ships, at least they had something – knowledge – to sell. 
The length of the shipping crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s was a blessing in disguise for South Korea’s 
shipbuilders. Had the crisis been shorter, the reduction of production capacity in Europe, and the amount of 
support to European yards, would have been lower. If this were the case, it is likely that South Korean yards 
would have faced much more fierce competition, both during the temporary improvement of new building orders 
in 1979 to 1980, and in the second half of the 1980s. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to look more closely into the factors that enabled South Korea to grasp substantial 
market shares in the shipbuilding industry in the 1970s and 1980s. The role of the South Korean government in 
supporting the venture was crucial, but we have also emphasized that the scale and the length of the shipping 
and shipbuilding crisis was beneficial. Traditional shipbuilders in Western Europe were beset by high wages, 
relative to productivity, which, over time, sounded the death-knell of most of the European shipbuilding. 
Consequently, European shipowners’ shift of focus from Europe to Asia was encouraged by lower prices, better 
delivery times and more beneficial financial terms. 
Today it seems likely that the shipbuilding sector again is suffering from substantial overcapacity. The 
development has been much the same as that of the 1970s: rapid growth of shipyard capacity, linked to a boom 
in the shipping market, followed by a collapse of shipbuilding orders among historically high order books. This 
time around, however, the low labour cost, government-sponsored challenger is China, while South Korea’s 
position is similar to that of the established builders – Japan and Europe – in the 1970s. 
 
  
                                            
56 There is of course also the possibility that by investing heavily in new capacity and accepting losses through aggressive pricing, the Asian yards 
were able to see off their European competitors. 
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Essay 2: Malaysian Palm Oil Refineries and Plantation Productivity 
 
Abstract 
The Malaysian palm oil sector is an example of how a developing country can manage to 
establish itself as a world leader in the production and processing of an agricultural crop. 
This paper examines how the productivity at the plantation level, the first level of 
production, influenced the establishment of the higher value-added refineries. The official 
productivity figures are inconsistent; therefore new productivity figures are estimated. The 
findings indicate that the improvements in plantation productivity were crucial for the 
refinery sector. 
 
Introduction 
Plantation agriculture has developed a bad reputation in recent years. The natural resource curse literature 
claims that negative associations exist between point sources, such as plantations, and economic growth.57 
However, some plantation crops, such as palm oil, have contributed to economic growth in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia.58 In fact, palm oil has become the leading vegetable oil in terms of production and trade in the course 
of the past 50 years, increasing its share of global trade in vegetable oils from 16.2 % in 1962 to 59.2 % in 2008.59 
Palm oil is an example of how South-South trade can contribute to economic growth. 
The palm oil sector is also an example of a sector that contributed to economic growth through the 
processing of primary commodities. Cramer (1999) is one of many to emphasise that such processing could 
contribute to industrialisation in other developing countries, as well. Understanding how this process occurred 
in Malaysia might therefore yield some useful insights for other developing countries attempting a similar strategy. 
The key to palm oil’s success was the development of an internationally competitive food processing industry in 
the form of the Malaysian palm oil refineries. These refineries had strong government support in terms of 
industrial policy and through institutions that helped important functional areas such as research. Palm oil 
plantations are the first level of the value-chain and provide the palm oil refineries with the necessary input 
material. However, the puzzle in the case of the Malaysian palm oil industry is that the first stage of production, 
the plantations, showed little to no increase in productivity according to the official figures, which go back to 
1975.60 This article therefore re-examines the productivity figures and analyses the role of productivity at the 
plantation level during the period in which palm oil established itself as a major agricultural product in world 
trade. 
The Malaysian palm oil sector has attracted much research, with two types especially relevant. The first 
deals with the establishment of the palm oil sector, with the PhD thesis by Gopal (2001) as the most extensive 
work. Gopal focuses on the establishment of the palm oil refineries, and how the industry overcame the common 
barriers to entry that developing countries face when establishing food-processing industries. However, Gopal to 
                                            
 I am grateful for comments from Stig Tenold and Karl Rolf Pedersen. I also would like to thank Ivar Kolstad, Rais Saniman, Jørgen Torp and the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board for providing assistance during the research. Also thanks to the participants of the International Conference on Business 
and Economics Research Annual Conference, March 2010, Kuching, Malaysia for valuable input. All remaining errors are solely mine. 
57 For a discussion of plantation-based agriculture and economic growth, see Auty (1997), Woolcook et al. (2001), Isham et al. (2005) and Boschini 
et al. (2007). 
58 Palm oil is a typical plantation-based crop. It has high establishment costs, high labour requirements and fluctuating (exogenous) world market 
prices (Fold, 1998 p.400). Interestingly, Isham et al. (2005) instead classified it as a diffuse resource. 
59 Figures based on Basiron et al. (2004) and MPOB (2009). From 1962 to 2008, the export volume of all vegetable oils increased annually by 6.3 %, 
while the similar figure for palm oil was 9.4 %. In fact, these figures underestimate the influence of the palm oil sector. Palm kernel oil, an 
important by-product of the palm oil sector, by itself accounts for around 5 % of vegetable oil exports in 2008. 
60 The most common productivity indicator is the oil yield, which measures the amount of crude palm oil (metric tonnes) per mature area 
(hectare). I will come back to these productivity figures later. 
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a lesser extent focused upon the development of productivity at the lower stages of production. The second type 
of research deals with the reasons for the lack of productivity growth.61 This lack of growth has been persistent 
despite large efforts to increase productivity levels. The primary reason behind this lack of growth might be the 
lack of implementation of new technology. However, the consequences of the lack of productivity growth for 
palm oil refineries is rarely considered. In fact, no study, to my knowledge, has explicitly looked at the 
relationship between plantation productivity and the establishment of palm oil refineries. This paper attempts 
to fill that gap. 
The research question is ‘How did the development in plantation productivity affect the establishment 
of the palm oil refinery sector?’ This paper adds to the literature in two ways. First, the paper aims to increase 
our understanding of the importance of plantation productivity during the formative years of the palm oil sector. 
Specifically, I provide new estimates of productivity for the first and second level of processing and analyse their 
importance for the refinery sector. Second, the paper aims to increase our understanding of how plantations can 
contribute to the economic growth process by increasing the value-added of the production structure. 
 
1. The Malaysian Palm Oil Sector 
The palm oil sector has three levels of processing. Plantations produce the palm oil fruit from the palm trees; 
these fruits are called fresh fruit bunches (FFB). Following detachment from the palm tree, processing of FFBs 
must take place within 24 hours to have sufficient quality. Mills, the second level, process FFB to produce crude 
palm oil (CPO), and as a by-product, palm kernel (PK).62 As the processing of FFBs has to be quick, mills are 
located close to or even on the plantations. Refineries, the final level, process CPO to produce various products 
called processed palm oil (PPO). CPO, PK and PPO products can also be used as inputs in other industries such as 
the oleochemical industry.63 During the 1970-90 period, the higher value-added refineries and the linkages to 
other industries were established. Figure 1 presents a schematic summary of the industry with some of its forward 
linkages. To limit the scope of the paper, I do not consider palm kernel or palm kernel oil, but focus on crude 
palm oil. In addition, as plantations and mills are highly integrated, this paper looks at the productivity of both 
plantations and mills and how it affects the palm oil refineries. 
  
                                            
61 See among others Jalani et al. (2002); Soh and Goh (2002), and Wahid et al. (2005). 
62 Crushing factories process palm kernel to produce crude palm kernel oil, which is an important by-product of the palm oil sector. 
63 For good introductory overviews of the palm oil sector, see Moll (1987), Teoh (2002) and Rasiah (2006). 
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Figure 1: Schematic Summary Malaysian Palm Oil Industry 
Source: Gopal (2001 Figure 3.1 p.131) 
 
The modern expansion of the sector started in the 1960s, though commercial production of palm oil first started 
in 1917 (see table 1). In colonial times, the palm oil sector was slow to develop, with production and exports 
increasing only modestly.64 In the 1960s, the government strongly promoted palm oil as part of a strategy of 
reducing the Malaysian dependence on rubber and tin. 65  Favourable prices and operating costs that were 
potentially lower than rubber made palm oil a natural long-term replacement for rubber. 
  
                                            
64 Pletcher (1990 p.329). 
65 Substantial replanting grants were given for planters shifting from rubber to palm oil (Pletcher, 1990 p.337). 
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Table 1: Phases of development in the Malaysian palm oil sector 
Phase 1: Colonial times (1875 to 1957) The introduction of palm oil in the 19th century and its first commercial 
exploitation from 1917: 
- Slow growth in crude palm oil production and exports 
Phase 2: Promotion of palm oil production (1957 to 1973) Government promotion of palm oil: 
- Investment and tax incentives 
- High growth in crude palm oil production and exports 
Phase 3: Promotion of refineries (1973 to 1986) Government promotion of increased value-added: 
- Investment and tax incentives 
- Increased institutional support 
- Export tax on crude palm oil 
- High growth in crude palm oil production 
- High growth in processed palm oil production and exports 
Phase 4: Promotion of upstream and downstream 
activities (1986 onwards) 
Government promotion of backward and forward linkages: 
- Investment and tax incentives 
- High institutional support 
- Continued high growth of processed palm oil production and 
exports 
- Continued high growth of crude palm oil production 
- Establishment of the oleochemical industry with subsequent 
high growth 
 
Following the rapid increase in crude palm oil production and exports in the 1960s and early 1970s, the structure 
of the industry changed. The government believed that a continued increase in exports hinged on increasing the 
value-added of production. To increase the value-added, the government promoted the establishment of the 
refinery sector through investment and tax incentives, and most importantly, an export tax on crude palm oil 
starting in 1973. The export tax increased the cost of crude palm oil for European refineries and led to increased 
investments in palm oil refineries in Malaysia. The World Bank opposed the export tax, as Malaysia did not have 
a comparative advantage in capital-intensive production.66 British plantation owners in Malaysia also opposed 
the tax, as they preferred to have palm oil processed in Europe.67 
Despite the initial scepticism, the palm oil refinery sector in Malaysia enjoyed high export growth for 
its products and increased competitiveness over time. Refineries increased their processing capacity from below 
0.1 million tonnes in 1971 to close to 10.5 million tonnes in 1990, see table 2. Table 2 also reveals that the 
average size of refineries gradually increased over time; since it was a capital-intensive industry, it had 
considerable economies-of-scale to exploit. In addition, most of the oil processed at the refineries came from 
domestic producers, as the expansion of the processed quantity was closely correlated with increases in local 
production from 1980 and onward. There was a dramatic change during the 1970s, when CPO processed compared 
to CPO production was only 4 %, but this figure increased to 95 % by 1980 and has since been at a minimum 
around 90 %. Figure 2 presents more evidence of the increased importance of refineries as processed palm oil 
replaced crude palm oil as the main palm oil export product in the 1970s and has kept this position ever since. 
Gopal (2001) analysed the competitiveness of the palm oil refineries by comparing the profit margins between 
Malaysian refineries and European ones in the time period 1980 to 1994. Gopal’s analysis strongly indicates that 
the Malaysian refineries became more competitive than the European ones towards the end of the 1980s.68 
  
                                            
66 Note that I used the phrase ‘comparative’ rather than ‘competitive’ in this sentence, with comparative advantage meaning the access to 
resources. Through the rest of the paper, I use the term ‘competitive’, with competitive meaning the creation of a strategic advantage. See for 
instance Neary (2002) for a discussion of these concepts. 
67 According to Bek-Nielsen, the founder of United Plantations, the British plantation owners were afraid of upsetting Unilever, their biggest 
customer, who preferred to process the vegetable oils in Europe (Fold, 1998 p.401). 
68 Earlier studies by Todd (1978) and Lim (1979) had concluded that the Malaysian palm oil refinery industry was not competitive at the end of 
the 1970s. 
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Table 2: Palm Oil Refineries Capacity in Operation Malaysia 1971-2010 
Year Capacity in operation Palm oil refineries in operation Average refinery size in operation CPO Processed at Refineries/CPO Production 
 Million metric tonnes No. Million metric tonnes Percentage 
1971 0.08 2 0.04 4 % 
1975 0.80 10 0.08 21 % 
1980 2.88 45 0.06 95 % 
1985 5.35 38 0.14 89 % 
1990 10.45 37 0.28 106 % 
1995 10.15 41 0.25 100 % 
2000 14.60 46 0.32 93 % 
2005 17.31 48 0.36 94 % 
2010 22.89 51 0.45 93 % 
Source: Gopal (2001) Table 4.1 for 1971-1995; and MPOB (2000; 2005) Table 2.14 and MPOB (2010) Table 2.17 for 2000-2010 
 
 
Figure 2: Exports (Metric Tonnes) 1960-2011 
Source: Gopal (2001) Table 4.4 for 1960-74; and MPOB (2012) Table 4.1 for 1975-2011 
 
Several factors contributed to the increased competitiveness of the palm oil refinery sector. The most important 
factor is probably that cost efficiency at Malaysian refineries increased through learning-by-doing. In addition, 
the refineries went through two restructuring processes in which ineffective refineries went bankrupt. Another 
important point is that Malaysian refineries had a higher degree of specialisation than those in Europe. European 
refineries used various vegetable oils to produce processed oil products; Malaysian refineries almost exclusively 
used palm oil. Such specialisation did create technological challenges, as Malaysia developed new technology to 
treat large volumes of palm oil. Malaysia increasingly became the main innovator within the industry as it met 
the challenge of creating palm oil-specific technology. The refineries probably benefited from this development, 
as the specialisation led to efficiency gains over their European rivals. 
By the second half of the 1980s, the palm oil industry had matured and was increasing its backward and 
forward linkages to other industries. The most important of which has probably been the oleochemical sector. 
Industry patterns were, however, largely a continuation of the previous period with processed palm oil being the 
industry’s driver. To understand the establishment of the palm oil sector, it is therefore important to look at the 
1970-90 period. 
The state played a decisive role in the development of the palm oil sector. Through government schemes, 
the state was directly involved in production. The most important of these schemes was the Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA), which changed its focus during the period from being a purely poverty reducing 
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institution to becoming a commercially active state company.69 The state also purchased most of the foreign-
owned companies to increase the equity share of indigenous ownership as a part of the New Economic Policy.70 
In addition to direct involvement in production and industrial policy, the state institutions’ support was important. 
The Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority (PORLA) was responsible for giving licences and controlling 
prices in the palm oil sector. The Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) was responsible for conducting 
public research in palm oil. Following a rationalisation process in 1998, PORLA and PORIM merged to form the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). The government is also the main owner of the current Malaysian Palm Oil 
Council (MPOC); a private company that promotes palm oil by launching marketing campaigns and trade missions. 
Direct government involvement in agricultural markets has been much criticised. However, in the case of the 
Malaysian palm oil sector, heavy government involvement has been compatible with high growth. Pletcher (1991) 
mentions two factors that he believes have been important for successful state intervention. The first is that the 
price mechanism, though influenced, was never controlled. The second is that the policies that helped shape the 
palm oil sector were internally consistent and consistent across time. 
The paradox addressed in this paper is that the most common productivity indicator for the palm oil 
sector, the oil yield, has been virtually constant since 1975 (see table 3. The oil yield measures crude palm oil 
production per mature area (area which is harvested) and is a joint productivity indicator of both plantations 
and mills. For an industry that became increasingly competitive internationally, one would expect productivity 
to have increased at all levels of production.71 According to Jalani et al. (2002), the reasons for  the stagnation 
of yields are: (i) Expansion into marginal areas; (ii) Inadequate agronomic inputs; (iii) Ineffective and inadequate 
management; (iv) Shortage of skilled labour; (v) Low replanting rate; (vi) Inadequate extension capability; and 
(vii) Combination of low fresh fruit bunch yields at plantations with low oil extraction rates at mills. A major 
concern is that the yields do not reflect the breakthroughs made by research, implying that the major failure 
was the lack of implementation of new technology.72 
 
Table 3: Main Official Productivity Indicator Palm Oil Sector 
Year Oil Yield: Crude Palm Oil Production (tonnes)/Mature Area (hectare) 
1960 3.75* 
1965 3.75* 
1970 3.68* 
1975 3.66 
1980 3.78 
1985 4.33 
1990 3.64 
2010 3.69 
Source: Jalani et al. (2002); MPOB (2010) 
*Estimates from MPOB personnel 
 
The large expansion of crude palm oil production, which was crucial for the establishment of the palm oil 
refineries, might therefore have been a pure input-driven process. There are several arguments that could 
support this interpretation. The most convincing argument would probably be that productivity, despite not 
increasing, was higher than for other vegetable oils. Even as late as in 2009, the oil yield for soya bean oil was 
                                            
69 On the evolution of FELDA regimes, see Pletcher (1991 pp.628-630). See also Simeh and Ahmad (2001 pp.2-4) for an overview of the government 
institutions in the palm oil sector. 
70 See Pletcher (1991 pp.630-631). 
71 Exporting firms have, in general, a higher productivity than comparable non-exporting firms do. However, it is still debated whether this occurs 
through self-selection of the most productive firms into the export market or as a result of the fact that international trade provides the 
competition that makes firms more competitive. See for instance Aw et al. (2011), Bernard and Jensen (1999), and Giles and Williams (2000a, 
2000b). 
72 See among others Jalani et al. (2002), Soh and Goh (2002), and Wahid et al. (2005). 
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0.3, rapeseed 1.3 and sunflower oil 0.8.73 The competitive pressure to increase the oil yield might therefore have 
been limited as profit margins continued to be high. However, productivity might in fact have increased. As, the 
land with the highest quality is taken into production first, future expansion into new areas increasingly meant 
that land decreased in quality. Producing the same quantity despite a decrease in the quality of inputs would be 
a de facto productivity increase. Another argument is that increased market entry caused the average 
productivity to decline. New plantations would initially be less productive, as productivity first increases through 
learning-by-doing.74 If a sufficient number of new plantations were established, the average productivity levels 
might decrease. 
A second possibility is that the official productivity figures do not give an accurate picture of the 
development of productivity. The oil yield is a partial productivity measure that combines land and process 
productivity. Partial productivity analysis does not take into account the effect of other inputs, or how other 
partial productivity measures have developed. In the next section of the paper, I explore this possibility further, 
and I do find inconsistencies in the official productivity measures indicating that these do not give an accurate 
picture of the evolution of productivity. 
As Cramer (1999) mentions, not much is understood of how food processing industries are established in 
developing countries. If increased productivity at the plantation level is an important precondition for developing 
a downstream food processing industry, the policy implications might be to increase the productivity in 
agriculture as a means to promote industrialisation. The Malaysian palm oil sector might then yield some 
important lessons for other developing countries to follow. However, if the Malaysian palm oil sector is unique, 
and purely a product of favourable geographical conditions, the potential lessons for other developing countries 
lessen. 
 
2. Productivity Measures in the Palm Oil Sector 
The main challenge in measuring productivity is to choose the appropriate methodology given the research 
question and the data availability. The main indicator of productivity has been the previously mentioned oil yield, 
which is a mixed land and processing productivity measure. The most commonly used methodology in the 
productivity literature is a total factor productivity analysis. However, data limitations, especially the lack of 
capital data for the 1970s, hinder such an analysis. 
Since the 1960s, there has been much research on palm oil production by the government and private 
plantations, which had several priority areas. The most relevant priority areas for plantations and mills have 
been (i) increasing the amount of oil produced per hectare; (ii) decreasing production costs; and (iii) increasing 
labour productivity. I therefore look into each of these to assess overall productivity. 
 
 2.1 Oil Yield 
To assess the actual oil yield, one has to assess the sources and the collection methods. The oil yield, as 
mentioned before, measures the amount of crude palm oil in tonnes per mature area in hectare per annum. Two 
agencies collected the official data from 1961 until present. From 1961 to 1988, the Department of Statistics of 
Malaysia collected the data, mainly through annual surveys. From 1989 until the present, the Palm Oil 
Registration and Licencing Authority (PORLA) had the responsibility for data collection. In 1998, PORLA merged 
with two other institutions to form the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). Another major source of agricultural 
                                            
73 The US for soya bean, the European Union for rapeseed and Argentina for sunflower; figures from FAO (2014). Palm oil needs a tropical climate 
to achieve high yields, while the other vegetable oils are close substitutes more adapted to other climates. The various vegetable oils, despite 
some different properties, compete more or less directly in the international market. 
74 Differences in productivity among different plantations and mills are huge; see for instance Basiron (2007). 
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data is the Food and Agricultural Organization Division of the United Nations (FAO), which also has data on the 
Malaysian palm oil sector. 
The oil yield data taken directly from the MPOB differs from the FAO data. According to MPOB data, the 
oil yield increased from 3.7 metric tonnes per hectare (mt/ha) in 1975 to 3.9 mt/ha in 2009, an annual compound 
growth rate of 0.2 %. However, according to FAO data, yield increased from 3.5 mt/ha in 1975 to 4.3 mt/ha in 
2009. The FAO data give an annual compound growth rate of 0.6 % in the same period. The FAO data thus shows 
a growth rate that is three times as high as the MPOB data. Fry (2009) also noted the difference, which he 
attributed to the unreliability of the FAO data. Fry believed that yield estimates based themselves on the 
assumption of an automatic increase over time. Fry’s assessment comes from the analysis of the yield of other 
vegetable oils. However, Fry’s conclusions are probably not correct, as the yields from other non-vegetable crops 
do not show an increasing trend. In addition, both production and end of year mature areas are identical for both 
the official MPOB data and the FAO data for the period 1975-2011. The difference in the yield figures has an 
easier explanation, since the formulae for calculating oil yields differ, as illustrated in equations (1) and (2): 
 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑂𝐵 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
 (1) 
   
 
𝐹𝐴𝑂 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
 (2) 
 
 
Normally, this difference would be unproblematic as the trends would be approximately the same. However, the 
trends are not the same, meaning that one of these is probably inconsistent. Palm kernel (PK) is, as mentioned, 
a by-product of the palm oil sector. Both CPO and PK are produced from fresh fruit bunches (FFB), and therefore, 
both use the same mature area. The MPOB has official figures for both the CPO yield and the PK yield. One can 
estimate the average amount of mature area in production as production and yield data are available. Using the 
yield figures to estimate mature area gives inconsistent results. Area estimates using CPO yield differ from the 
estimates using PK yield prior to 1984. In addition, for most of the 2000s, the official MPOB figures imply that 
nearly 100 % of all planted land was in production, while the official MPOB figures for mature area at the end of 
the year show that this is implausible. Appendix 1 explains these inconsistencies further and shows the estimation 
of average mature area for all years in more detail. 
To get a more plausible estimate of oil yield, I use yearly CPO production and end-of-year mature area 
data, which are the same for 1975-2011, regardless of whether FAO or MPOB figures are used. For the years 1961-
1974, production and mature area data are available from the FAO, which are broadly similar to earlier PORLA 
publications. Figures for the 1950s are estimated using data from Gopal’s (2001) PhD dissertation, and are the 
least accurate. The yield figures for the 1950s are therefore those with the highest degree of uncertainty. To get 
a better measurement of land used in production, I use the average amount of mature land during the production 
year as shown in equation (3): 
 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2
 (3) 
 
The oil yield is the CPO production divided by the average amount of mature area as shown in equation (4): 
 
 
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
(
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 (4) 
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For more details, and calculations for each individual year, see appendix 1. Figure 3 presents the results; to 
smooth out short-term fluctuations, I present only the five-year moving average. 
 
 
Figure 3: Oil Yield Crude Palm OIl (metric tonnes)/Average Mature Area (ha) 1953-2009 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Note: For sources and a more detailed explanation of the estimation, see appendix 1 
 
The results in figure 3 show that the official MPOB oil yield figures were probably too optimistic in the 1980s and 
too pessimistic in the 1990s. Taking the estimated figures, the oil yield increased from 1.4 t/ha in 1950 to 2.3 
t/ha in 1960, and even further to 3.7 t/ha in 1975; several authors, among them Gopal (2001 table 3.8 p.125), 
report similar figures. There has also been a considerable increase in long-term yields in the period since the 
mid-1970s. However, the increase was slow up until the mid-1990s. It is important to analyse the potential 
reasons for this pattern. To examine the underlying process, I divide the production process into its two stages; 
figure 4 shows a rough schema of this two-stage process. 
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Figure 4: Production process of Crude Palm oil 
 
The productivity of crude palm oil can therefore be divided into two components as shown in equation (5a), with 
equation (5b) showing the same two components defined: 
 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
=
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
×
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 (5a) 
   
 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝐹𝐹𝐵 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑂𝐸𝑅) (5b) 
 
To calculate these separate ratios, I had to make some assumptions. Time-series on fresh fruit bunch production 
suffer from a lack of time consistency as the collection of official data was changed in 1989. The Department of 
Statistics and the MPOB used different ways of collecting the data, thus, the time series are not comparable. 
Therefore, I used the FAO time-series on fresh fruit bunch production as these are consistent over time.75 In 
appendix 1, I show the results for individual years. In figure 5, I show the five-year moving average to smooth 
out short-term fluctuations, and I have also indexed the figure to 1963 to enable an easier analysis of relative 
changes over time. 
 
                                            
75 For estimating the Oil Extraction Rate, the preferred measure is FFB processed and not FFB produced, as some of the FFBs are used for seed 
production. However, the difference between the two is small and I assumed that the relative share was constant over time. 
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Figure 5: Oil Yield, FFB Yield and OER 1963-2009 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Note: For sources and a more detailed explanation of the estimation, see appendix 1 
 
The results show that the growth in the yield of fresh fruit bunches (FFB) is the main contributor to the growth 
in the oil yield. FFB yield grew fast in the three short periods, 1963-69, 1975-81 and 1999 until the present. These 
‘leaps’ were followed by more modest growth. The most relevant ‘leap’ for the topic of the paper is the 1975-
81 one. The oil extraction rate (OER) contributed to the growth in oil yields from 1963 to 1975, but then entered 
a period of long-term decline, which lasted until the mid-1990s. Since 1995, the OER has again increased, but 
has still not come back to the levels of the mid-1970s. If true, it would imply that the main driver for increasing 
oil yields were productivity improvements at the plantation level. It would also imply that mill productivity held 
oil yields back. 
To find the reason for the increase in oil yields, one has to find the reason for an increase in FFB yields. 
One potential reason is the increased amount of palm oil research. Several palm oil companies improved their 
research through the creation of the Oil Palm Genetics Laboratory.76 In addition, the Malaysian Department of 
Agriculture launched a research exchange programme with West Africa. The most important technological change 
has been the improvement of the palm trees through the introduction of new species. The introduction of the 
DxP variety in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which led to more FFB per hectare, is probably the main reason 
behind the large leap in FFB yields from 1975 to 1981. As can be seen in figure 6, the DxP variety of oil palm 
quickly replaced the less efficient DxD and other oil palm species. Since it takes three years from a tree is planted 
until it reaches harvesting maturity, and a further five years for the highest yield, one would expect yields to 
increase approximately eight years following the planting of a new DxP tree. There is a lagged correlation 
between the share of DxP palm trees and the increase in FFB yields eight years later. Data from the Department 
of Statistics (1969-1988) show that plantations that have the DxP variety of oil palm trees have a higher yield 
than plantations with a different palm oil species. However, there are too few observations, and a large selection 
bias issue, which means that any kind of econometric specification would not yield reliable results. 
 
                                            
76 See for instance Hartley (1988) and Kajisa et al. (1997). 
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Figure 6: Planted Palm Oil Species, Share (%) of Total Planted Area Peninsular Malaysia 1968-1988 
Source: DoS (1968) Table 25; DoS (1969) Table 26; DoS (1970-1971) Table 29; DoS (1972) Table 30; DoS (1973-1981) Table 31; DoS (1982-
83) Table 29; DoS (1984-1988) Table 6.1 
 
A second reason for improvements in FFB yields is the increased productivity in the government schemes. As 
mentioned previously, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) was the largest government scheme in 
Malaysia.77 FELDA increased its ownership share of oil palm planted area from less than 5 % in 1970 to around 
30 % in 1990.78 Plantations expanded on good soil, and often shifted from rubber to palm oil. FELDA expanded on 
virgin soil, often considered of ‘secondary suitability’ in terms of soil quality and topography.79 FFB yields of the 
FELDA programme increased from 13.9 FFB per ha in 1975 to 18.1 FFB per ha in 1985.80 Private estates only 
managed an increase from 18.0 to 18.6 FFB per ha the same years. FELDA’s improvements in management and 
the private incentives for smallholders that took part in the programme probably led to the increase in FFB 
yields.81 
The oil extraction rate (OER) has not shown clear progress for the period as a whole. The major reason 
mentioned for the lack of increase in OER is that FFBs do not have a proper degree of ripeness, which lowers 
OER.82 One potential reason for this lack of ripeness is the high competition among mills, especially those without 
their own plantation.83 The competition, coupled with the pressure to increase production, might have caused a 
decline in harvesting standards and the quality of FFBs. Another reason for the lack of ripeness has been the 
increasing shortage of workers at plantations. This meant that detached FFBs are lying on the ground too long 
before being transported to mills. 
                                            
77 The private plantations have the best FFB yield. Government schemes, sometimes called organized smallholders, have a lower FFB yield than 
private plantations. FELDA has had periods with highly centralised management on the different schemes in an attempt to benefit from 
economies-of-scale. The different farmers resisted such attempts, as these preferred more independence in how to manage their own plots. The 
independent smallholders, or true smallholders, have the lowest FFB yield among oil palm growers. For the role of independent smallholders, 
see for Rahman et al. (2008). 
78 Data based on Simeh and Ahmed (2001). Other public schemes accounted for a further 16 % of total planted area in 1990. 
79 Fold (1994 p.76). 
80 DoS (1975 Table 32); and DoS (1985 Table 6.2). 
81 Palm oil was the most profitable of the government schemes with FELDA settlers growing palm oil earning 765 RM per month, compared to 484 
RM for rubber schemes and 148 RM for padi rice cultivators. 
82 Chan and Lee (1993 p.11). 
83 In 1988, 45 mills were located on estates and 58 mills were owned by estates. The remaining 119 mills are ‘independent’ in the sense that 
they are owned by smallholders or (local) state organisations or linked to comparatively small private estates (Fold, 1994 p.76). Mills that do not 
have their own plantations are fully ‘supply-dependent’. An estimate made by Thiran (1984) claims that 29 of 171 mills in 1981 were fully ‘supply-
dependent’. 
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Large private firms owning both plantations and mills in general have higher OERs than the industry 
average.84 This might be the result of (i) better labour saving technologies at plantations; (ii) private research 
which is more directed at firm-specific problems and therefore more likely to be relevant for the firm; and (iii) 
a tighter integration between plantations and mills, meaning that there are better routines to get FFBs quickly 
to the mills, thereby increasing their ripeness. However, the OER in private plantation firms, despite being higher, 
did have the same trends as the rest of the industry.85 
 
2.2 Labour productivity 
SInce plantations are labour-intensive, labour productivity has special importance. Employment data are taken 
from ‘The Oil Palm, Coconut and Tea Statistics Handbook’ published annually by the Department of Statistics. 
The data from the Department of Statistics show end of year employment for 1969-88. Having only one 
observation per year could potentially be problematic because of the seasonal nature of production. However, 
the correlation between annual production and employment in December is high, which makes the indicator 
plausible.86 
 
To analyse the labour productivity for the period 1969-88, I estimate two labour productivity measures shown in 
equations (6) and (7): 
 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 =
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
(
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 (6) 
   
 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 =
𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
(
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 (7) 
 
To estimate the input, the employment during the year, I estimate the average employment by dividing the two 
end-of-year figures. The input estimation measure for employment is similar to the input measure for land for 
oil yields. In addition, I had to adjust the data to make sure they were consistent over time. Workers were 
categorized into (i) Directly employed; and (ii) Contract workers. While the share of directly employed on 
plantations was available for the whole period, the share of contract workers employed on plantations was only 
available for 1979-1988. Therefore, the share of contact workers employed on plantations and those employed 
in mills in the period 1969-1978 had to be estimated using the trend in the share 1979-1988. It is important to 
stress that the results do not hinge on these assumptions. Appendix 2 shows the calculation and data issues more 
extensively. 
The first labour productivity measure is for the plantations. As the employment figures were only for 
plantations in Peninsular Malaysia, I excluded FFB production from Sabah and Sarawak, as well as from 
government schemes. The production data for FFB is the same as for FFB yields, from the FAO (2014), adjusted 
to make sure that the production figures were only for Peninsular Malaysia plantations. For more details on the 
estimations, see appendix 2.  
The evidence indicates that labour productivity increased strongly for plantations (see figure 7). Better 
equipment might explain the increase in labour productivity meaning that capital per worker increased. However, 
the mechanisation of production of palm oil first started in the 1980s. Anecdotal evidence from the 1970s 
                                            
84 Chang et al. (2003 p.28) shows that the OER is highest for plantation-based mills. The ‘supply-dependent’ mills came out second, with the 
government mills having the lowest OER. 
85 See for instance Gan et al. (1993) for Sime Darby; Lee and Shawaluddin (1993) for Golden Hope; and Toh and Tan (1993) for United Plantations. 
86 This correlation is sufficient, as I am interested in trends rather than absolute values. 
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indicates that there was no large increase in the capital per worker in this decade.87 Figures from the Department 
of Statistics indicate that real capital per worker was actually decreasing. It is therefore unlikely that an increase 
in capital caused the increase in labour productivity. The evidence indicates that better organisation and 
improvements in management probably were the keys to increasing productivity. Mature land per worker in 1970 
was 3.3 ha; by 1988, this figure had increased to 8.8 ha. It is not possible to cover an increasing land area without 
an improvement in the organisation at the plantations. 
 
 
Figure 7: Labour Productivity and Land per Labour Ratio Plantations Peninsular Malaysia 1970-1988 (1970 = 100) 
Note: For sources and a more detailed explanation of the estimation, see appendix 2 
 
The labour situation does deserve a special comment, since the 1980s started to see the first signs of problems 
with labour shortage. Following the introduction of manufacturing free trade zones and the higher wages offered 
there, Malaysians became increasingly unwilling to work on plantations. This created a labour shortage in the 
palm oil industry. This situation is a chronic problem for the industry, which, despite attempts to raise labour 
productivity and mechanisation, refuses to go away. Since 1986, the inflow of foreign workers, especially from 
Indonesia, is meeting the palm oil industry’s need.88 
For plantation mills, labour productivity increased from 1970 to 1986 (see figure 8). The problem is that 
plantation mills are unlikely to be representative for mills in general. Figure 8 shows that the share of mills that 
are located on plantations was a declining share of overall mills, declining from 58 % in 1970 to 17 % in 1988. 
Chang et al. (2003 p.28) shows that plantation mills are more productive, as the oil extraction rates differ 
between plantation types. Less data are available for mills compared to plantations, so no quantitative 
assessment on the causes of the increase in labour productivity is possible. Mills are capital-intensive and labour 
productivity is therefore not likely to be as important for plantations. 
 
                                            
87 Company records from United Plantations show no clear trends in the capital at plantations. The problem is that these records include capital 
invested in mills and refineries, and these explain the large ‘leaps’ in the records. The trend apart from these ‘leaps’ is non-increasing. 
88 For the labour constraints in the plantation industry, see Amatzin (2006). 
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Figure 8: Labour Productivity Mills on Plantations and Production Share of Mills on Plantations 1970-1988 
Note: For sources and a more detailed explanation of the estimation, see appendix 2 
 
 2.3 Cost of production 
A pragmatic view of productivity is to look at real production costs, as plantations aim to minimise these. The 
source of the cost data is the Department of Statistics of Malaysia’s annual survey, published in ‘The Oil Palm, 
Coconut and Tea Statistics Handbook’.  The average annual response rate is around 75 %, with the lowest response 
rate being two-thirds for two separate years. These data are not part of the current official MPOB data. The 
reason appears to be a lack of communication between the Department of Statistics and the MPOB, rather than 
unreliable collection methods. These annual surveys are also the only source that has reported the costs on an 
industry-wide basis. However, I do have cost data for the same period for a single market-leading palm oil 
company, United Plantations. Comparing the production cost from the Department of Statistics with the 
production costs from the United Plantations will give an indication of the data’s validity. 
Cost data is published for 1980-88 and for individual cost categories for the years 1969-88. 89 
Approximately 80 % of total production costs are accounted for by three cost categories: wages, fertilizers, and 
total immature area upkeep costs. It is therefore possible to estimate costs for the 1970s. For a detailed 
description of the costs estimated, see appendix 3. The production data are the same as those used for the 
labour productivity on plantations. Figure 9 presents the unit cost estimates: 
 
 
                                            
89 The cost data is for plantations that have a planted area of 200 ha and above. These figures are representative as these plantations account 
for 93.3 % of all fresh fruit bunch production of all plantation production in the period 1981-87. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
50
100
150
200
250
300
19
7
0
19
7
1
19
7
2
19
7
3
19
7
4
19
7
5
19
7
6
19
7
7
19
7
8
19
7
9
19
8
0
19
8
1
19
8
2
19
8
3
19
8
4
19
8
5
19
8
6
19
8
7
19
8
8
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
M
il
ls
 o
n
 P
la
n
ta
io
n
s 
(%
)
L
a
b
o
u
r 
P
ro
u
d
ct
iv
it
y
 I
n
d
ex
ed
 (
19
7
0
 =
 1
0
0
)
CPO/Average Employment (Indexed 1970 = 100)
Share production mills on estate (%)
Page | 48  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Palm Oil Plantations Peninsular Malaysia: Real Production Costs 1969-88 (2005 prices)/Fresh Fruit Bunch Production (tonnes) 
Note: For sources and a more detailed explanation of the estimation, see appendix 3 
 
According to figure 9, plantations’ cost efficiency increased in real terms. The largest cost share was wages, in 
which wages for harvesters had the highest cost share. The materials for immature area up-keep were large at 
the start of the period, which is not surprising. As mentioned above, oil palm trees takes three years to mature, 
and during the first three years prior to harvesting the area is immature. Oil palm trees have a lifespan of about 
20-30 years before replanting (Ismael and Mamat, 2002). Once planted, it takes a long time until the next 
replanting. Immature area as a share of total planted area decreased from 42.6 % in 1970 to 14.0 % in 1990.90 In 
the 1960s and 1970s, oil palm expanded into many new areas and the costs naturally declined during the 1980s 
and 1990s as more area became mature. 
As mentioned, United Plantations publishes annual reports, which present time-series cost data all the 
way back to 1966. Taking the cost of production for crude palm oil (CPO) and converting it into real figures shows 
a clear downward trend since the end of the 1970s (see figure 10).  The level of cost per CPO is not comparable 
with the cost per FFB in figure 9, as the United Plantation figures include both plantation and milling costs. 
However, the trend is the same for both figures 9 and 10, in that unit costs are declining. This similarity increases 
the plausibility of the cost data based on the Department of Statistics data. For the cost data for individual years, 
see appendix 3. 
 
 
                                            
90 Figures from FAO (2014) and MPOB (2011). 
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Figure 10: United Plantations: Real Average Production Costs 2005 prices Crude Palm Oil 1968-2007 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Note: For sources and a more detailed explanation of the estimation, see appendix 3 
 
There are several reasons for the decline in unit costs. Evidence presented by Noor et al. (2004 pp. 36-37) 
strongly indicated that cost per FFB decreases with plantation size. The same study found similar results for mill 
size and cost efficiency. There was a large concentration of ownership in the palm oil industries, dominated by 
large private plantation companies and government schemes. Large plantation companies, such as United 
Plantations, owned plantations, mills and refineries.91 The integrated production structure meant that a decrease 
in plantation and mill costs increased the competiveness of the refineries. For the government schemes, there 
were private incentives to decrease operation costs. Each settler has a plot of land, at the expense of a loan 
with a maturity of 20 years. Since settlers are organised smallholders, rather than a collective, settlers have an 
incentive to maximise profits in order to repay their loans. Private plantations that did not own their own 
refineries also had incentives to become more profitable. 
 
3. The role of plantations in the establishment of the refineries 
The results of the previous section show that productivity, measured in various ways, probably did increase at 
plantations and mills. However, was the increase in productivity important for the establishment of the palm oil 
refinery sector? Oil palm is the most profitable vegetable oil crop, as shown in table 4.92 If the palm oil sector 
had the same oil yield in 2007 as in 1963, it would still be the highest among all vegetable oils. An increase in 
palm oil productivity, measured by the oil yield, would perhaps not have been necessary for the establishment 
of the palm oil refineries. 
  
                                            
91 Simeh (2002) found that the OER, together with the productivity of palm kernel, were important for the mills’ profits. Differential gains in 
these productivity measures were used to offset the mill’s operating cost. Fold (1994) looked at the origins of the concentration of plantation 
ownership, which was caused by an increase in centralisation in the 1950s in a period when plantations were sold to agency houses as Malaysian 
independence seemed imminent. In 1974, the five largest companies controlled 45 % of the total oil palm planted area, and together with a 
dozen other plantation groups, they controlled about 70 % of the planted area. 
92 Among the four major agricultural crops in Malaysia measured by planted area, palm oil had the highest growth in yield meaning tonnes per 
hectare. From 1961 to 2008, palm oil yield increased by an annual compound growth rate of 1.3 % compared to padi rice the similar figure was 
1.1 %, rubber 0.7 %, and coconuts declined -1.4 %, all data from FAO (2014). Had crop prices been included, the difference would be even larger. 
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Table 4: Value per ha (nominal values based on a three-year moving average) 
 1962-64 1984-86 2006-08 
Crude Palm Oil – Malaysia 
 Oil Yield* 2.40 3.31 4.29 
 Price – USD** 237 466 662 
 Value per ha 569 1,545 2,844 
Rapeseed Oil – European Union 
 Oil Yield* 0.58 0.90 1.16 
 Price – USD** 245 467 924 
 Value per ha 141 421 1,069 
Soyabean Oil – USA 
 Oil Yield* 0.18 0.17 0.31 
 Price – USD** 243 499 826 
 Value per ha 45 85 259 
Sunflower Oil – Argentina 
 Oil Yield* 0.20 0.47 0.69 
 Price – USD** 268 535 942 
 Value per ha 54 251 651 
Source: Calculations based on FAO (2014) and MPOB (2011) 
*Oil Yield is calculated as the three-year moving average of production (tonnes) per harvested area (ha) using FAO data 
** Prices are three-year moving averages of annual average prices in dollar per metric tonne registered on the North West Europe 
Market 
 
Based on the evidence in the previous section, plantations probably did increase their FFB yield, cost efficiency 
and labour productivity. As mentioned, there is no evidence that capital otherwise increased to drive these 
results. The amount of land per worker did increase, and this points to better organisation and learning-by-doing 
as one of the most important reasons for increased productivity. The introduction of the DxP variety of oil palm 
trees also seems to have had an important say in increasing the overall productivity of plantations 
The evidence for mills is far weaker and hampered by a lack of data. The OER was stagnant, with the 
decrease in ripeness of FFBs being the most probable cause. There are no cost efficiency figures for mills, but 
the United Plantations figures do indicate that mills increased cost efficiency. However, there is no sure way of 
telling whether this decrease was similar in magnitude to plantations. The labour productivity figures only existed 
for the mills at plantations, and did show that labour productivity increases were lower for mills than they were 
for plantations. 
These increases in productivity probably allowed for a long-term decline of domestic real palm oil prices 
from 1975 to 1990 (see figure 11). These prices show the same trends as the international prices for crude palm 
oils.93 The decline from 1975 to 1990 followed the introduction of export tax on crude palm oil in 1973; the 
domestic sale of crude palm oil to refineries increased. The refineries are organised through the Palm Oil Refinery 
Association of Malaysia (PORAM).94 Being organised through PORAM meant that the refineries could coordinate 
decisions collectively, giving them a high degree of market power. For instance, PORAM imposes strong quality 
requirements on crude palm oil in order to increase the quality of processed palm oil. Another example is how 
PORAM attempts to lower market prices on inputs to be able to compete on the world market. 
 
 
                                            
93 By using data from the Department of Statistics, and MPOB, one can compare the locally delivery prices of crude palm oil (converted to US 
dollars) with the international prices in US dollars on the Western European market. For the years 1960-2008 the correlation coefficient is 0.972. 
The Malaysian market share of total vegetable oils has been too small to have a direct impact on prices. 
94 Plantations are also organised through the Malaysian Palm Oil Association (MPOA) which had more than 100 members and covered about 70 % 
of the area under private ownership in 2002 (Teoh 2002 p.37). 
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Figure 11: Locally Delivered Average Yearly Price 1961-2010 RM per metric tonne (2005 prices) 
Source: DoS (2007) table 10.1 for 1960-1979 prices; MPOB (2011) for 1980-2011 prices Table 5.1; and WDI (2014) 
 
The main relationship between plantations/mills and refineries is that crude palm oil is the major input of the 
refinery sector. According to Gopal (2001), the main competitive advantage of the Malaysian refinery sector is 
the cheap supply of crude palm oil. The increase in productivity was probably crucial for the establishment of 
the refinery sector, for three important reasons. 
First, the increased cost efficiency meant that crude palm oil lowered the input costs for the refineries, 
both for those refineries that produced their own crude palm oil and those that purchased it on the market. 
Gopal (2001) showed that Malaysian refineries lowered their operating costs during the establishment period of 
the palm oil refineries, which increased their competitiveness.95 Costs were binding for the palm oil refineries; 
the evidence coming from two restructuring processes.96 In the early 1980s, a number of Malaysian palm oil 
refineries went bankrupt as there was a restructuring period following a period of overcapacity. At the end of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a second and far more severe crisis. This crisis coincided with an increase 
in crude palm oil prices, as figure 11 shows, which increased input costs, indicating that these costs were binding 
for the refinery sector.97 
The second reason is that inputs were becoming increasingly scarce. This goes especially for labour. The 
increase in labour productivity allowed an increase in production in excess of what otherwise would have been 
possible. Time-series on employment by the Department of Statistics (2007) indicate that labour productivity has 
not increased since 1986. The reason is that Malaysian labour increasingly refused to work on plantations and 
went to better-paid jobs in the manufacturing sectors. Increasingly, the palm oil sector became dependent on 
foreign labour, especially from Indonesia. However, even if labour productivity probably did not increase by 
much since 1986, it also did not decrease.98 
The third reason is that the increase in productivity allowed an expansion of the output of mills. The 
technological development at the mills was important for the competitiveness of the palm oil sector as the 
                                            
95 The profit margins only considered the value-added at the refinery level of production and did not include the cost of crude palm oil. 
96 Fold (1998 pp.401-402). 
97 Government support alone did therefore not guarantee the survival of the palm oil refinery sector. Food processing industries in most countries 
receive government support and this support is therefore an important competitive advantage. Government support is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for food processing companies. 
98 Based on FAO figures of fresh fruit bunch production and time-series data on employment from the Department of Statistics, the FFB per 
employment ratio increased from 51.8 in 1969 to a high of 241.9 in 1989, and has since been relatively stable. In 2006, the figure was 228.3 
tonne FFB per employed worker. 
800
1300
1800
2300
2800
19
6
1
19
6
3
19
6
5
19
6
7
19
6
9
19
7
1
19
7
3
19
7
5
19
7
7
19
7
9
19
8
1
19
8
3
19
8
5
19
8
7
19
8
9
19
9
1
19
9
3
19
9
5
19
9
7
19
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
A
v
er
a
g
e 
Y
ea
rl
y
 P
ri
ce
 (
R
M
 2
0
0
5
) 
p
er
 m
et
ri
c 
to
n
n
e
Locally delivered average yearly price
Trend using a HP filter (λ = 6.25)
Page | 52  
 
 
quality of crude palm oil increased.99 This increased quality reduced operating costs for refineries and meant 
that processed palm oil had a higher degree of quality. Increased controls were vital for this process to occur.100 
Even the smallest of the Malaysian refineries have established their own laboratory facilities to ensure the quality 
of final products.101 
 
Conclusion 
This paper found that the official oil yield figures have probably understated the true extent of the productivity 
growth at palm oil plantations. As the official oil yield figures were inconsistent, new estimates indicate that 
there has been a considerable increase in oil yields over time. The main source of this increase has been the 
increase in fresh fruit bunches per hectare, and not the oil extraction rate. Estimates of cost efficiency and 
labour productivity show a clear increase in productivity levels. 
The research question of the paper is ‘How did the development in plantation productivity affect the 
establishment of the palm oil refinery sector?’ The increase in productivity was probably crucial for the 
establishment of the palm oil refinery sector. Despite government protection, the palm oil refinery sector was 
cost sensitive because of high international competition. The decrease in production costs for those refineries 
that owned plantations and mills, and a decrease in price for those refineries that had to purchase their crude 
palm oil were vital for the competitiveness of the palm oil refinery sector. The progress in labour productivity 
was not only crucial for the increase in the crude palm oil industry in the establishment period 1970-90, but also 
laid the foundation for the subsequent period. Therefore, it seems likely that the increased productivity was an 
important part in establishing a higher value-added production structure. 
 
                                            
99 PORAM (1990) and Fold (1994 p.77). 
100 Fold (1994 p.77). 
101 Maycock (1989). 
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Appendix 1: Estimating new yield figures 
Stage 1.1: Estimating the Mature Area 
Palm oil fruits, fresh fruit bunches, are used to produce a number of different products; the two major ones are 
crude palm oil and palm kernel, as illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure Appendix 1.1: Illustration of the relationship between palm kernel and crude palm oil 
 
To assess the productivity, the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) uses two land productivity measures: 
 
 
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
 (A1.1) 
   
 
𝑃𝐾 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝐾 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
 (A1.2) 
 
The MPOB publishes time-series, starting in 1975. Figures available include the CPO yield and the PK yield, along 
with yearly production of CPO and PK. The only figure not published, which features in the formula above, is the 
average amount of mature area used in production that specific year. However, this information can be easily 
obtained by re-arranging the above two expressions: 
 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡
 (A1.3) 
   
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
𝑃𝐾 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝐾 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡
 (A1.4) 
 
Since the average mature area to produce crude palm oil and palm kernel is the same, equations A1.3 and A1.4 
should yield the same result. I attempted to estimate the average mature area in production using these two 
equations in table appendix 1.1: 
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Table appendix 1.1: Estimated mature area using equations A1.3 and A1.4 
Year CPO 
Yield 
CPO 
Production 
PK 
Yield 
PK 
Productio
n 
Mature Area Equation A1.3 Mature Area Equation A1.4 
(
Equation A1.3
Equation A1.4
− 1) % 
1975 3.66 1,257,573 0.74 232,821 343,599 314,623 9.21 % 
1976 3.48 1,391,965 0.71 256,015 399,990 360,585 10.93 % 
1977 3.54 1,612,747 0.74 334,791 455,578 452,420 0.70 % 
1978 2.95 1,785,525 0.68 367,540 605,263 540,500 11.98 % 
1979 3.65 2,188,699 0.79 475,039 599,644 601,315 -0.28 % 
1980 3.78 2,573,173 0.81 557,066 680,734 687,736 -1.02 % 
1981 3.76 2,822,144 0.79 588,783 750,570 745,295 0.71 % 
1982 3.83 3,510,920 0.80 909,918 916,689 1,137,398 -19.40 % 
1983 3.43 3,016,481 0.72 834,570 879,441 1,159,125 -24.13 % 
1984 4.25 3,714,795 1.19 1,045,579 874,069 878,638 -0.52 % 
1985 4.33 4,134,463 1.28 1,211,887 954,841 946,787 0.85 % 
1986 4.41 4,542,249 1.28 1,336,263 1,029,988 1,043,955 -1.34 % 
1987 3.39 4,531,960 0.98 1,311,218 1,336,861 1,337,978 -0.08 % 
1988 3.47 5,027,496 1.01 1,473,288 1,448,846 1,458,701 -0.68 % 
1989 3.88 6,056,501 1.15 1,793,690 1,560,954 1,559,730 0.08 % 
1990 3.64 6,094,622 1.10 1,844,737 1,674,347 1,677,034 -0.16 % 
1991 3.48 6,141,353 1.01 1,785,218 1,764,757 1,767,543 -0.16 % 
1992 3.43 6,373,461 0.99 1,874,367 1,858,152 1,893,300 -1.86 % 
1993 3.78 7,403,498 1.16 2,266,104 1,958,597 1,953,538 0.26 % 
1994 3.43 7,220,631 1.05 2,203,929 2,105,140 2,098,980 0.29 % 
1995 3.50 7,810,546 1.08 2,395,588 2,231,585 2,218,137 0.61 % 
1996 3.55 8,385,886 1.06 2,488,750 2,362,221 2,347,877 0.61 % 
1997 3.63 9,068,728 1.06 2,638,068 2,498,272 2,488,743 0.38 % 
1998 3.02 8,319,682 0.88 2,429,468 2,754,862 2,760,759 -0.21 % 
1999 3.58 10,553,918 1.03 3,025,690 2,948,022 2,937,563 0.36 % 
2000 3.46 10,842,095 1.01 3,162,760 3,133,553 3,131,446 0.07 % 
2001 3.66 11,803,788 1.05 3,367,710 3,225,079 3,207,343 0.55 % 
2002 3.59 11,909,298 0.98 3,268,635 3,317,353 3,335,342 -0.54 % 
2003 3.75 13,354,769 1.02 3,627,235 3,561,272 3,556,113 0.15 % 
2004 3.73 13,976,182 0.98 3,661,456 3,746,966 3,736,180 0.29 % 
2005 3.80 14,961,654 1.01 3,964,031 3,937,277 3,924,783 0.32 % 
2006 3.93 15,880,786 1.02 4,125,124 4,040,912 4,044,239 -0.08 % 
2007 3.83 15,823,745 0.99 4,096,989 4,131,526 4,138,373 -0.17 % 
2008 4.08 17,734,441 1.05 4,577,500 4,346,677 4,359,524 -0.29 % 
2009 3.93 17,564,937 1.01 4,500,683 4,469,450 4,456,122 0.30 % 
2010 3.69 16,993,717 0.93 4,292,076 4,605,343 4,615,135 -0.21 % 
2011 4.01 18,911,520 1.00 4,706,603 4,716,090 4,706,603 0.20 % 
Source: Yield and production figures gathered from MPOB (2012) tables 1.17  and 3.2 
 
The differences in average mature area, using the two formulas, were large, especially for the period up until 
1983 as illustrated in figure appendix 1.2: 
 
 
Figure appendix 1.2: Percentage difference in estimated mature area using equations A1.3 and A1.4 
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As an alternative, one could estimate average mature area by dividing the mature area at the end of year t and 
the mature area at the end of year t-1: 
 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2
 (A1.5) 
 
The MPOB published time-series data on the mature area at the end of the year. I have used this somewhat crude 
measure to compare it with the other two estimates of productivity in figure appendix 1.3: 
 
 
Figure appendix 1.3: Estimated yearly mature area 
Source: For equations A1.3 and A1.4 see table appendix 1.1; for equation A1.5 data was gathered from MPOB (2012) table 1.2 
 
According to figure appendix 1.3, the mature area estimates using equations A1.3 and A1.4 are internally 
inconsistent up until 1983, but have followed each relatively closely since then. However, from 1994 and onwards, 
equation A1.5 gives a lower estimate of mature area than equation A1.3 and A1.4. This is puzzling, since all the 
data used come from the same source, namely the MPOB. If true, the figures from 1994 and onward would imply 
that area considered mature during the production year, is immature at the end of the year. This is plausible for 
a limited number of years, since an area might need to be re-planted towards the end of the year. However, as 
oil palm trees take approximately 3 years to mature, the figures could only explain the deviation for 2-3 years 
at most, while the figures above show that this process then must have occurred 17 years in a row. This is highly 
unlikely, and is therefore dismissed, which means that equation A1.3 and A1.4 yield implausible estimates for 
mature area in production. In addition, the increase in mature area using A1.5 shows a smoother trend than 
equations A1.3 and A1.4. This implies that the trend using A1.5 is more plausible. 
The official yield figures, from which A1.3 and A1.4 are derived, is therefore inconsistent. More evidence 
comes from figure appendix 1.4, which seems to indicate unrealistically large fluctuations in the average mature 
area using the official figures. In addition, if the official figures are true, then the share of land in production 
has been close to 100 % during the year since 2000, but between 80-85 % at the end of the same years. In 
conclusion, despite the average mature area derived by using equation A1.5 is a simple and somewhat crude 
measure, it provides a more consistent and plausible estimate of average mature areas than do the first two 
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equations derived from the official yield figures. To re-estimate the oil yield, I therefore use the average mature 
area. 
 
 
Figure Appendix 1.4: Mature Area as a % Share of Planted Area 
Source: Mature area using CPO and PK Yield from table appendix 1.1, end of year figures for mature and planted area are gathered from 
MPOB (2011) table 1.2 
 
Stage 1.2: Estimating the Oil Yields 
To construct the oil yields, production data on crude palm oil (CPO) and mature area 1975- 2011 are from the 
MPOB (2011). Production data on fresh fruit bunches (FFB) presented a problem as the Department of Statistics, 
which collected palm oil data up until 1988, reported widely different figures than PORLA/MPOB did following 
1989 indicating a measurement change. To avoid internal inconsistency, all FFB production figures from 1961-
2011 are from the online FAO (2014) database. Figures for the period 1950-60 are uncertain. The doctoral thesis 
of Gopal (2001) reported production and oil yield figures for 1950 and 1960, and using these figures, I estimated 
mature land in these two years. Production and mature area data for 1951 to 1959 is extrapolated separately 
and must therefore be interpreted with caution. Appendix 1.2 presents the data.  
Using the CPO production and the mature area figures from table appendix 1.2, I estimate two separate 
oil yields: 
 
 
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
 (A1.6) 
   
 
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 =
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
(
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 (A1.7) 
 
The results, from these two equations are compared with the official oil yield in table appendix 1.3 
The two components of the oil yield, the FFB yield and the Oil Extraction Rate (OER) are given by: 
 
 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝐹𝐹𝐵 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑂𝐸𝑅) 
 
(A1.8) 
   
 𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
=
𝐹𝐹𝐵 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎
×
𝐶𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐹𝐹𝐵 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
 
(A1.9) 
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Using the FFB production, CPO production, and the different measures of mature area, I have estimated the 
separate components in table appendix 1.4. 
 
Table Appendix 1.2: Production and land data palm oil 
Year FFB Production CPO Production Mature Area End of Year Average Mature Area Equation A1-5 
1950  54,100 37,832  
1951  57,870 38,058 37,945 
1952  61,640 38,283 38,170 
1953  65,410 38,509 38,396 
1954  69,180 38,734 38,621 
1955  72,950 38,960 38,847 
1956  76,720 39,185 39,073 
1957  80,490 39,411 39,298 
1958  84,260 39,636 39,524 
1959  88,030 39,862 39,749 
1960  91,800 40,087 39,975 
1961 500,000 94,846 43,302 41,695 
1962 570,000 108,171 46,175 44,739 
1963 662,000 125,691 49,073 47,624 
1964 647,000 122,913 52,900 50,987 
1965 792,000 150,411 59,000 55,950 
1966 949,000 189,687 67,400 63,200 
1967 1,129,000 225,758 78,500 72,950 
1968 1,415,000 282,984 99,100 88,800 
1969 1,761,000 352,096 125,400 112,250 
1970 2,155,000 431,069 149,900 137,650 
1971 2,902,000 580,389 184,000 166,950 
1972 3,422,000 718,580 235,100 209,550 
1973 3,870,000 812,614 278,300 256,700 
1974 4,981,000 1,045,975 329,800 304,050 
1975 6,200,000 1,257,573 385,666 363,809 
1976 6,500,000 1,391,965 454,009 419,838 
1977 7,500,000 1,612,747 521,486 487,748 
1978 9,900,000 1,785,525 603,087 562,287 
1979 10,700,000 2,188,699 670,299 636,693 
1980 12,800,000 2,573,173 777,388 723,844 
1981 14,400,000 2,822,144 848,143 812,766 
1982 17,900,000 3,510,920 888,619 868,381 
1983 15,400,000 3,016,481 1,010,879 949,749 
1984 19,500,000 3,714,795 1,072,451 1,041,665 
1985 21,400,000 4,134,463 1,201,010 1,136,731 
1986 23,100,000 4,542,249 1,360,579 1,280,795 
1987 22,800,000 4,531,960 1,373,147 1,366,863 
1988 25,300,000 5,027,496 1,530,906 1,452,027 
1989 30,600,000 6,056,501 1,672,096 1,601,501 
1990 31,000,000 6,094,622 1,746,054 1,709,075 
1991 31,500,000 6,141,353 1,826,267 1,786,161 
1992 33,200,000 6,373,461 1,890,268 1,858,268 
1993 39,700,000 7,403,498 2,020,516 1,955,392 
1994 38,800,000 7,220,631 2,144,080 2,082,298 
1995 42,200,000 7,810,546 2,243,065 2,193,573 
1996 44,030,000 8,385,886 2,353,147 2,298,106 
1997 47,670,000 9,068,728 2,513,183 2,433,165 
1998 43,840,000 8,319,682 2,638,020 2,575,602 
1999 55,000,000 10,553,918 2,856,701 2,747,361 
2000 56,600,000 10,842,095 2,941,791 2,899,246 
2001 58,950,000 11,803,788 3,005,267 2,973,529 
2002 59,546,000 11,909,298 3,188,307 3,096,787 
2003 66,775,000 13,354,769 3,303,133 3,245,720 
2004 69,881,000 13,976,182 3,450,960 3,377,047 
2005 74,800,000 14,961,654 3,631,440 3,541,200 
2006 79,400,000 15,880,786 3,703,254 3,667,347 
2007 79,100,000 15,823,745 3,764,389 3,733,822 
2008 88,672,000 17,734,441 3,915,924 3,840,157 
2009 87,825,000 17,564,937 4,075,702 3,995,813 
2010 84,965,000 16,993,717 4,202,213 4,138,958 
2011 94,557,600 18,911,520 4,281,837 4,242,025 
Source: MPOB (2011) table 1.2 (mature area) and 3.2 (CPO production) for 1975-2011; FAO (2014) for FFB production 1961-2011; CPO production and mature 
area 1961-1974; 1950 and 1960 figures from Gopal (2001) table 3.8 page 125; 1951-1959 extrapolated 
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Table Appendix 1.3: Oil yields, official and estimated 
Year Official MPOB Oil Yield Equation A1.6 Equation A1.7 
1950  1.43  
1951  1.52 1.53 
1952  1.61 1.61 
1953  1.70 1.70 
1954  1.79 1.79 
1955  1.87 1.88 
1956  1.96 1.96 
1957  2.04 2.05 
1958  2.13 2.13 
1959  2.21 2.21 
1960  2.29 2.30 
1961  2.19 2.27 
1962  2.34 2.42 
1963  2.56 2.64 
1964  2.32 2.41 
1965  2.57 2.70 
1966  2.88 3.05 
1967  3.01 3.20 
1968  3.06 3.38 
1969  3.01 3.36 
1970  3.05 3.34 
1971  3.29 3.66 
1972  3.33 3.67 
1973  3.13 3.42 
1974  3.06 3.48 
1975 3.66 3.26 3.46 
1976 3.48 3.07 3.32 
1977 3.54 3.09 3.31 
1978 2.95 2.96 3.18 
1979 3.65 3.27 3.44 
1980 3.78 3.31 3.55 
1981 3.76 3.33 3.47 
1982 3.83 3.95 4.04 
1983 3.43 2.98 3.18 
1984 4.25 3.46 3.57 
1985 4.33 3.44 3.64 
1986 4.41 3.34 3.55 
1987 3.39 3.30 3.32 
1988 3.47 3.28 3.46 
1989 3.88 3.62 3.78 
1990 3.64 3.49 3.57 
1991 3.48 3.36 3.44 
1992 3.43 3.37 3.43 
1993 3.78 3.66 3.79 
1994 3.43 3.37 3.47 
1995 3.50 3.48 3.56 
1996 3.55 3.56 3.65 
1997 3.63 3.61 3.73 
1998 3.02 3.20 3.26 
1999 3.58 3.69 3.87 
2000 3.46 3.69 3.74 
2001 3.66 3.93 3.97 
2002 3.59 3.74 3.85 
2003 3.75 4.04 4.11 
2004 3.73 4.05 4.14 
2005 3.80 4.12 4.23 
2006 3.93 4.29 4.33 
2007 3.83 4.20 4.24 
2008 4.08 4.53 4.62 
2009 3.93 4.31 4.40 
2010 3,69 4,04 4,11 
2011 4,01 4.42 4.46 
Source: Official MPOB yield gathered from MPOB (2011) table 1.17. The other figures used are data from table appendix 1.2 
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Table Appendix 1.4: Oil Yield and its separate components 
Year Method 1: End Year Mature Area Method 2: Average Mature Area 
 FFB Yield OER Oil Yield FFB Yield OER Oil Yield 
1961 11.55 0.19 2.19 11.99 0.19 2.27 
1962 12.34 0.19 2.34 12.74 0.19 2.42 
1963 13.49 0.19 2.56 13.90 0.19 2.64 
1964 12.23 0.19 2.32 12.69 0.19 2.41 
1965 13.53 0.19 2.57 14.21 0.19 2.70 
1966 14.41 0.20 2.88 15.26 0.20 3.05 
1967 15.03 0.20 3.01 16.02 0.20 3.20 
1968 15.29 0.20 3.06 16.88 0.20 3.38 
1969 15.04 0.20 3.01 16.80 0.20 3.36 
1970 15.27 0.20 3.05 16.69 0.20 3.34 
1971 16.46 0.20 3.29 18.29 0.20 3.66 
1972 15.86 0.21 3.33 17.46 0.21 3.67 
1973 14.89 0.21 3.13 16.27 0.21 3.42 
1974 14.57 0.21 3.06 16.55 0.21 3.48 
1975 16.08 0.20 3.26 17.04 0.20 3.46 
1976 14.32 0.21 3.07 15.48 0.21 3.32 
1977 14.38 0.22 3.09 15.38 0.22 3.31 
1978 16.42 0.18 2.96 17.61 0.18 3.18 
1979 15.96 0.20 3.27 16.81 0.20 3.44 
1980 16.47 0.20 3.31 17.68 0.20 3.55 
1981 16.98 0.20 3.33 17.72 0.20 3.47 
1982 20.14 0.20 3.95 20.61 0.20 4.04 
1983 15.23 0.20 2.98 16.21 0.20 3.18 
1984 18.18 0.19 3.46 18.72 0.19 3.57 
1985 17.82 0.19 3.44 18.83 0.19 3.64 
1986 16.98 0.20 3.34 18.04 0.20 3.55 
1987 16.60 0.20 3.30 16.68 0.20 3.32 
1988 16.53 0.20 3.28 17.42 0.20 3.46 
1989 18.30 0.20 3.62 19.11 0.20 3.78 
1990 17.75 0.20 3.49 18.14 0.20 3.57 
1991 17.25 0.19 3.36 17.64 0.19 3.44 
1992 17.56 0.19 3.37 17.87 0.19 3.43 
1993 19.65 0.19 3.66 20.30 0.19 3.79 
1994 18.10 0.19 3.37 18.63 0.19 3.47 
1995 18.81 0.19 3.48 19.24 0.19 3.56 
1996 18.71 0.19 3.56 19.16 0.19 3.65 
1997 18.97 0.19 3.61 19.59 0.19 3.73 
1998 16.88 0.19 3.20 17.16 0.19 3.26 
1999 19.25 0.19 3.69 20.17 0.19 3.87 
2000 19.24 0.19 3.69 19.52 0.19 3.74 
2001 19.62 0.20 3.93 19.82 0.20 3.97 
2002 18.68 0.20 3.74 19.23 0.20 3.85 
2003 20.22 0.20 4.04 20.57 0.20 4.11 
2004 20.25 0.20 4.05 20.69 0.20 4.14 
2005 20.60 0.20 4.12 21.12 0.20 4.23 
2006 21.44 0.20 4.29 21.65 0.20 4.33 
2007 21.01 0.20 4.20 21.18 0.20 4.24 
2008 22.64 0.20 4.53 23.09 0.20 4.62 
2009 21.55 0.20 4.31 21.98 0.20 4.40 
2010 20.22 0.20 4.04 20.53 0.20 4.11 
2011 22.08 0.20 4.42 22.29 0.20 4.46 
Source: Calculated using data presented in table appendix 1.2. 
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Appendix 2: Labour productivity 
Data on employment is available for 1969-1988 in the Department of Statistics ‘The Oil Palm, Coconut and Tea 
Statistics Handbook’. For the years 1969-1978, information is available on three categories: (1) Directly 
employed; (2) Contract workers; and (3) Other workers. The first category consists of (a) Administrative staff; 
(b) Estate workers; and (c) Mill workers. For the years 1979-1988, the third category, (3) Other workers, is 
incorporated in the figures for various plantation staff. In addition, contract workers for 1979-1988 are subdivided 
into (a) Estate workers and (b) Mill workers. 
To make the figures consistent, I made some modifications. The reason for these modifications is that 
a small share of the workers is classified differently in the two periods. To be able to compare the data, I had to 
make three adjustments. First, I added the category (3) Other workers to the (1b) Directly employed estate 
workers for 1969-1978. Second, I included a residual category called ‘unpaid family workers, working proprietors 
and partners’ in the (1b) category for 1979-1988. Finally, as the estate and mill shares for contract workers were 
unavailable for 1969-78, I estimated these. To estimate the respective shares of estate and mill workers, I used 
the 1979-1988 data. Estimating the share of the estate workers as a share of total workers from 1979 to 1988 
yields the following trend: 
 
 
Figure Appendix 2.1: Number of Estate Workers as Share of Contract Workers 1979-1988 
 
To estimate the share from 1969-78 I assume the same linear trend. The linear trend gave the highest R2 and is 
found appropriate as the period estimated is short. It is important to emphasise that the results in this paper do 
not hinge on these assumptions, since the results are the same if only directly employed figures were employed, 
whether all contract workers were assumed to be working on plantations or using these estimated figures. 
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Table appendix 2.1 Employment Palm Oil Estates by Number at the End of the Year 
Year 1. Directly employed 2. Contract workers TOTAL 
 (a) 
Administrative 
Staff 
(b) 
Estate 
Workers* 
(c) 
Mill 
Workers 
Total 
Directly 
Employed 
(a) 
Estate 
Workers 
(b) 
Mill 
Workers 
Total 
Contract 
Workers 
Total 
Employed 
1969 1,554 19,500 1,778 22,832 10,572 574 11,146 33,978 
1970 1,382 21,302 1,877 24,561 11,264 584 11,848 36,409 
1971 1,471 24,517 2,138 28,126 12,956 640 13,596 41,722 
1972 1,545 25,707 2,057 29,309 17,600 827 18,427 47,736 
1973 1,660 28,958 2,013 32,631 18,335 818 19,153 51,784 
1974 1,993 35,329 2,182 39,504 22,956 969 23,925 63,429 
1975 4,300 33,615 2,412 40,327 24,510 976 25,486 65,813 
1976 4,781 35,174 2,608 42,563 22,427 840 23,267 65,830 
1977 5,040 37,537 2,288 44,865 22,897 803 23,700 68,565 
1978 5,819 39,975 2,382 48,176 24,808 812 25,620 73,796 
1979 6,672 41,965 2,606 51,243 27,158 729 27,887 79,130 
1980 7,832 44,527 2,760 55,119 27,000 778 27,778 82,897 
1981 8,983 45,719 2,836 57,538 27,721 689 28,410 85,948 
1982 9,282 43,776 2,847 55,905 27,784 654 28,438 84,343 
1983 9,317 43,434 2,683 55,434 24,213 496 24,709 80,143 
1984 10,442 43,290 2,725 56,457 29,369 509 29,878 86,335 
1985 10,718 43,775 2,764 57,257 32,830 494 33,324 90,581 
1986 10,985 42,874 2,755 56,614 30,511 476 30,987 87,601 
1987 11,544 42,535 2,760 56,839 34,209 317 34,526 91,365 
1988 12,257 43,133 2,680 58,070 37,982 318 38,300 96,370 
Source: For the years 1969-1978: Department of Statistics (1973) Table 43; Department of Statistics (1978) Table 45 
For the years 1979-1988: Department of Statistics (1983) Table 42; Department of Statistics (1988) Table 10.1 
Figures in bold are estimated using the estimated share of estate and contract workers 
* For the years 1969-1978: Includes the category ‘other workers’; For the years 1979-1988: Includes the category ‘unpaid family workers, working proprietors 
and partners’ 
 
The data on employment back to 1969 was only available for the plantations of Peninsular Malaysia. Employment 
data for Sabah and Sarawak first became available from 1980 and onwards. Therefore, the production and land 
figures had to be re-adjusted. I therefore deducted the Sabah and Sarawak production quantity of fresh fruit 
bunches for 1969-1988; and for the mature area 1969-1974, using Department of Statistics data. As the total 
production and mature area figures included both plantations and government schemes, I had to adjust for that 
as well. The problem was that FFB production data for government schemes was missing for 1969-1972, while 
they were available for 1973-1988. Using the 1973-1988 figures, I estimated a linear trend for both production 
and land as illustrated in figure appendix 2.2. Again, the linear trend gave the highest R2 and was chosen, as the 
time-period estimated for was short. 
 
 
Figure appendix 2.2: Plantation share of production and area in production in peninsular Malaysia 
Source: DoS (1973-1981) Table 32; DoS (1982-1983) Table 30; DoS (1984-1988) Table 6.2 
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The data on employment for mills is only available for those mills that are located on plantations. Data is 
available for crude palm oil production coming from these mills, and to get a more accurate estimate of the 
labour productivity of mills, I only use this production figure. I also included data on the share of CPO production 
coming from mills located on plantations as a share of total CPO production in Peninsular Malaysia. The data 
used on production and land are presented in table appendix 2.2. 
The employment figures are end of year figures; therefore, I take the averages of the two end of year 
figures to construct labour input. The labour productivity measures for plantations and for mills are estimated 
by equations A2.1 and A2.2: 
 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 =
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
(
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 
 
(A2.1) 
   
 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 =
𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑡
(
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 
 
(A2.2) 
 
For the calculation of labour productivity at the plantation level, I use workers from categories (1a), (1b) and 
(1c). For the calculation for labour productivity at the mill level, I use workers from categories (1c) and (2b). I 
also measure the amount of land per employee by estimating equation A2.3: 
 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑡 =
(
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
(
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1
2 )
 
 
(A2.3) 
 
Table appendix 2.3 shows the estimated labour productivity and land per employee. 
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Table appendix 2.2 FFB, CPO production and mature area, all figures for plantations located in Peninsular Malaysia 
Year FFB Production 
(metric tonnes) 
Mature Area 
(Hectare) 
CPO Production Mills 
(metric tonnes) 
CPO Production Share 
Mills on Plantations 
1969 1,713,911 104,841 192,585 59 % 
1970 1,689,418 114,681 232,318 58 % 
1971 2,234,850 137,746 301,385 55 % 
1972 2,565,746 176,206 318,237 48 % 
1973 2,898,678 190,697 327,667 44 % 
1974 3,563,765 220,882 391,531 42 % 
1975 4,280,113 248,556 459,814 40 % 
1976 4,507,975 299,733 476,094 38 % 
1977 5,220,453 334,392 509,685 34 % 
1978 7,346,168 373,747 505,011 31 % 
1979 7,069,063 408,867 614,137 30 % 
1980 7,870,750 449,514 640,369 27 % 
1981 8,830,108 483,936 648,348 25 % 
1982 10,810,010 525,095 737,172 23 % 
1983 9,415,567 601,292 582,059 21 % 
1984 12,066,568 645,607 659,938 19 % 
1985 13,051,008 703,246 711,288 19 % 
1986 13,849,386 784,680 759,063 18 % 
1987 13,633,600 774,665 696,453 17 % 
1988 15,472,856 896,205 774,990 17 % 
Source: The production and mature area figures for FFB are from the same source as in Appendix 1.2 with two deductions. 
 
The mature area for peninsular data for 1975-1988 are from MPOB (2011) table 1.2. The first the deduction by the FFB production (1969-1988) and mature 
area (1969-74) from Sabah and Sarawak using data Department of Statistics (1974; 1975; 1976; 1977; 1978; 1979; 1980; 1981) Table 51; Department of 
Statistics (1982; 1983) Table 49; Department of Statistics (1984; 1985; 1986) Table 12.6; Department of Statistics (1987; 1988) Table 12.4; and Department 
of Statistics (1974) Table 46. 
 
The second deduction is by excluding the share of production and mature area of non-plantations. For data on the plantation share of production and mature 
area in Peninsular Malaysia I used the Department of Statistics (1973; 1974; 1975; 1976; 1977; 1978; 1979; 1980; 1981) Table 32; Department of Statistics 
(1982; 1983) Table 30; Department of Statistics (1984; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1988) Table 6.2. 
 
CPO production by mills on estates, and their share, was gathered from Department of Statistics (1969) Table 24; Department of Statistics (1970; 1971; 1972) 
Table 26; Department of Statistics (1973; 1974; 1975; 1976; 1977; 1978; 1979; 1980; 1981) Table 34; Department of Statistics (1982; 1983) Table 32; 
Department of Statistics (1984; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1988) Table 6.4.  
 
Table appendix 2.3: Labour Productivity for Plantations and Mills; and Land per Labour Ratio 
 FFB Production per Person Employed CPO Production per Person Employed Mature Area per Person Employed 
1970 52 97 3,3 
1971 61 115 3,5 
1972 61 112 3,7 
1973 62 115 3,9 
1974 65 131 3,8 
1975 70 141 3,8 
1976 72 139 4,3 
1977 82 156 5,2 
1978 108 161 5,8 
1979 97 188 5,9 
1980 101 186 6,1 
1981 109 184 6,0 
1982 132 210 6,6 
1983 119 174 7,7 
1984 151 206 8,4 
1985 153 219 8,8 
1986 161 234 9,0 
1987 158 221 8,9 
1988 170 255 8,8 
Source: Calculated with data from tables appendix 2.1 and 2.2 
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Appendix 3: Cost data 
The cost data for 1981-1987 was only available for plantations over 200 hectares. I made the simplifying 
assumption that these plantations were representative for other plantations. Since these plantations account for 
93.3 % of all fresh fruit bunch production from plantations, the assumption does not have large implications. The 
costs, converted to 2005 Ringgit, are shown in table Appendix 3.1: 
 
Table Appendix 3.1: Share Real Production Costs Measured in Ringgit (2005 = 100) 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 SUM Share 
Supervision costs 30,171 35,433 38,005 45,342 47,882 44555 49,592 290,980 3 % 
Miscellaneous 51,084 62,004 61,707 66,429 79,054 80653 69,041 469,972 5 % 
Transportation costs 87,295 98,519 82,391 104,275 126,583 121697 120,775 741,534 7 % 
Repairs and maintenance 69,086 70,963 66,189 74,058 81,531 68599 72,636 503,061 5 % 
Mature area up-keep (materials) 371,517 308,120 291,831 335,373 389,550 294495 294,730 2,285,616 23 % 
Immature area up-keep 
(materials) 
210,774 157,403 157,574 150,676 196,649 186907 183,598 1,243,582 12 % 
Harvesting and collection 34,887 42,997 16,056 24,442 24,321 15715 6,055 164,473 2 % 
Salaries and wages 571,807 592,072 548,665 61,5196 667,786 651698 676,548 4,323,773 43 % 
TOTAL 1,426,62
2 
1,367,51
1 
1,262,41
9 
1,415,79
1 
1,613,35
6 
1,464,31
8 
1,472,97
5 
10,022,99
2 
100 
% 
Source: Source: DoS (1985-1987) Table 11.2; Depreciation and taxes are not included; WDI (2014) 
 
There are three main cost categories, with salaries and wages comprising of 43 % of the total production costs; 
materials for mature area up-keep 23 % and materials for immature are up-keep 12 %. The other cost categories 
collectively account for 22 % of total production costs. To estimate the total costs for the period 1969-1988, I 
will therefore look at each of them in turn and consider: (i) Salaries and wages; (ii) Materials for mature are up-
keep; (iii) Materials for immature area up-keep; and (iv) Other costs. 
 
3.1 Wage cost 
I had to make two adjustments. The first adjustment was to convert those years that only had December figures 
available to yearly figures. For 1969-79, the wage data is for December while for 1979-1988 there are yearly 
figures. 1979 is the only year in which these figures overlap, and I assume that the ratio of yearly wages relative 
to December wages are the same for each individual year 1969-1978 as for 1979. I calculate the ratio between 
yearly and December wage for each individual wage category, namely (1a) Directly employed administrative 
staff; (1b) Directly employed estate workers; (1c) Directly employed mill workers; (2) Contract workers; and (3) 
Other workers. Thereafter, I estimate the yearly wage for each individual year from 1969 to 1978. To get the 
real wage, I use the consumer price index from WDI (2014). 
The second adjustment I had to make was similar to the one in appendix 2. I had to estimate the share 
of contract workers that were working on plantations and the share working in plantation mills. I use a similar 
approach by estimating the relationship for the years 1979-1988 as shown figure appendix 3.1: 
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Figure Appendix 3.1: Share Wages Estate Contract Workers as a Share of Wages Contract Workers 1979-1988 
 
I then assumed that the linear relationship to hold for 1969-1978 and used the equation above to estimate the 
wage costs for estate contract workers. The result of the estimations are shown in table appendix 3.2. When 
using the cost data as a part of total production costs, I will not include (1c) Directly employed mill workers; and 
(2b) Contract mill workers as these do not contribute to the production of fresh fruit bunches. 
 
Table Appendix 3.2: Real yearly wages 1969-88 (1969-78 estimated) 
Year 1. Wages Directly employed 2.  Wages Contract workers TOTAL WAGES 
 (a) 
Administrative 
Staff 
(b) 
Estate 
Workers 
(c) 
Mills 
Workers 
Total 
Directly 
Employed 
(a) 
Estate 
Workers 
(b) 
Mills 
Workers 
Total 
Contract 
Workers 
Total 
Employed 
1969 29,661,091 63,416,255 7,225,645 100,302,992 49,945,328 5,611,210 55,556,539 155,859,531 
1970 25,938,830 65,441,382 8,202,245 99,582,458 51,985,191 5,712,024 57,697,216 157,279,673 
1971 28,867,095 74,007,488 9,457,124 112,331,706 54,607,144 5,865,884 60,473,028 172,804,734 
1972 26,925,094 91,658,121 9,664,973 128,248,189 69,344,598 7,279,267 76,623,866 204,872,054 
1973 29,419,904 105,964,237 10,137,173 145,521,314 77,135,236 7,909,126 85,044,361 230,565,676 
1974 33,143,373 140,657,325 10,677,412 184,478,109 116,646,542 11,677,487 128,324,029 312,802,138 
1975 51,616,577 134,818,844 11,680,843 198,116,264 124,454,641 12,158,576 136,613,217 334,729,481 
1976 58,510,331 150,958,457 12,625,191 222,093,979 116,360,517 11,088,023 127,448,540 349,542,519 
1977 58,244,103 170,977,368 11,705,346 240,926,818 128,790,048 11,964,103 140,754,151 381,680,968 
1978 65,073,661 199,557,283 13,882,399 278,513,343 155,476,143 14,072,541 169,548,684 448,062,027 
1979 93,744,064 231,892,497 18,647,077 344,283,637 202,074,808 5,021,236 207,096,045 551,379,682 
1980 109,129,780 248,704,091 22,477,451 380,311,322 216,657,571 5,501,796 222,159,367 602,470,689 
1981 132,708,790 246,808,554 22,851,060 402,368,404 208,014,302 4,934,169 212,948,472 615,316,875 
1982 140,690,053 253,961,251 25,281,169 419,932,473 207,466,721 4,127,498 211,594,219 631,526,691 
1983 142,848,509 246,649,872 21,707,958 411,206,338 175,675,642 3,686,952 179,362,595 590,568,933 
1984 158,208,643 256,874,970 22,612,172 437,695,786 224,745,687 2,855,485 227,601,172 665,296,958 
1985 172,359,744 267,797,268 23,579,636 463,736,647 253,174,102 3,808,516 256,982,618 720,719,266 
1986 179,401,996 252,441,705 23,357,030 455,200,731 246,328,470 3,406,819 249,735,289 704,936,020 
1987 188,599,521 257,938,922 23,082,755 469,621,197 252,276,482 2,330,230 254,606,712 724,227,910 
1988 198,227,790 282,031,690 23,454,725 503,714,205 292,113,346 2,053,329 294,166,675 797,880,880 
Source: DoS (1969) Table 31; 33; DoS (1970; 1971; 1972) Table 33; 35 Department of Statistics (1973; 1974; 1975; 1976; 1977; 1978) Table 44; 45; DoS (1979; 
1980; 1981); DoS (1979) Table 45 DoS (1982; 1983); Table 42; DoS (1982) Table 43; DoS (1984; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1988) Table 10.2; DoS (1988) Table 10.1; 
and WDI (2014) 
 
3.2 Materials Mature area up-keep costs 
The approach to estimate the material costs for mature area up-keep costs was relatively straightforward. Data 
for mature area up-keep were only available for the period 1981-1987. However, data on fertilizer cost was 
available for the period 1967-88. Fertilizer is the biggest expenditure of materials for mature area up-keep costs, 
and the approach is then to estimate the cost through a mark-up on fertilizer costs through equation A3.1: 
 
y = 0,002x + 0,9719
R² = 0,9217
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 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑈𝑝𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 = (1 + 𝜇)𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 (A3.1) 
 
For the period the 1980-86, fertilizer costs are approximately 75.7 % of total mature upkeep costs using a 
weighted average. There were no large yearly fluctuations. The mark-up is μ ≈ 1.32. Using this mark-up, I 
estimate the total costs for materials mature upkeep costs for 1969-79. 
 
3.3 Materials Immature area up-keep costs 
It is not possible to take the same approach as for materials for mature area up-keep costs and use fertilizer 
data, since these constitute a far lesser share of the overall costs of materials immature area up-keep costs and 
are more volatile in terms of their share. Data does exist for total costs for immature area up-keep 1969-1988, 
but the problem is that it includes wage costs. For the years 1981-87, however, both material costs and total 
costs are given. Using table 11.2 from DoS (1985-1987), one can calculate the share of materials cost of immature 
area as a share of total costs of immature area through equation A3.2: 
 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡
 (A3.2) 
 
For 1981-1987, the weighted share was 45.5 %, and the share was relatively constant for each individual year. As 
the share does not vary for the observable years, I assume this share is constant, and I estimate material costs 
for immature area by using equation A3.3: 
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (A3.3) 
 
3.4 Other Costs 
Rather than take the five other cost categories individually, I take them as a whole. These other costs have a 
weighted share of total production costs 1981-1987 of 21.6 %. This share is relatively constant over time. I will 
therefore assume that this goes for the 1969-1988 period as a whole, and estimate other costs to be 21.6 % of 
total production costs. 
 
3.5 Total and Unit Costs 
Table appendix 3.3 shows total real costs and the various cost categories. For unit costs, I used the production 
data presented in table appendix 2.2 to estimate the unit costs presented in table appendix 3.4. Finally, table 
appendix 3.5 presents the real production costs for United Plantations for individual years. 
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Table Appendix 3.3: Total Costs (2005 Ringgit) Plantations Peninsular Malaysia 1969-1988 
Year (1) Wages (2) Materials 
Mature Area 
Keep-Up 
(3) Materials 
Immature Area 
Keep-Up 
(4) Other Cost TOTAL = (1) + 
(2) + (3) + (4) 
1969 143,022,675 45,208,851 142,460,224 91,271,922 421,963,673 
1970 143,365,404 62,476,183 115,496,547 88,690,296 410,028,429 
1971 157,481,726 93,244,807 123,974,700 103,418,673 478,119,906 
1972 187,927,814 114,433,542 149,079,800 124,599,123 576,040,280 
1973 212,519,377 121,646,248 144,686,776 132,164,710 611,017,110 
1974 290,447,240 182,820,344 181,699,691 180,772,947 835,740,223 
1975 310,890,062 214,699,728 181,688,896 195,211,055 902,489,740 
1976 325,829,305 223,162,337 172,166,541 199,041,838 920,200,021 
1977 358,011,519 211,010,283 122,296,814 190,806,027 882,124,643 
1978 420,107,087 256,101,690 148,199,858 227,539,275 1,051,947,910 
1979 527,711,369 321,741,733 147,409,587 275,137,115 1,271,999,804 
1980 574,491,442 385,380,506 147,412,248 305,613,784 1,412,897,979 
1981 587,531,646 402,356,918 214,104,935 332,305,844 1,536,299,343 
1982 602,118,024 321,280,258 153,665,512 297,272,862 1,374,336,656 
1983 565,174,023 300,374,209 156,035,087 281,960,083 1,303,543,402 
1984 639,829,301 346,449,870 152,439,463 314,289,784 1,453,008,417 
1985 693,331,114 401,535,302 196,760,655 356,492,975 1,648,120,046 
1986 678,172,171 285,573,482 189,422,990 318,278,030 1,471,446,674 
1987 698,814,925 296,284,089 181,153,273 324,649,186 1,500,901,472 
1988 772,372,826 410,620,643 160,444,101 370,792,829 1,714,230,398 
Source: DoS (1969) Table 27; 30; DoS (1970-1972) Table 31; 34; DoS (1973-1981) Table 39; 42; DoS (1982-1983) Table 36; 39; 41; DoS (1984-1988) Table 7.1; 
11.1; DoS (1984) Table 11.4; DoS (1985-1986) Table 11.3;  Table Appendix 3.1; and Table Appendix 3.2. 
 
Table Appendix 3.4: Unit Costs (2005 Ringgit) Plantations Peninsular Malaysia 1969-1988 
Year (1) Wages/FFB (2) Materials Mature Up-Keep/FFB (3) Materials Immature Up-Keep/FFB (4) Other Cost/FFB TOTAL/FFB = 
(1) + (2) + (3) + (4) 
1969 83 26 83 53 246 
1970 85 37 68 52 243 
1971 70 42 55 46 214 
1972 73 45 58 49 225 
1973 73 42 50 46 211 
1974 82 51 51 51 235 
1975 73 50 42 46 211 
1976 72 50 38 44 204 
1977 69 40 23 37 169 
1978 57 35 20 31 143 
1979 75 46 21 39 180 
1980 73 49 19 39 180 
1981 67 46 24 38 174 
1982 56 30 14 27 127 
1983 60 32 17 30 138 
1984 53 29 13 26 120 
1985 53 31 15 27 126 
1986 49 21 14 23 106 
1987 51 22 13 24 110 
1988 50 27 10 24 111 
Source: Appendix Table 2.2 and Appendix Table 3.3 
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Table Appendix 3.5: Real cost of production (2005 Ringgit) 
Year Crude Palm Oil Palm Kernel 
1966 910 199 
1967 898 216 
1968 822 203 
1969 882 209 
1970 868 210 
1971 783 211 
1972 803 226 
1973 813 360 
1974 714 292 
1975 707 183 
1976 912 178 
1977 810 227 
1978 806 217 
1979 820 212 
1980 783 201 
1981 780 210 
1982 699 206 
1983 771 249 
1984 743 231 
1985 713 209 
1986 630 214 
1987 708 220 
1988 684 224 
1989 661 220 
1990 627 182 
1991 593 191 
1992 564 174 
1993 546 149 
1994 590 159 
1995 585 152 
1996 572 142 
1997 547 131 
1998 643 186 
1999 556 139 
2000 573 133 
2001 577 143 
2002 551 143 
2003 544 124 
2004 550 118 
2005 536 115 
2006 488 106 
2007 524 123 
2008 515 109 
2009 481 107 
Source: United Plantations (1975-2009) 
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Essay 3: Resource-Led Growth Past and Present 
 
Abstract 
The impact of natural resources on economic growth has clearly differed among countries. 
This paper asks whether this impact has also changed over time when comparing Finland 
and Sweden (1860-1910) to Indonesia and Malaysia (1960-2010). The results indicate that 
natural resources have a positive effect in all four countries. Better institutions, more 
supportive economic policy and a higher degree of human capital all affect a country’s 
ability to manage its natural resources. However, natural resources have less of an impact 
on economic growth in the more recent period. The most plausible reason is the larger 
technological catch-up potential, which leads to a greater reliance on non-resource 
manufacturing exports in the latter period. In addition, the increasing share of 
manufacturing in world trade might also affect the result. 
 
Introduction 
Most economic historians agree that natural resources greatly enhanced economic growth in a number of early 
industrialisers. In the late 19th century, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United States all benefited 
greatly from their natural resources. Economic historian Gavin Wright claims that natural resources not only 
benefited these early industrialisers, but also current resource-abundant countries.102 However, these claims are 
contradictory to the majority of relatively recent literature dubbed the ‘resource curse’ literature. 103 
Representative of these views is Richard Auty (2001a p.840) who claims: ‘Since the 1960s, the resource-poor 
countries have outperformed the resource-rich countries compared by a considerable margin’. The obvious 
question that arises is which of the two views is correct. Do natural resources have a different effect on 
economies in the late 19th compared to the late 20th century?104 
Many scholars claim that natural resources do have a similar impact in both periods. Ferranti et al. 
(2002) claimed that industrialisation in the late 19th century was highly dependent on natural resources. They 
illustrate how Italy’s failure to industrialise in this period might have been caused by a lack of necessary natural 
resources. Sweden, in contrast, is an example of successful 19th century resource-led growth. The country utilised 
its forests to upgrade its production from wood to wood manufacturing and, later, paper. The value-added 
content of production thereby increased over time, leading to increased economic growth. Wright and Czelusta 
(2006) argued that this same process was present for mineral products in Australia and Chile in the late 20th 
century, meaning that natural resources had the same impact in the late 19th as in the late 20th century. If true, 
current resource-abundant developing countries can learn important lessons from the late 19th century 
experience. 
However, other researchers disagree and believe that the late 20th century is different from the late 
19th century. Sachs and Warner (1995) claimed that the 1971-1990 period (their period of study) was different 
from the late 19th century period. The problem was that they provided few empirical or theoretical reasons for 
                                            
I am grateful for comments from Stig Tenold, Liam Brunt, Ola Honningdal Grytten, Jan Tore Klovland, Ingelin Orten and Karl Rolf Pedersen. Also 
thanks to the participants of the Economic History Society Annual Conference, March 2010, Durham, United Kingdom; and the 6th Sound Economic 
History Workshop, 23 September 2011, Department of Economics, The Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen for valuable input. All remaining 
errors are solely mine. 
102 See for instance Wright (1990); David and Wright (1997); and Wright and Czelusta (2006). 
103 The term resource curse describes the paradox that many resource rich countries since 1970 have failed to experience high economic growth. 
104 Comparing these two time-periods is natural. 1850-1914 called the first era of globalisation, with an increased integration of the world 
economy, just as the post-1950 period, analogously called the second era of globalisation. These periods contrast with the interwar period, 
between 1918 and 1939 when the world economy disintegrated. 
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why this should be the case. In one way, however, Sachs and Warner (1995) were right. The 1971-1990 period 
was unusual as commodity prices were highly volatile, there was much macroeconomic instability and economic 
growth declined in comparison to the 20 years that preceded it. The 1971-1990 period is unlikely to yield the 
true relationship between natural resources and economic growth. More recently, Ragnar Torvik (2009), 
commenting on the difference between the 19th and 20th century resource abundance, admitted it was still an 
underexplored topic. 
The current paper aims to increase our understanding of resource-led growth in different periods by 
analysing four case studies. For this purpose, Finland and Sweden (1860-1910) are compared to Indonesia and 
Malaysia (1960-2010). An obvious weakness is the lack of generalizability of case studies. However, important 
lessons can be learned by analysing a limited number of countries, as one can analyse mechanisms more in depth 
compared to a broad cross-country study. 
The paper is organised as follows. First, a brief literature review is presented, emphasising some 
relevant theoretical links between natural resources and economic growth. Second, the empirical approach of 
the paper is explained. In the following two sections, Finland/Sweden and Indonesia/Malaysia are analysed in 
turn. Finally, the results of the two preceding sections are compared to analyse whether there are differences 
between the two periods. 
The results indicate that natural resources do have a positive effect on the economy in both periods. In 
addition, the reasons for this positive impact are broadly similar, since better institutions, a more supportive 
policy and increased human capital all seem to increase the success of the natural resource sectors. However, 
the impact of natural resources on economic growth was greater for the 1860-1910 case studies. The most likely 
reason is that the technological catch-up potential was far greater in the 1960-2010 period, which allowed for a 
more rapid economic growth through technological learning. 
 
1. Literature overview 
1.1 Dutch Disease and Rent Seeking 
The traditional Dutch disease and rent seeking models have a number of common features. First, they are 
deterministic and pessimistic with regard to economic growth: An increase in natural resources will set in motion 
some mechanism X, which in turn reduces economic growth. Second, they assume no idle production factors, 
meaning that capital and labour are fully utilised. This means that an increase in natural resources distorts the 
resource allocation in the economy. Finally, there is no theory of the resource sector as natural resources are 
often modelled as a currency gift. In other words, these models take a ‘black box’ approach of the natural 
resource sectors and do not consider processes that occur at the sector level. 
The traditional Dutch disease argument suggests that the discovery of natural resources leads to an 
appreciation of the exchange rate and affects the allocation of labour and capital. Sachs and Warner (1995) use 
a Dutch disease model with three sectors: a tradable natural resource sector, a tradable (non-resource) sector, 
and a non-traded sector. An assumption is that the tradable (non-resource) sector generates learning-by-doing 
and thereby technological progress, while the other sectors do not. The larger the natural resource sector, the 
less labour and capital would be diverted to the tradable (non-resource) sector. Hence, an increase in natural 
resources reduces technological progress and thereby long-term economic growth. 
In an extension of the Dutch disease argument, Gylfason (2001) argued that the increased resource 
abundance would lead to a decrease in education. The argument was similar to the one for the Dutch disease 
models. As manufacturing experiences learning-by-doing; the sector has a higher demand for human capital than 
the natural resource sectors. If the natural resource sectors expand, it would lower demand for human capital. 
A lower degree of human capital is then equated with a decrease in economic growth. 
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Similarly, the resource curse has also been associated with excessive rents. Entrepreneurs can 
potentially engage in productive activities or attempt to capture rents in natural resource sectors, so-called 
windfall profits. A resource boom increases the number of entrepreneurs investing in natural resource sectors to 
capture this windfall profit (as it is privately optimal), and thereby reduces activities that are more productive, 
thereby lowering economic growth. Many studies have linked rent-seeking behaviour to lower economic growth 
(Torvik, 2002, Robinson et al., 2006, Sandbu, 2006).105 
These explanations have a number of problems. The first is the assumption that natural resource sectors 
have fewer linkages than the growth sector. The argument is that an expansion in the natural resource sector 
will have less impact on the economy because of its enclave structure; thereby, an economy would experience 
a lower growth rate compared to a situation with a similar expansion in manufacturing (Hirschman, 1958; Seers, 
1964; Baldwin, 1966). However, the growth experience of 19th century resource-abundant countries contradicts 
this view, since natural resource sectors increased their linkages to manufacturing sectors.106 In addition, many 
studies argue that processing their natural resources is a feasible and desired way forward for many developing 
countries (Roemer, 1970, Lewis Jr, 1989, Cramer, 1999, Jaffee and Gordon, 1993). The problem is that little 
evidence exists on the development of linkages from natural resources over time. 
In addition, the ‘fewer linkages’ argument implicitly relies on the assumption that manufacturing 
automatically generates linkages. However, manufacturing sectors in developing countries can be highly 
inefficient and have little connection with the rest of the economy. This is related to the ‘low level equilibrium 
trap’ caused by coordination failure proposed by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). In an attempt to promote 
industrialisation, governments in several developing countries have invested in state-owned manufacturing 
companies with no clear incentives for increasing production. This ‘White Elephants’ problem leads to 
manufacturing sectors with low capacity utilisation, low productivity and few linkages to the rest of the economy 
(Auty, 2001a; Baland and Francois, 2000; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Robinson and Torvik, 2005).107 It 
is safe to say that manufacturing production alone is not sufficient for linkages to develop. 
A second problem is the assumption of learning-by-doing as a sole property of the growth sector. This 
assumption implies that productivity growth in manufacturing is higher than in agriculture. However, Martin and 
Mitra (2001) concluded that total factor productivity growth had been higher for agriculture than for 
manufacturing for the period 1967 to 1992, which is consistent with the results from other studies (Lewis et al., 
1988; Martin and Warr, 1993; Bernard and Jones, 1996a). This means that there is little evidence to support the 
assumption that manufacturing is ‘superior’ with regard to productivity. However, these studies only compared 
agriculture and manufacturing, not mining and fuel sectors, for which, to my knowledge, no studies have 
compared productivity performances with manufacturing. Still, little compelling evidence has thus far been 
presented to justify the assumption of a ‘superior’ productivity performance of manufacturing over the natural 
resource sectors. 
A third problem is that neither Dutch disease nor the rent seeking effects seem sufficiently strong to 
lower economic growth (Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Bulte et al., 2005). 
Oil economies are found to have higher wages, but its effect on economic growth is not severe. In addition, these 
explanations fail to account for the cases in which resource-abundant countries have achieved economic growth 
                                            
105 A related mechanism is the classic commons problem, in which the discovery of new natural resource deposits leads to an inefficient 
exploitation of the public good (Lane and Tornell, 1996). While the commons problem is associated with inefficient resource utilisation, rent 
seeking is associated with inefficient production. Both can potentially reduce long-term economic growth. 
106 One obvious question is how applicable Dutch disease and rent seeking models are for 19th century economies, since these models assume full 
usage of the factors of production. The Lewis-Ranis-Fei model assumes that countries in an early stage of development have underutilised labour 
(so-called ‘surplus labour’), which can be transferred to modern sectors without affecting wages. The evidence of the applicability of the Lewis-
Ranis-Fei model is weak, however; since economic growth in the 19th century was correlated with increased wages, see for instance Blomqvist 
(1990) for the case of Finland. 
107 Related to this argument is the effect of foreign direct investments, which has been criticised for the lack of technology transfer to the local 
economy. On the debate on the impact of foreign direct investments, see for instance Lipsey and Sjöholm (2005). 
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(Auty, 2001b). This goes especially for 19th century resource-led growth in which increased production in the 
natural resource sectors was correlated increased economic growth and industrialisation (Wright, 1990).108 Most 
economists do acknowledge that Dutch disease effects are present, but claim they do not affect long-term 
economic growth. 
 
1.2 Institutions 
The institutional explanation comes in two different variants. 109  The first of these, dubbed endogenous 
institutions, emphasises that natural resources affect institutional quality and institutions in turn affect economic 
growth. The second, dubbed exogenous institutions, instead claims that countries that had good quality 
institutions benefit from their natural resources. Both explanations, like the Dutch disease, employ a ‘black box’ 
approach towards the natural resource sector itself. 
The endogenous institutions view is similar to the Dutch disease and rent-seeking arguments, with 
institutions becoming mechanism X. The argument is that natural resources do not have a direct impact on 
economic growth, but rather, an indirect effect by reducing the quality of institutions (Leite and Weidmann, 
2002). A number of studies have linked resource abundance with a decline of the quality of institutions (Auty, 
2001a; Auty, 2001b; Ross, 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham 
et al. (2005) suggested that institutions were only affected by geographically concentrated natural resources (so 
called ‘point sources’ which were defined as minerals and plantation crops). Thereby, only certain natural 
resources affect the economy adversely. 
However, similar problems are associated with the endogenous institutional explanation as with the 
Dutch disease. Endogenous institutions fail to explain resource-led growth in economies with point sources. 
Resource-led growth in 19th century US was based mainly on minerals and fuels, the same resources claimed to 
reduce institutional quality (David and Wright, 1997). In addition, it fails to explain resource-led growth in the 
late 20th century. Since 1970, oil exporting Norway has experienced high economic growth, and it is hard to claim 
that Norwegian institutions have deteriorated in the process.110 
The exogenous institutions explanation differs as resources do not affect institutions, but institutions 
instead determine how natural resources affect the economy (Mehlum et al., 2006a; Mehlum et al., 2006b). On 
the one hand, countries that had good institutions prior to a resource discovery, will benefit from their natural 
resources. On the other hand, countries with bad institutions may experience a resource curse. Mehlum et al. 
(2006b pp.2-3) made the following distinction on institutional quality: 
 
‘The distinction we make is between producer friendly institutions, where rent-seeking and production 
are complementary activities, and grabber friendly institutions, where rent-seeking and production are 
competing activities. With grabber friendly institutions, there are gains from specialisation in 
unproductive influence activities, for instance due to a weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy, 
and corruption. Grabber friendly institutions can be particularly bad for growth when resource 
abundance attracts scarce entrepreneurial resources out of production and into unproductive activities. 
                                            
108 In an interesting extension of the Dutch disease explanation, Torvik (2001) constructed a model in which natural resources had a more 
ambiguous effect on economic growth. The difference in this model, compared to the ones above, was that learning-by-doing occurred in all 
sectors, and the growth effect of natural resources depended on the extent of learning-by-doing in the various sectors and the spillover effect 
between sectors. The Torvik (2001) model is different from other Dutch disease models as its outcome is less deterministic. It is more promising 
as it incorporates many of the problems mentioned with the more standard explanations of Dutch disease and rent seeking. 
109 The recent resurgence of institutions in economics is attributed to North (1990) who popularised the study of institutions as a cause for long-
term growth. Subsequent research has strongly indicated that there is a link between the two, see for instance Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu 
et al.(2001), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004). 
110 Another problem is the quality of the evidence presented in Isham et al. (2005), who claimed that point source reduced institutional quality. 
Point sources were defined as minerals and plantation crops, and a country was judged to be dominated by point sources if these were the two 
main primary export products. In the case of Malaysia, the two main exports were oil (a mineral) and palm oil (a plantation crop). However, 
Malaysia was judged not to have point sources, despite the definition in the paper. 
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With producer friendly institutions, however, rich resources attract entrepreneurs into production, 
implying higher growth.’ 
 
Even though the exogenous institutions explanations are intuitive and appealing as they can explain both 
resource-led growth and the resource curse, they do have some issues. First, if a country has ‘bad’ institutions 
prior to a discovery, natural resources might hurt the economy, implying that a country should increase its 
institutional quality prior to natural resource production. However, little is explained on how to acquire ‘good’ 
institutions (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). In addition, it is unlikely an economy is willing to postpone natural 
resource production until these ‘good’ quality institutions are acquired. Second, because these explanations 
treat natural resource sectors as a ‘black box’, little is explained on how institutions affect the resource sectors 
themselves. 
 
1.3 Economic Policy 
Economic policies offer a non-deterministic explanation of how natural resources affect economic growth. The 
explanation assumes that governments in resource-abundant countries can pursue either growth enhancing or 
growth retarding economic policies. These explanations have some common features. First, the outcome is open 
and policy explanations have therefore more potential to explain why some countries experience resource-led 
growth, while others experience a resource curse. Second, the policy explanations in general highlight fiscal 
policy as the resource sectors generate large revenues. Finally, as above, the natural resource sectors are 
generally treated using a ‘black box’ approach. 
In theory, governments can use large resource revenues to stimulate a big-push industrialisation, which 
overcomes coordination failures. Economic policy can also be concentrated in specific areas such as human 
capital. Evidence found by Stijns (2006) suggests that resource abundance increased human capital. Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003), also highlights that the curse may be caused by the government’s inability to manage large 
revenues. They present examples of cases in which a combination of natural resources, macroeconomic instability 
and public expenditure have caused a low rate of genuine savings. As a number of researchers emphasise, this is 
not a ‘resource curse’ per se, but rather a ‘fiscal income’ curse, which could as easily occur by other means such 
as foreign aid (Harford and Klein, 2005, Morrison, 2012). 
Related to the management of revenues is the high volatility of commodity prices, which continues to 
receive much attention as an important cause of the resource curse (Davis, 2001, Davis et al., 2003, Atkinson 
and Hamilton, 2003, Bleaney and Halland, 2009, Van der Ploeg, 2011). This explanation becomes more powerful 
when combined with foreign debt, as many oil-rich countries increased long-term borrowing in the 1970s 
following the oil price increase, using future oil income as collateral. When oil prices subsequently declined, the 
foreign debt became unsustainable, leading to a debt crisis in a number of oil-rich countries during the 1980s 
(Manzano and Rigobon, 2006). A potential solution to the fiscal policy challenges is the establishment of a 
stabilisation fund for non-renewable resources, as has been done in Norway. Uncertainty would decrease as price 
shocks have less of an impact on government spending and would therefore improve fiscal responsibility (Davis, 
2001). 
The economic policy explanations are attractive, but do have some issues. Often, the only economic 
policy considered is revenue management. While important, it is far from the only policy that influences resource 
sectors. US resource-led growth in the 19th century involved a broader economic policy that promoted search 
activity, research and innovation in the natural resource sectors (David and Wright, 1997).  
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1.4 Technology 
Economic historians use a different approach when analysing resource-abundant countries. First, natural 
resources are seen as endogenous. In other words, there is no ‘black box’ approach toward the natural resource 
sector. Second, the interrelationship between institutions and economic policy is analysed. Third, the research 
relies on case studies, which allow for a more in-depth analysis. 
Case studies on the US are particularly interesting. The US emerged as the world’s largest economy 
towards the end of the 19th century with much of its growth being related to the country’s resource abundance 
(Habakkuk, 1962). David and Wright (1997) claimed that the resource abundance in the 19th century US was 
endogenous to the government’s policies. No other country invested as much in the exploration and development 
of new technologies to produce and apply minerals. 
US resource abundance and 19th century industrialisation are closely linked. In fact, the US became the 
world leading manufacturing producer in the same period as the country became the world leading producer of 
numerous mineral and fuels. Wright (1990) proved that these two processes were linked as the mineral factor 
content of US manufacturing exports increased from 1870 until the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. 
According to David and Wright (1997), the US experience highlighted the importance of (i) Strong institutions, 
especially an accommodating legal framework; (ii) Infrastructure and public knowledge; and (iii) Human capital, 
especially in the education in mining, minerals and metallurgy.111 
The problem is that not much can be generalised from analysing only one country, especially as the US 
has a number of unique characteristics.  Findlay and Lundahl (2004), however, compares various resource-
abundant countries in the 1870-1914 period. Their findings indicated that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the US used their natural resources as a catalyst, with linkages spreading to other sectors, which was used to 
industrialise. Argentina and Brazil managed to promote some linkages between the primary sector and 
manufacturing, allowing for the development of early industrialisation. Other primary exporting countries such 
as Costa Rica and Siam (Thailand) failed to establish strong linkages between the primary sector and 
manufacturing. The findings indicate that the difference between ‘successful’ and ‘not successful’ 19th century 
resource-led growth lay in the country’s ability to upgrade the level of technology and develop linkages to other 
sectors in the economy. 
Some researchers believe that these differences also apply to late 20th century resource-abundant 
countries (Ferranti et al., 2002). Wright and Czelusta (2006) analysed mineral-abundant Australia and Chile in 
the late 20th century, and concluded that the growth process is similar to the one in the mineral-abundant US in 
the late 19th century. In addition, Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006) found that countries with a higher level 
of human capital benifited more from their natural resources, indicating that the level of technology is important 
for resource-led growth. If these arguments are true, the countries that experience a ‘resource curse’ are more 
likely suffering from a ‘low level of technology curse’. 
There are, however, two main issues with the technology explanation of resource-led growth. First, the 
case study methodology limits its generalizability. One notable exception is Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006) 
who apply a panel data set-up to analyse the effect of the level of technology. However, one quantitative study 
alone is not sufficient evidence. Second, the claims from Gavin Wright, that 20th century mineral economies have 
the same pattern of growth as late 19th century economies, is not clear. The claim was based solely on two 
mineral economies, Australia and Chile. In addition, only the domestic factors were considered, leaving out a 
number of potentially important mechanisms. 
                                            
111 Mineral owners were not rent-seeking agents interested in windfall profit from a sector with backward technology as assumed in the Dutch 
disease and rent seeking models. Rather, the mining sector invested heavily in new technologies and created new linkages to manufacturing. 
These effects might have been long lasting, as a larger mining industry in 1880 is correlated with a better productivity performance among US 
states up until as late as 1980 (Bernard and Jones, 1996b, Mitchener and McLean, 1999, Mitchener and McLean, 2003). 
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2. Empirical approach 
The research strategy is to use a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, I compare two countries within each period 
to analyse the reasons for differences in performance. In the second stage, I compare the two periods in order 
to analyse differences over time. 
For 1860-1910, Finland and Sweden are analysed as examples of resource-led growth. The two countries 
both have large forest areas, have relatively similar cultures and are geographically located in the same region. 
Sweden was, however, more successful than Finland, in that industrialisation occurred earlier, economic 
development in the period of analysis was higher and the development of forestry-related industries was more 
rapid. 
For 1960-2010, Indonesia and Malaysia are analysed. Indonesia and Malaysia are both large producers of 
oil and palm oil; they have similarities culturally and are located in the same region. However, Malaysia was the 
more successful of the two with more rapid industrialisation and higher economic growth. In other words, the 
Finland/Sweden comparison share many features of the Indonesia/Malaysia comparison. 
The analysis will use some simple time-series econometrics to quantify some features of the growth 
process in the four countries mentioned above. In particular, three specifications are tested. The first will 
measure the absolute contribution of natural resource value-added to the rest of the economy to determine if 
natural resources have a positive correlation with non-resource production. The second will measure how the 
share of natural resource (% of GDP) is correlated with total production to measure if the process is consistent 
with resource-led growth. The final specification measures how the share of natural resource production (% of 
GDP) affects non-resource production. This specification attempts to measure some Dutch disease effects in 
order assess the potential relevance of these theories for the four resource-abundant countries. 
Before proceeding to the country case studies, I will first explain the econometric approach in more 
detail and give an overview of the main determinants analysed. 
 
2.1 Econometric specifications 
The main practical problem was that all variables of interest were non-stationary. Ideally, analysing the driving 
factors behind economic growth would involve an analysis of the levels of natural resources and economic growth 
if these are co-integrated. However, when testing for co-integration using the Engle-Granger test, I failed to 
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the dependent variables and the natural resource indicators.112 
To correct for non-stationarity, I use two techniques; (i) The first difference; and (ii) De-trending. More advanced 
techniques lie beyond the scope of this paper, as the research problem is adequately addressed using the above-
mentioned techniques. 
 
2.1.1 First-difference 
The first-difference technique has a number of advantages. First, one obtains stationary variables if the series 
follow an I (1) process. In the case of the present study, all variables become stationary with first differencing.113 
Second, first differencing removes any linear time trend, simplifying the interpretation of the coefficients. 
However, first differencing has a number of drawbacks. Probably the most serious is that first 
differences should only be used to determine levels in the short-run. The reason is that the first differences 
                                            
112 I ran four specifications for each country, sixteen specifications in all. The test statistic is a modified Dickey-Fuller test developed by 
MacKinnon (1990, 2010). In all but one specification, the null hypothesis of no co-integration was accepted, and the one specification in which 
the null hypothesis was rejected was only at the 10 % level of significance. 
113 Using a Dickey-Fuller test, the null hypothesis of a random walk was rejected at the 99 % degree of confidence for all variables used. 
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method assumes away all long-run information on the relationship between the two variables. Another drawback 
is that one loses the first observation because one always need the lagged value. Dropping the first observation 
means that first differences are less efficient than other estimation techniques. To counter some of these 
drawbacks, I will also use de-trended figures to conduct the same analysis as a robustness check. 
The first difference estimation is used to test three equations. The main problem in measuring the 
extent of resource abundance are the few indicators available for both time-periods. It is possible to use natural 
resource exports as a share of GDP, but this indicator has many problems (see essay 4 in this PhD thesis). To be 
able to compare the impact of natural resources over time, I chose to use natural resource value-added (in effect 
agriculture and mining). The first reason is because it shows the absolute value-added of the natural resource 
sectors. Second, it allows testing for both the 1860-1910 and the 1970-2005 periods (data limitation on Malaysia 
prevented the series going back to 1960). The definition of what constitutes the different sectors is relatively 
similar across sources allowing for a great degree of comparison. 
The first equation tests the impact of the natural resource sectors on non-resource GDP: 
 
 ∆ ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑁𝑅)𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ ln 𝑁𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2∆ ln 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽3∆ ln 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4∆ ln 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
 
Where GDP is gross domestic product and NR is natural resource value-added.114 The choice of control variables 
is limited by data availability, as some of the controls preferred are not available for both periods.115 For a full 
list of sources and descriptive statistics, see appendix 1. 
The first control variable is investments, which has the notation INV. This control variable measures the 
effect of investments on GDP. More investments increases the productive capacity of the economy, which leads 
to improved long-term economic growth. 
The second control variable is the sum of exports and imports, which has the notation TRADE. The 
control measures the degree of openness, which is often assumed to be positively correlated with higher GDP as 
sectors engaging in international trade are more productive than sectors producing for the domestic market. 
The third control variable is government consumption with the notation GOV. Government consumption 
measures the degree of government expenditures on non-investment activities, which according to Barro (1991) 
is negatively correlated with economic growth. It is argued that government consumption (as opposed to 
government investment) does not contribute to long-term economic growth, and is a proxy for government 
wastefulness. 
Equation (1) shows that the growth in non-resource GDP is dependent on the growth of the natural 
resource sectors and the growth of the control variables. The coefficient β1 in equation (1) is the % change in the 
growth rate of non-resource GDP associated with a 1 % increase in the growth rate of the value-added of the 
natural resource sectors. The equation captures the impact the resource sectors have on the rest of the economy, 
to see if there is any difference between the four countries. I expect the coefficient β1 > 0, as an increase in the 
value-added of agriculture and the mining sector is expected to benefit the rest of the economy. 
The second equation is the effect of natural resource share on GDP per capita: 
 
 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ (
𝑁𝑅
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
+ 𝛽2∆ (
𝐺𝑂𝑉
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
+ 𝛽3∆ (
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
+ 𝛽4∆ (
𝐼𝑁𝑉
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
 
                                            
114 All variables are measured as total economy sizes as dividing each variable by the population size would yield identical results. 
115 There are three controls which would have been preferable to have included had these been available; (i) Age dependency ratio to control 
for the demographic burden; (ii) Institutions to control for institutional quality; and (iii) Domestic credit to the private sector to control for the 
quality of the financial system. 
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The resource indicator chosen is the value-added of natural resource sectors as a share of GDP, which can be 
interpreted as a measure of resource dependence. The resource curse literature often uses a measure of resource 
dependence as the indicator for resource abundance, with the natural resource exports as a share of GDP the 
most common.116 Equation (2) shows that economic growth in GDP per capita is dependent on the change in 
resource dependence and the change in the control variables.  
As equation (2) is a log-level specification, the coefficient 100*β1 in equation (2) shows the % change in 
the growth rate of GDP per capita associated with a one percentage point increase in the change in resource 
dependence. 117 The sign of β1 is interesting, as it is undetermined. The first possibility is that the coefficient β1 > 
0, which could be interpreted as evidence for resource-led growth. The second possibility is that the same 
coefficient β1 < 0, which in the literature is interpreted as a resource curse, since a larger degree of resource 
dependence slows economic growth. The final possibility is that it is not statistically significant, which could 
mean that natural resources are not correlated with economic growth. 
The final equation I test is how resource dependence affects non-resource GDP per capita: 
 
 
∆𝑙𝑛([𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑁𝑅] 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ (
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𝐺𝐷𝑃
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𝑡
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Equation (3) shows that economic growth in non-resource GDP per capita is dependent on the change in resource 
dependence and the change in the control variables. Similarly as above, the coefficient 100*β1 in equation (3) is 
the % change in the growth rate of non-resource GDP per capita associated with a one percentage point increase 
in the change in resource dependence. Equation (3) measures the impact of the relative size of the resource 
sector on non-resource GDP per capita. For equation (3), I therefore expect the coefficient β1 < 0, as a relative 
increase of the natural resource sector implies that the non-resource sector has grown less than the resource 
sector. The reason for including this equation is to test whether Dutch disease effects are present. 
 
2.1.2 De-trending 
De-trending is a highly effective way of dealing with non-stationarity if the data is trend stationary. It also allows 
the use of levels rather than the differences, which removes some of the potential problems associated with 
first-differencing, such as its usage for short time periods. 
One problem associated with de-trending is that the ‘true’ time trend is unknown. Therefore, the 
analysis with de-trended data was done twice; once for a linear trend and once for a stochastic trend. 
The linear time trend presented a number of problems. First, the de-trended variables were not 
stationary.118 Second and probably caused by the first, there was a high degree of autocorrelation in the 
regressions using linear detrended variables. To correct for this I used feasible generalised least squares (GLS) to 
correct for autocorrelation. I used the Prais-Winsten approach as it includes the first observation, and therefore 
is potentially more efficient.119 Given the problems with the linear trend, I also decided to de-trend with a 
stochastic trend. 
                                            
116 Resource exports as a share of GDP was first used by Sachs and Warner (1995) and quickly became the standard measure of the resource curse 
literature. However, in recent times, it has increasingly become more popular to measure resource abundance as resource income per capita, 
see for instance Ramsay (2011) and Bjorvatn et al. (2012). 
117 A coefficient β1 of 0.05 implies that the growth rate increases by 5 %. If the change in resource dependence increases from 0 % to 1 %, the 
growth rate of 2 % in GDP per capita would then increase by 5 % to 2.1 %. 
118 The Dickey-Fuller test was used to test for stationarity. 
119 The Prais-Winsten approach assumes that the autocorrelation is generated by an AR(1) process. I used the estimated error terms to perform 
a t-test for the presence for AR(1) and AR(2) autocorrelation for each regression, and for most specifications I found evidence of an AR(1) process, 
but not an AR(2) process. 
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To estimate a stochastic trend, I used the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a λ = 6.25 which is standard 
for yearly observations. One beneficial property of the de-trended data using an HP filter was that all variables 
were stationary.120 The HP trend analysis had a low degree of autocorrelation; I could therefore run standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) on all but two specifications. 
There are, however, a number of pitfalls in using the HP filter. First, there is no way of knowing the 
true smoothing parameter λ. I followed the standard in the literature and set λ = 6.25 as I used yearly data. 
However, there are no theoretically objective ways of setting this parameter, so the HP filter will always have 
some arbitrary judgement relating to it. Second, I had to drop the first and last observations in my sample, since 
the HP filter needs one lag and one forward observation to be calculated. This makes the HP estimation less 
efficient than other estimations in which more observations can be included. 
I use de-trended variables to test three similar specifications as for the first difference as a robustness 
check. All equations are estimated with both linear and HP de-trended data. The de-trended equivalent of 
equation (1) is: 
 
 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑁𝑅)𝑡
𝐷𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑁𝑅𝑡
𝐷𝑇 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡
𝐷𝑇 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐷𝑇 + 𝛽4 ln 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝐷𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
 
The notation ‘DT’ stands for de-trended. The interpretation of β1 is slightly different from equation (1), as it 
represents the % increase in non-resource GDP from a 1 % increase in natural resource value-added. 
The de-trended equivalent of equation (2) is: 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑡
𝐷𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
𝑁𝑅
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝛽2 (
𝐺𝑂𝑉
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ +𝛽3 (
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝛽4 (
𝐼𝑁𝑉
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝜀𝑡 (5) 
 
For equation (5), the coefficient 100*β1 shows the % increase in GDP per capita from a one percentage point 
increase in resource dependence. 
The final equation is the de-trend equivalent of equation (3): 
 
 
ln([𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑁𝑅] 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑡
𝐷𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
𝑁𝑅
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝛽2 (
𝐺𝑂𝑉
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝛽3 (
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝛽4 (
𝐼𝑁𝑉
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑡
𝐷𝑇
+ 𝜀𝑡 (6) 
 
For equation (6), the coefficient 100*β1 in equation (6) is interpreted as the % increase in non-resource GDP per 
capita with a one percentage point increase in resource dependence. 
 
2.2 Determinants for growth 
In addition to the time-series econometrics, this essay analyses the underlying causes of resource-led growth, 
using the three determinants illustrated in figure 1: 
 
                                            
120 Using a Dickey-Fuller test, the null hypothesis of a random walk was rejected at the 99 % degree of confidence for all variables used. 
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Figure 1: Analytical Framework 
 
Each of the three determinants in figure 1 has been mentioned in the literature overview, so I will only briefly 
touch upon them. The first determinant for growth in resource-abundant countries are good institutions, with 
‘good’ meaning the ability to promote long-term sustained economic growth by generating incentives for the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, and for increased technological development. In figure 1, 
institutions can change in two ways. The first is through economic policies, as emphasised by Rodrik (2000). 
Policies that initiate large institutional reforms have often occurred in a period immediately prior to a country’s 
growth take-off, such as in a number of East Asian countries. The second is through the degree of human capital, 
as emphasised by Glaeser et al. (2004). The argument is that a more highly educated civic society does not 
accept ‘bad’ institutions, thereby ensuring that institutions evolve into stronger ones as education levels 
increase.121 
The second determining factor in figure 1 is a large stock of human capital. 122  Human capital 
accumulation is clearly linked to both institutions and economic policy. First, institutions provide incentives for 
economic agents, and can therefore influence the returns and the cost of education. Second, economic policy 
increases human capital through for instance government spending on education or through selective industrial 
policy that promote sectors intensive in their usage of human capital. 
The final determining factor in figure 1 is a supporting economic policy. Economic policies are highly 
dependent on a strong state, which again is dependent on institutions and on human capital. First, strong 
institutions such as a competent bureaucracy and a strong rule-of-law increase the effectiveness of economic 
policy, and therefore increase state power. Second, a higher education level means that the state can employ 
more skilled workers, and the policies that promote growth can be implemented more effectively. 
                                            
121 For this mechanism to work the preferences of low educated people has to be different than for highly educated people. This process might 
have occurred in South Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s, in which both countries evolved into democracies following two decades of high 
economic growth. 
122 The evidence for a link between education levels and economic growth is strong, see for instance Barro (2001); and Hanushek and Woessman 
(2008; 2012). 
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3. Finland and Sweden 1860-1910 
3.1 Resource-Led Growth in Finland and Sweden 
Finnish and Swedish economic growth improved considerably in the second half of the 19th century compared to 
the first. Economic growth, measured as annual growth rate of GDP per capita (1990 Int. GK$), increased from 
0.6 % in Sweden for 1820-1850, to 1.1 % for 1850-1890, and increased further to 2.2 % for 1890-1910. Finland’s 
growth increased from 0.5 % for 1820-1850, to 1.0 % for 1850-1890, to 1.6 % for 1890-1910 (all figures from Bolt 
and van Zanden, 2013). As living standards in Sweden were higher than in Finland in 1820, and the subsequent 
growth rate higher in Sweden, there was no convergence. Instead, GDP per capita in Sweden was 1.3 times the 
level of Finland’s in 1910.  
Whether Finland experienced resource-led growth is somewhat unclear given the first specification. 
Result (1-1) in table 1 for Finland shows that a 1 % increase in the growth rate of natural resource value-added 
reduces the growth rate of non-resource GDP by 0.747 %. This is an odd result, as one would expect that the 
feedback mechanisms were strong between the natural resource sectors and the rest of the economy. Separating 
the natural resource sectors into forestry and the natural resource sectors apart from forestry, the forestry 
coefficient in result (1-1+) shows that a 1 % increase in the growth rate of forestry value-added increases the 
growth rate of non-resource GDP by 0.349 %. The reason for the differences between the two results might be 
that Finnish agriculture was characterised by non-modern production methods, and therefore ‘backward’ with 
little interaction with the rest of the economy. The Finnish results are consistent with forestry-led economic 
growth. 
In the case of Sweden, resource-led growth is far clearer. Result (2-1) from table 2 shows that a 1 % 
increase in the growth rate of the value-added of the resource sectors increases the growth rate of non-resource 
GDP by 0.245 %. This result is statistically significant, indicating a strong correlation between the natural resource 
sectors and non-resource GDP in Sweden.123 
  
                                            
123 The reason for not testing forestry explicitly for Sweden is that the Schön figures do not differentiate between agriculture and forestry. 
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Table 1: First-Difference Results for Finland 1860-1910 
 (1-1) (1-1+) (1-2) (1-3) 
 Δ ln(GDP-NR) Δ ln(GDP-NR) Δ ln(GDP per capita) Δ ln([GDP–NR] per capita) 
     
Δ ln(NR)  -0.747***    
 (-8.93)    
     
Δ ln(Forestry)  0.349***   
  (3.66)   
     
Δ ln(NR-Forestry)  -0.604***   
  (-10.32)   
     
Δ (NR/GDP)    0.00771*** -0.0248*** 
   (5.37) (-14.02) 
     
Δ ln(Gov.consum) -0.118 -0.106   
 (-0.80) (-1.36)   
     
Δ ln(Trade) 0.415*** 0.250***   
 (6.83) (4.37)   
     
Δ ln(Investments) 0.152** 0.147**   
 (2.06) (2.50)   
     
Δ (Gov.consum /GDP)    -0.0414*** -0.0467*** 
   (-3.51) (-4.56) 
     
Δ (Trade/GDP)    0.000453 0.00164 
   (0.31) (0.98) 
     
Δ (Investments/GDP)    0.00208 -0.00112 
   (0.54) (-0.30) 
     
Observations 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.743 0.838 0.665 0.898 
Adjusted R2 0.720 0.819 0.635 0.889 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.849 2.259 1.875 2.086 
Note: t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with * Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels indicating no autocorrelation. 
Table 2: First-Difference Results for Sweden 1860-1910 
 (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) 
 Δ ln(GDP-NR)  Δ ln(GDP per capita)  Δ ln([GDP–NR] per capita)  
Δ ln(NR) 0.245***   
 (3.69)   
    
Δ (NR/GDP)   0.0110** -0.00445 
  (2.30) (-0.94) 
    
Δ ln(Gov.consum) -0.0903   
 (-0.86)   
    
Δ ln(Trade) 0.150**   
 (2.20)   
    
Δ ln(Investments) 0.167***   
 (5.40)   
    
Δ (Gov.consum /GDP)   -0.0560*** -0.0558*** 
  (-5.51) (-5.53) 
    
Δ (Trade/GDP)   -0.00295** -0.00314** 
  (-2.09) (-2.25) 
    
Δ (Investments/GDP)   0.0122** 0.0120** 
  (2.66) (2.67) 
    
Observations 50 50 50 
R2 0.586 0.569 0.583 
Adjusted R2 0.549 0.531 0.546 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.976 1.705 1.707 
Note: t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with * Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels indicating no autocorrelation. 
 
More evidence of the importance of natural resources comes from results (1-2) and (2-2). For both countries, the 
change in resource dependence is positively correlated with GDP per capita. Result (1-2) shows that a one 
percentage point increase in the change in resource dependence increases the growth rate of GDP per capita by 
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0.771 % in Finland. Result (2-2) shows that the similar figure in Sweden is 1.1 %. In both Finland and Sweden, a 
positive statistically significant correlation strongly indicates that economic growth was resource-led. 
The importance of the forestry sector and its relationship with other sectors is also highlighted in figure 
2, which shows the export structure in both Finland and Sweden. Forestry and those manufacturing sectors that 
used wood as an important input in production (including furniture and paper) increased in both countries toward 
the turn of the century. 
 
 
Figure 2: Forestry and Wood Manufacturing as Shares of Total Exports 1870-1910 (%) 
Source: Calculations based on Hjerppe (1996) and Statistics Sweden (1972) 
* For Finland the 1869 share and for Sweden the 1871 share is reported 
 
Dutch disease effects might have been present in both countries. Result (1-3) shows that a one percentage point 
increase in the change in resource dependence decreased the growth rate of non-resource GDP per capita in 
Finland by 2.48 %. The Finnish result is statistically significant. Result (2-3) for Sweden also shows a decrease, 
but this coefficient is not statistically significant. These results indicate that an increase in the relative share of 
natural resource value-added has a negative correlation on the rest of the economy. The difference between 
results (1-1)/(2-1) and (1-3)/(2-3) is that the former measure the absolute impact of the natural resource sector 
while the latter measure the relative impact. 
The robustness check, running all specifications mentioned above with de-trended data, yield similar 
results. Results for the linear and HP de-trended figures are reported in appendices 2 and 3. Natural resource 
value-added is positively and statistically significantly correlated with both non-resource GDP (as with first-
differences, it holds only for forestry for Finland). In addition, resource dependence is positively and statistically 
significant correlated with GDP per capita, and negatively correlated with non-resource GDP per capita. As 
mentioned, the first-differences have some weaknesses as a method. However, obtaining similar results using 
two different de-trended analyses increases the robustness of the first-difference findings. 
The paper has already mentioned that Sweden is more ‘successful’ than Finland within the 1860-1910 
period, since economic growth and living standards at the end of the period were higher in Sweden. There are 
three areas that are important in the context of this paper. 
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First, the growth take-off occurred earlier in Sweden and is usually set in the 1850s, following a large 
expansion in forestry exports.124 The Finnish growth take-off did not occur before the 1890s, and was interrupted 
by World War I and the following Finnish Civil War. While considerable progress was made in Finland in the 
interwar years, the true take-off of the Finnish economy occurred first in the post-1945 era in which Finland 
converged with Sweden. Rostow (1959) argued that an economy goes through five growth phases from a 
traditional to a mature economy. With the take-off occurring at different times, it indicates that the 
preconditions in the two countries were different, something I will return to when discussing the determinants. 
Second, the productivity was higher for Swedish sawmills. Even though comparable figures are hard to 
come by, there is sufficient indirect evidence. For instance, for the period from 1859 to 1869, when wood price 
quotations decreased by 25 %, Swedish wood production increased, while Finnish wood production decreased. 
Profit margins in Sweden must have decreased in periods with decreasing prices (Söderlund, 1953). However, the 
increase in production is a strong indication that profit margins were still sufficient to allow for a further 
expansion of production, indicating that Swedish exports remained more cost efficient than their Finnish 
counterparts. 
Finally, the linkages from the forestry sector to other sectors of the economy were more extensive in 
Sweden. This difference is illustrated in figures 3 and 4, as the manufacturing sectors (that used wood as an 
important input) increased more in Sweden than in Finland. Following a crisis in the 1870s, the Swedish forestry 
industry evolved from a market structure with many small producers in the 1860s to a market with a few large 
producers in the 1880s. Companies increasingly owned the entire value chain, leading to increased economies-
of-scale and more efficient production of the higher value-added products. In Finland, wood manufacturing and 
paper production did emerge prior to 1910, with many of these being directed towards the Russian market. 
However, these were often protected from foreign competition and productivity was low. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sweden Forestry and Wood Manufacturing Value-Added per Capita (SEK 1910-1912) 1860-1910 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Source: Own calculations based on Edvinsson (2005) and Smits et al. (2009) 
 
                                            
124 Söderlund (1953) mentions that the key reasons for this expansion were (i) The increase in wood prices as British demand increased; (ii) 
Decreasing British trade barriers; (iii) Supply problems in the Norwegian forestry sector; and (iv) Increased domestic support for the Swedish 
forestry sector. 
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Figure 4: Finland Forestry and Wood Manufacturing Value-Added per Capita (1926 FIM prices) 1862-1910 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Source: Own calculations based on Hjerppe (1996) and Smits et al. (2009) 
 
3.2 Determinants of Resource-Led Growth 
3.2.1 Institutions in Finland and Sweden 
In the mid-19th century, institutions in Sweden were better suited for an expansion in the forestry sector than 
they were in Finland. One example is in the area of property rights, as Sweden had strengthened the property 
rights to forests by transferring these to farmers during the 1820s (Söderlund, 1951). With clear property rights, 
Swedish forest owners had strong incentives to invest in sawmills. Gradually, sawmills grew more productive and 
invested in new technologies and forest owners attempting to expand into higher value-added production. 
In contrast, Finnish property rights were still weak in 1850. The consequence was that Finnish forests in 
practice were open access forests, which led to typical commons problems of a lack of incentive to promote the 
long-term economic value of forests. The lack of property rights was especially prevalent in Eastern, Western 
and Northern Finland (Michelsen, 1995; Palo and Uusivuoriu, 1999). By 1900, the demarcation of property rights 
was mostly completed (Palo and Uusivuoriu, 1999). Once clear private and state property rights had been 
established, new incentives were created which emphasised the forests’ long-term economic value, which led to 
increased investments and eventually increased production and exports. 
Another notable institutional difference is the restriction on forestry production. In Sweden, restrictions 
on forestry had existed since the 18th century to protect the mining industry.  However, the invention of the 
Bessemer process led to the abolishment of the restrictions on the usage of forests as access to forests was no 
longer important for the mining industry.125 In 1841, the export tax on sawn timber was abolished, and in 1842, 
the start-up privileges of sawmills was also abolished (Söderlund, 1951, Schön, 2007). These abolitions gave way 
to a near unrestricted exploitation of the forests for the sawmill industry. This development, coupled with an 
increase in wood prices in the 1850s, led to a large increase in production and exports in the Swedish sawmill 
industry. 
In Finland, the Swedish restrictions had stayed in place following the Finnish annexation into the Russian 
empire in 1809. The Russian emperor allowed the Finnish a semi-autonomous rule, and the Swedish laws simply 
remained in effect during a transition period into the Russian empire that lasted until the mid-19th century. As 
                                            
125 Prior to the Bessemer process, the access to wood was vital as an input for the production of steel. The Bessemer process allowed the 
production of steel without the usage of wood, meaning that the forests were no longer of strategic importance to the Swedish mining industry.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
18
6
2
18
6
4
18
6
6
18
6
8
18
7
0
18
7
2
18
7
4
18
7
6
18
7
8
18
8
0
18
8
2
18
8
4
18
8
6
18
8
8
18
9
0
18
9
2
18
9
4
18
9
6
18
9
8
19
0
0
19
0
2
19
0
4
19
0
6
19
0
8
19
10
F
IM
 F
ix
ed
 P
ri
ce
s 
(1
9
2
6
 V
a
lu
es
)
(1) Forestry per capita production
(2) Wood manufacturing per capita production
Total: (1) + (2)
Page | 87  
 
 
Finland had few mines, these restrictions were largely redundant. However, attempts to get rid of these 
restrictions proved difficult. The Forestry Act of 1851 continued to put restrictions on sawmills, including yearly 
production quotas and a ban on steam-powered sawmills (Michelsen, 1995). The rationale behind continued 
restrictions was a scepticism of the sawmill industry and a fear of deforestation. These restriction were only 
gradually lifted in the late 1850s and early 1860s; for instance, the ban on steam-power sawmills was lifted in 
1858. However, the establishment of sawmills still required an application to the Senate for official permission 
(Michelsen, 1995). The first large steam-powered sawmills were not constructed before early 1870s (Hjerppe, 
1989). Finnish restrictions stayed in place longer than in Sweden, making a similar export expansion unlikely 
(Söderlund, 1951, Kaukiaien, 2006). 
The key difference between Finland and Sweden were the institutional reforms in the first half of the 
19th century, and was most likely a key factor in determining the differences in resource-led growth. While 
Swedish institutions increasingly became more market-oriented, Finland retained many mercantile institutions 
up until the mid-19th century. One example is the development of the financial system, which came earlier in 
Sweden, and played an important role in financing the forestry and related industries following 1870. 126 An 
underlying cause was that the Finnish Diet did not meet in the first half of the 19th century, and first started to 
assemble from the 1860s and onwards (Ojala and Karonen, 2006 p.103). The lack of an active political body 
meant that reforms were not enacted before this time. 
 
3.2.2 Economic Policy in Finland and Sweden 
While Finland and Sweden in general were supportive in terms of the provision of public goods, the big difference 
lay in their support for forestry and related industries. I have already mentioned the abolishing of restrictions on 
the exploitation in Sweden that was crucial for their initial expansion. Following this initial expansion of the 
1850s, Swedish state support for the forestry sector was high. One example is how the Swedish state pursued an 
active industrial policy to promote the pulp and paper industry, which started to emerge in the 1850s in Southern 
Sweden. These ventures generally proved unprofitable even as late as the 1890s and therefore needed state 
support (Glete, 1989). One method to promote higher value-added production was the imposition of high tariffs 
on the import of high-value added products in which wood was a major input (Bohlin, 2005). This protection led 
to higher profits, which led to increased investment and an expansion of production in wood manufacturing and 
the paper industry in Sweden. 
In contrast, Finnish state support was mixed. In the 1850s and 1860s, there was much hostility towards 
the sawmill sector, which undoubtedly halted the sector’s development. For instance, Johan Vilhelm Snellman, 
an influential journalist and later professor, senator and prime minister, strongly opposed the education of 
foresters and a professional state forest administration (Michelsen, 1995). According to Brems (1971), a part of 
this resistance was caused by a linguistic and social conflict between the Finnish-speaking majority and the 
Swedish-speaking minority. This minority, often more wealthy, constituted a Swedish-speaking business elite. 
The Finnish resistance towards forestry was eventually eased, and there was an increasing amount of support 
towards the end of the 19th century. This included the establishment of the Finnish Forestry Association in 1877 
to promote forest research (Palo, 2004).127 
 
  
                                            
126 For the emergence of the Swedish banking sector, see for instance Sandberg (1978) and Adams et al. (2005); and for the emergence of the 
Finnish banking sector, see for instance Palo (2004). 
127 Following independence in 1917, several forest scientists and foresters became leading politicians, marking a new degree of support for the 
forest industries in Finland. Several politicians with a strong forestry background eventually served as prime minister or in other leading functions. 
The same year as Finnish independence, the Forest Research Institute was established. The Forest Research Institute would play a leading role 
in the development of forest policies following independence. 
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3.2.3 Human capital in Finland and Sweden 
Human capital played an important role for the establishment of the sawmill industry in both Finland and Sweden 
as it constituted a major source of technology transfer. Norway had been the major exporter of wood to Great 
Britain up until the 1840s. However, the increased British demand in the 1850s led to Norwegian supply problems 
as primal forests declined. This decline led many Norwegian businesses to relocate to Sweden, taking with them 
superior sawmill technology and business knowhow. The inflow of Norwegian human capital thereby created a 
more productive Swedish sawmill sector (Söderlund, 1951). For Finland, there was an increase in the influx of 
Norwegian and Swedish businesses in the 1870s as Finnish regulation on sawmills were increasingly relaxed. This 
led to a technological transfer for Finland, in similar fashion as it had been for Sweden two decades earlier (Palo, 
2004). This pattern of technological upgrading has some similarities to the Flying Geese Pattern of development 
in which maturing, industries relocate in accordance to shifting comparative advantages. 
In Sweden, there was a strong connection between the forestry sector and research institutions. 
Industrialised forestry, which had as its aim to keep a sustainable high yield, was a priority for leading members 
within the industry. A forestry college was established as early as 1830, while a modern state forestry 
administration was in place in 1838 (Palo, 2004). Ahlström (1992; 1993) argues that the successful innovators and 
entrepreneurs illustrate that there already existed a network among the technical institutions, industry and the 
government by the middle of the 19th century, and this contributed significantly to the success of Swedish 
industrialisation. The networks were of central importance for the development of industry, especially after the 
1880s, when products became more differentiated and higher value-added products became increasingly more 
important (Blomström and Kokko, 2006). 
In Finland, research institutions developed later than in Sweden. Michelsen (1995) has written at length 
about the problems facing not only the sawmill sector but also state institutions that attempted to support the 
forestry industry. The State Forestry Board was concerned with establishing a professional set of foresters to 
oversee and administer the forests, but was for the most part on the receiving end of critics opposing a 
professional forest administration (Palo, 2004). The Evo Forestry Institute was established in 1858 to be a source 
of forestry education and research, but because of a lack of funding and lack of political support, it was not able 
to fill any effective role before the 1880s.128 
 
4. Indonesia and Malaysia 1960-2010 
4.1 Resource-Led Growth in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Indonesia and Malaysia both increased their economic growth rates starting in 1970, which is widely regarded as 
the take-off for both countries. Malaysian economic growth (growth rate of GDP per capita 1990 Int. GK$), 
increased from 1.4 % for 1950-1970, to 4.6 % for 1970-1990, and decreasing slightly to 3.4 % for 1990-2010. 
Indonesia’s growth increased from 2.1 % for 1950-1970, to 3.6 % for 1970-1990, and to 3.2 % for 1990-2010 (all 
figures from Bolt and van Zanden, 2013). As in the Finland/Sweden case, living standards in Malaysia were higher 
than in Indonesia in 1970, and the subsequent growth rate was higher in Malaysia, meaning that there was a 
divergence in living standards. GDP per capita in Malaysia was 2.1 times the level of Indonesia’s in 2010. 
In both countries, natural resources have contributed to economic growth. This is consistent with results 
(3-1) and (4-1). Result (3-1), for Indonesia, shows that a 1 % increase in the growth rate of value-added of the 
                                            
128 Following independence, Finland was quick to increase the support for forestry. In 1917, the Forest Research Institute and the Society of 
Forest Sciences were established (Palo and Uusivuoriu, 1999, Palo, 2004). By 1922, Finland had five state schools teaching elementary forestry, 
which in the early 1920s educated 70-80 forestry foremen a year (Heikinheimo and Saari, 1922). In 1921, the Finnish Sawmills Industries Schools, 
with a mixture of state and private funding, began teaching. In 1908, higher education in forestry was transferred from the Evo Forestry Institute 
to the University of Helsinki. A higher education in forestry would take 3-4 years, which included theoretical studies and practice in the forests 
(Heikinheimo and Saari, 1922). 
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resource sectors increased the growth rate of non-resource GDP by 0.643 %. Result (4-1) shows that the similar 
figure for Malaysia was 0.208 %. However, the Malaysia results are only significant at the 10 % level of significance. 
The results do indicate that the natural resource sectors contributed to GDP in excess of their own value-added. 
These results are broadly similar to the ones for Finland and Sweden. 
 
Table 3: First-Difference Results for Indonesia 1970-2005 
 (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) 
 Δ ln(GDP-NR)  Δ ln(GDP per capita)  Δ ln([GDP–NR] per capita)  
Δ ln(NR) 0.643**   
 (2.48)   
    
Δ (NR/GDP)   -0.00902 -0.0291*** 
  (-1.20) (-4.13) 
    
Δ ln(Gov.consum) -0.0671   
 (-0.82)   
    
Δ ln(Trade) -0.145*   
 (-1.90)   
    
Δ ln(Investments) 0.368***   
 (3.72)   
    
Δ (Gov.consum /GDP)   -0.00765 -0.00649 
  (-0.88) (-0.81) 
    
Δ (Trade/GDP)   -0.00162 -0.00128 
  (-1.28) (-1.13) 
    
Δ (Investments/GDP)   0.00738* 0.00627 
  (1.80) (1.63) 
    
Observations 35 35 35 
R2 0.615 0.399 0.694 
Adjusted R2 0.564 0.319 0.653 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.751 1.632 1.581 
Note: t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with * Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels indicating no autocorrelation. 
 
Table 4: First-Difference Results for Malaysia 1970-2005 
 (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) 
 Δ ln(GDP-NR)  Δ ln(GDP per capita)  Δ ln([GDP–NR] per capita)  
Δ ln(NR) 0.208*   
 (1.89)   
    
Δ (NR/GDP)   -0.00205 -0.0171*** 
  (-0.37) (-3.15) 
    
Δ ln(Gov.consum) 0.00817   
 (0.14)   
    
Δ ln(Trade) 0.179***   
 (2.94)   
    
Δ ln(Investments) 0.197***   
 (5.04)   
    
Δ (Gov.consum /GDP)   -0.0129*** -0.0127*** 
  (-3.35) (-3.25) 
    
Δ (Trade/GDP)   -0.000117 -0.000139 
  (-0.23) (-0.29) 
    
Δ (Investments/GDP)   0.00617*** 0.00610*** 
  (3.44) (3.58) 
    
Observations 35 35 35 
R2 0.780 0.611 0.751 
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.559 0.718 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.965 2.466 2.436 
Note: t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with * Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels indicating no autocorrelation. 
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One notable difference between Finland/Sweden and Indonesia/Malaysia has been the nature of economic growth. 
Most economists believe that Indonesia and Malaysia are two resource-abundant countries that have experienced 
high growth, rather than having experienced resource-led growth, at least since 1985 (Jomo et al. 1999, Hill, 
2000). These views are consistent with results (3-2) and (4-2) which show that the coefficient of the change in 
resource dependence is not statistically significant (and negative), indicating that natural resources might have 
played a lesser role in Indonesia/Malaysia compared to Finland/Sweden. These views are also consistent with 
figure 5 showing a declining share of natural resource exports as a share of exports over time. The major 
difference between Finland/Sweden and Indonesia/Malaysia is the composition of exports. In Finland/Sweden, 
resource-based manufacturing exports took over when natural resource exports declined. However, in 
Indonesia/Malaysia the increase in exports and economic growth from 1985 was led by manufacturing exports 
that were not resource-based, such as textiles and electronics (Hill, 2000, Felker et al., 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5: Natural Resource Exports as a Share of Merchandise Exports 1970-2010 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Source: Calculated using figures from WDI (2014). Natural resource exports are comprised of (i) Agricultural raw materials (SITC section 2 
crude materials except fuels excluding divisions 22, 27; crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones, and 
28 metalliferous ores and scrap); (ii) Food (SITC sections 0 food and live animals, 1 beverages and tobacco, and 4 animal and vegetable oils 
and fats and SITC division 22 oil seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels)  (iii) Fuels (SITC section 3 mineral fuels); and (iv) ores and metals  (SITC 
section 27 crude fertilizers and crude minerals; 28 metalliferous ores, scrap; and 68 non-ferrous metals). 
 
Still, results (3-1) and (4-1) indicated that in absolute terms, natural resource value-added still contributed to 
GDP. The natural resource sectors did in fact remain more important than the export statistics would lead one 
to believe for four reasons. First, the high degree of local ownership played a role. Much of the export expansion 
in labour-intensive manufacturing exports came through foreign direct investments, with relatively little 
technological spillover to the Malaysian economy. Ownership in the natural resource sectors is primarily domestic; 
implying that these sectors have a larger effect on the domestic economy than competing businesses owned by 
foreigners. Second, an expansion in labour-intensive exports would have been more difficult without the initial 
growth surge in the natural resource sectors. The increased economic growth allowed for more investments in 
infrastructure and human capital, which benefited the later increase in labour-intensive exports. Third, since 
the East Asian financial and economic crises in 1997/1998, there has been an increase in the share of exports of 
natural resource products or manufacturing products intensive in natural resources following increased demand 
from China. Finally, the natural resource sectors constitute an important backbone for both economies through 
the entire period, lifting rural people out of poverty and providing the export income that finances the imports 
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that are important for technological progress. Increased technological progress has in turn been vital for 
economic growth. 
In the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, the paper specifically focuses on two natural resources: oil and 
palm oil. The first reason is that these two natural resources are highly important for both countries, see figure 
6.129 The second reason is to allow for a better comparison between the two countries and give an indication of 
how similar resources affect different economies. In addition, both oil and palm oil are well-established products 
that are affected by international prices. Finally, palm oil is representative of how other natural resource sectors 
(such as cocoa, forestry and natural rubber) were promoted in both countries. 
 
 
Figure 6: Oil and Palm Oil as a Share of Total Natural Resource Exports 1970-2010 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Source: COMTRADE (2013) 
 
Some degree of Dutch disease effects might be present, as indicated by results (3-3) and (4-3). Result (3-3) shows 
that for Indonesia, a one percentage point increase in the change in resource dependence decreased the growth 
rate of non-resource GDP per capita by 2.91 %. The similar figure for Malaysia in results (4-3) was a decrease of 
1.71 %. Both coefficients were statistically significant. The interpretation is the same as for the Finland/Sweden 
case. 
The robustness checks for all three specifications yielded similar results as when using first differences. 
Results with the de-trended variables are shown in appendices 2 and 3. Natural resource value-added is positively 
and statistically significantly correlated with non-resource GDP. The results that natural resource dependence is 
not correlated with GDP per capita still holds for the de-trended analysis. Finally, natural resource dependence 
is negatively correlated with non-resource GDP per capita. As the evidence when using de-trended data is similar 
as for first-differences, the results are more robust. 
As mentioned, Malaysia is more ‘successful’ than Indonesia for similar reasons as to why Sweden 
outperformed Finland. GDP per capita in Indonesia and Malaysia has been diverging, and this in part is explained 
by two differences in the resource sectors. 
First, Malaysia is a more efficient resource-producing country. The contrast between the Malaysian 
state-owned company Petronas and its Indonesian counterpart Pertamina exemplifies this difference. Since its 
establishment in 1974, Petronas has expanded into upstream activities as well as some downstream projects. 
                                            
129 For Malaysia, palm oil and oil constituted more than 50 % of total natural resource exports in 18 of 41 years and more than 40 % in 29 of 41 
years in the period 1970-2010. For Indonesia, palm oil and oil constituted more than 50 % of total natural resource exports in 33 of 41 years. 
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From the 1990s and onwards, the company became an important international oil company with overseas 
operations in 35 countries. They also invested in shipping and became the world’s largest single owner-operator 
of LNG vessels (Von der Mehden and Troner, 2007). Petronas’ growing market share and ability to enter new 
markets give the company a reputation of being a relatively efficient oil company. 
In contrast, Pertamina, established through a merger in 1968, has experienced little technological 
learning from foreign companies, resulting in high exploration costs for oil. Following the transition to democracy 
in 1998, Pertamina lost its monopoly power in upstream activities in the domestic Indonesian market. Since the 
company lacked a competitive environment prior to 1998, it was unable to compete with foreign competitors 
coming into the Indonesian market, among them Petronas. The low efficiency and, thus, lack of competiveness 
has resulted in decreasing market shares and political influence (Hertzmark, 2007).  Pertamina is an example of 
how excessive protection and a lack of incentives for technological upgrading can hurt a company long-term 
when the economic environment changes. 
Second, Malaysia was able to generate more extensive linkages from the natural resource sectors to 
manufacturing sectors. In effect, Malaysia managed to achieve a larger extent of resource-based industrialisation 
than Indonesia. This difference is most adequately illustrated in the palm oil sector. Malaysia established a 
refinery sector in the 1970s, and developed linkages to other industries in the 1980s (Rasiah and Shahrin, 2006). 
Figure 7 illustrates the expansion of Malaysian exports and the share of exports that are of the processed palm 
oil variety. Industrial policies were used to increase value-added and expand linkages to other sectors in the 
economy. There is a near consensus that these linkages would not have been developed by the market mechanism 
alone (Gopal, 2001). 
The Indonesian palm oil sector lagged behind the Malaysian until recent years in terms of both production 
and exports. The reason lies in the orientation of the palm oil sector. While Malaysia promoted an export-oriented 
strategy, the Indonesian palm oil sector pursued an import substitution strategy until the early 1990s. In 1994, 
the Indonesian palm oil sector started to pursue a similar export-oriented strategy as Malaysia and exports has 
since expanded greatly as illustrated in figure 7. However, the share of palm oil exported that is processed is far 
lower than in Malaysia, and the linkages of the Indonesian palm oil sector is weaker than in Malaysia. The reason, 
as explained below, is probably the less efficient industrial policy in Indonesia. 
 
Figure 7: Malaysia and Indonesia Palm Oil Exports 1970-2009 (Five-Year Moving Average) 
Source: Gopal (2001); MPOB (2011); and COMTRADE (2013) 
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4.2 Determinants of Resource-Led Growth 
4.2.1 Institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Compared to Indonesia, Malaysian institutions are more suited for an expansion in the natural resource sectors. 
The difference in property rights and ownership structure in the palm oil sector illustrates this difference. In 
Malaysia, private ownership was strongly encouraged. This included investment incentives and replanting grants 
that provided incentives for private investments in palm oil plantations. Most of the expansion in the palm oil 
sector subsequently came through increased production from these private plantations. Investments both opened 
up new land and led to existing rubber plantations shifting to palm oil cultivation. 
The government was highly supportive in providing public goods, and supporting the sector through 
industrial policies (Pletcher, 1990). The government either owned or supported a number of institutions. To 
increase the quality of palm oil produced, the government established the Palm Oil Regulation and Licencing 
Agency (PORLA) in 1975. To promote palm oil research and development, the government established the Palm 
Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) in 1979.  In 1998, PORLA and PORIM merged to form the Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board (MPOB). Another example is the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC), which has the task of 
promoting the general interests of the palm oil sector abroad, including its image. In addition, the state also 
produced palm oil through so-called government schemes. These schemes gave landless people access to land 
and organised many small land plots as a collective to exploit economies-of-scale. Individual farmers were 
allowed to keep the profit from their sales, with the collective being responsible for tasks involving economies-
of-scale. The government in Malaysia was therefore supportive and complemented the private sector. 
In contrast, the Indonesia government intervention hindered the palm oil sector prior to 1988. Private 
ownership was limited until the government came to regard the palm oil sector as a strategic sector. From 1968 
to 1988, the growth in the palm oil sector was led by direct government investments through the so-called 
Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan (PTP). The government, in an effort to control inflation, controlled palm oil 
prices and restricted exports.130 From 1988 and onwards, there was a gradual shift in policies. Trade restrictions 
on palm oil were removed in 1991 and 1992 was the first year that private estates produced more than the state-
owned plantations. From 1994 onwards, the government increasingly played a supporting role in a similar 
capacity as in Malaysia, with growth in the palm oil sector primarily coming through private plantations. 
Another difference is the stronger rule of law in Malaysia, which is related to the independence of 
business. The best example is for the Malaysian state-owned oil company, Petronas. The company was relatively 
independent of the government and focused mainly on its core business activities. This included professional 
management, which focused on expanding the company into new business areas as Malaysian oil reserves were 
declining. Despite some exceptions, such as the Petronas Twin Towers and a ‘new capital’ in Putra Jaya, 
government involvement was generally low (Von der Mehden and Troner, 2007). Some of these government 
ventures were in fact profitable for Petronas and the company did not always do the governments’ bidding. 
Petronas for instance refused to bail out the failing Malaysian airline MAS. 
However, the Indonesian state-owned company Pertamina experienced a long-term decline since the 
1980s following massive government intervention. The company came under increasing control of President 
Suharto, his bureaucrats and his family members (Hertzmark, 2007). With a weak legal system, there was little 
to stop the president from using the company as a source of finance for various projects. While the Malaysian 
counterpart was protected by laws, and was able to develop professional management, Pertamina increasingly 
                                            
130 Controlling inflation through controlling the prices of agricultural products is common in Indonesia and many other developing countries. The 
Indonesian government successfully managed to control inflation by keeping rice prices low, as rice constitutes 68 % of food (Hill, 2000). However,  
cooking oil only constituted 0.4 % of household expenses (4 % for the poor), so the arguments for controlling palm oil prices based on inflation 
were weak (Larson, 1996). The regulations were complex, and by the end of the 1980s, there were four separate prices administered. According 
to Tomich and Mawardi (1995) these regulations harmed both consumers and producers. 
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became prone to corruption, which led to many problems in the post-1998 era. These problems included a lack 
of competiveness due to high costs and a declining market share in the Indonesian market following liberalisation. 
The difference in institutional quality between Indonesia and Malaysia is more general. Malaysia has 
relatively well-developed institutions, with well-defined property rights, a clear legal framework, rule-of-law 
and a functioning bureaucracy (Kanapathy, 2001). In comparison, Indonesia’s institutions were not as well 
developed, property rights were not as strong, rule-of-law and the legal framework were weak because the 
judiciary was marginalised, and the bureaucracy was weak as there was a shortage of skilled personnel (Hofman 
et al., 2004). Institutions are difficult to measure, but there is a near consensus that Malaysia’s institutions have 
been more conducive to economic growth.131 
 
4.2.2 Economic Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia 
While Indonesian and Malaysian economic policy in general was supportive in the provision of public goods, state 
support for the resource sectors differed. This difference is best illustrated in the palm oil refinery sector, in 
which Malaysia pursued an active industrial policy. The industrial policy was conducted through investment tax 
credits, export allowances and export duties on crude palm oil and duty exemptions on processed palm oil (Rasiah 
and Shahrin, 2006). The export allowance in 1973 put an export tax on crude palm oil, but the duty was exempted 
for processed palm oil, thereby increasing the incentives to process crude palm oil locally. These measures 
allowed for increased investments in the Malaysian palm oil plantations and refineries. There is a near consensus 
that the palm oil refineries would not have been established without the strong degree of state support (Gopal, 
2001, Rasiah and Shahrin, 2006). 
Also in terms of ownership, Malaysia pursued a rather active policy. In 1970, most of the palm oil 
plantations were foreign-owned, and these protested against the government policies to move into the higher 
value-added processed palm oil, as the foreign-owned plantations preferred to have their palm oil processed in 
Europe. The Malaysian government responded with an aggressive buy-out of foreign plantations through stock 
market operations on the London Stock Exchange and selling them to domestic owners willing to support the 
government’s plans. 
Indonesian support for the higher value-added palm oil segment of the palm oil sector was lacking prior 
to 1988. Following 1988, and partly caused by the spectacular success of Malaysia, Indonesian policies shifted. 
In 1994, the government attempted to promote the refinery sector through an export tax. However, Rasiah and 
Shahrin (2006) claim that these efforts did not succeed in the same manner as in Malaysia as the Indonesian 
export tax was inconsistent and did not provide the same incentives as it had done in Malaysia. In Malaysia, 
incentives for investments and an export on crude palm oil (CPO) meant that profits for investments in palm oil 
refineries was potentially high. In Indonesia, no similar investment incentives followed the export tax and the 
export tax targeted not only CPO but also processed palm oil. In addition, there was uncertainty regarding the 
willingness of the Indonesian government to support the industry as policy changes have been numerous, meaning 
that potential profits of investing in palm oil refineries was uncertain. This meant that while investments in the 
refinery sector increased in Malaysia, Indonesia did not see a similar surge. 
 
  
                                            
131 Quantitative assessments of institutions are difficult at best as these by definition are not measurable. However, some indicators might tell 
something about the outcome. According to the Corruption Perception Index Indonesia scores a 32 out of a 100 points which means is the 
Indonesia 118th ‘cleanest’ out of 176 countries; while Malaysia compares more favourably with a score of 49, which means it is the 54th ‘cleanest’ 
country (Transparancy International, 2014). Indonesia also ranks poorly in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ indicators as it ranks as the 128th 
best country (out of 185) in the world to do business WDI (2014). Malaysia ranks as the 12th best country in the world to do business in. The two 
main contributing factors were the easiness to get credit, and the high protection for investors. The general perception is that Malaysia has 
better institutions to support economic growth than does Indonesia. 
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4.2.3 Human capital in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Malaysia has a more human capital-intensive resource sector and conducts more research than Indonesia. One 
example is the case of Petronas. The company was intent on learning to produce oil themselves, rather than 
being reliant on foreign technology and knowledge. However, there was a severe shortage of engineers during 
the 1970s. Petronas launched several scholarships to increase the number of students of Malay origin in 
engineering and related fields (Von der Mehden and Troner, 2007). In 1997, Petronas established its own 
engineering university, Universiti Teknologi Petronas. The focus on educating engineers meant that learning and 
productivity increased in the long run. In the Indonesian oil sector, no such process took place for Pertamina. As 
mentioned before, the lack of a competitive environment and a lack of focus on technological learning in the oil 
sector made Pertamina a less efficient oil company compared to Petronas. 
Another example is in the palm oil sector. The Malaysian Palm Oil Board conducts applied research on 
problems facing the palm oil industry. In addition, the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute 
educates an increasing number of students within agricultural studies. The focus of Malaysian agricultural policies 
was to promote increased productivity and allow the most profitable sectors such as the palm oil sector to export 
their products. Consequently, the level of full-time employees conducting agricultural research per 1000 person 
active in agriculture has been steadily increasing from 1985 until 2005 as seen in table 5. 
The Indonesian palm oil sector has not attained the same level of human capital and research. Following 
the Malaysian model, Indonesia established the Indonesian Oil Palm Research Institute (IOPRI). However, the 
quality of the support and the research conducted was far lower than in Malaysia, as private estates in Indonesia 
view the research conducted by the IOPRI to be more directed towards government schemes and smallholders 
(Rasiah and Shahrin, 2006). One of the main obstacles for the IOPRI is the lack of qualified post-graduate 
personnel. Table 5 shows that the level of personnel conducting agricultural research in Indonesia is far from the 
Malaysian level, and has virtually been stagnant from 1985 to 2005. 
 
Table 5: Agricultural research employment per 1000 persons active in agriculture (five-year moving average) 
 1985 1995 2005* 
Indonesia 0.08 0.11 0.10 
Malaysia 0.44 0.55 0.80 
Source: ASTI (2013) for agriculture research data; FAO (2014) for active population in agriculture 
Agricultural research is measured as the total number of full-time equivalent (FTE) agricultural research staff in the government, higher education and non-
profit sector combined 
*For Indonesia the 2005 figure is only for 2003 
 
5. Comparison 
5.1 Similarities 
There are numerous similarities between the two late 19th and the two late 20th century case studies. First, 
important natural resource sectors are correlated with non-resource production. This implies that the natural 
resource sectors were important for economic growth. Table 6 summarises the results for the first difference 
analysis, which are similar to the de-trended results presented in appendix 2 and 3. Finland is the exception, but 
this correlation is positive for the forestry sector. The absolute effects of the natural resources might therefore 
have been similar for all four countries. 
Sweden increased its productivity, expanded its linkages and was able to generate major innovations. 
The value-added of forestry and the related industries increased over time, and is still an important part of both 
the Finnish and the Swedish economy. In fact, many of the most successful companies started in the forestry 
sector, and have since expanded into other areas. 
In Malaysia, the palm oil industry also increased its productivity, expanded its linkages and had to 
become a main innovator within palm oil. The success of the Malaysian palm oil sector is to a large extent caused 
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by supportive government policies which provided incentives not only for expanding production but also to 
increase research and the value-added content of palm oil. Many of the applications that palm oil is used for 
today were first developed by Malaysian companies that managed to expand the potential usages of palm oil.  
 
Table 6: Summary of the main correlations from the first-difference specifications (tables 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
Time period Country Natural resource sectors value-
added on growth in non-
resource GDP 
Share of natural resource 
sectors (of GDP) on growth in 
GDP per capita 
Share of natural resource 
sectors (of GDP) on growth in 
non-resource GDP per capita 
1860-1910 
Finland 
Negative 
(Positive for forestry) 
Positive Negative 
Sweden Positive Positive 
Not significant 
(Negative) 
1970-2005 
Indonesia Positive 
Not significant 
(Negative) 
Negative 
Malaysia Positive 
Not significant 
(Negative) 
Negative 
 
A second similarity is that the share of natural resource value-added is negatively correlated with non-resource 
GDP. The results are summarized in table 6 for first differences, and are similar as for the de-trended results in 
appendices 2 and 3. This could be a potential Dutch disease effect, as the relative share of production factors 
affects the rest of the economy adversely. This effect is logical as a slower expansion in the non-resource sectors 
(than in the resource sectors) will automatically allow the relative share of the resource sector to increase. 
A third similarity is the role of the determinants in both centuries. Sweden and Malaysia were more 
successful, and their institutions, economic policy and human capital were all more conducive to growth than in 
Finland and Indonesia.  
The obvious question is how generalizable these results are to other resource-abundant developing 
countries. Indonesia and Malaysia are unusually blessed with natural resources, thereby casting doubts on which 
policy implications can be taken from studying these countries. There are especially three arguments for why 
Indonesia and Malaysia are not representative case studies: (i) The presence of oil cannot be ‘created’ as it is 
given by nature; (ii) Both countries are blessed with a near optimal climate for palm oil; and (iii) The variety of 
natural resources, especially for Malaysia, was large. 
However, none of these make the Indonesia and Malaysia case study less relevant. First, oil production 
has in fact been in decline in both countries since the mid-1980s, and Indonesia became the first country ever to 
withdraw from OPEC in 2008. Oil, though important, has not been as abundant as in many other countries.132 
Second, the potential for palm oil production is probably higher in Southeast Asia than most other regions 
in the world. However, there are other high-value crops for which there is a high demand, and for which linkages 
can be developed. As mentioned, Malaysia had to develop many of the linkages that are important to the industry 
today. The potential for other countries to have a similar strategy is plausible. Cramer (1999), for instance, 
discusses these possibilities against the backdrop of the Mozambican cashew nut industry. 
Finally, the variety of natural resources has probably benefited Malaysia, as price shocks became less of 
an issue. Lederman and Maloney (2006) indicated that a more diverse export structure was beneficial. However, 
a number of successful resource-abundant countries have managed to cope with a highly concentrated export 
structure such as Botswana (diamonds), Chile (copper) and Norway (oil). 
 
5.2 Differences 
The differences are also numerous. First, resource dependence is positively correlated with GDP per capita in 
the late 19th century, but not in the late 20th century. The summary of the first-difference results is shown in 
                                            
132 In fact, in per capita terms neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are that resource-abundant in oil. Using figures from Haber and Menaldo (2011) on 
the value oil of income per capita in 2006, Malaysia ranked 22nd out of 136; while Indonesia ranked 41st. Both countries lagged Canada, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Mexico and the United Kingdom when oil is measured per capita. 
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table 6, with the de-trended results in appendices 2 and 3 showing similar results. It means that natural resources 
might have been more important for economic growth for Finland and Sweden than they were for Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
One potential cause might be that the driver of economic growth, technological progress, is different in 
the two centuries. For countries far from the technological frontier, the primary driver behind technological 
progress is learning of already existing technologies from advanced economies. For a country close to or even at 
the technological frontier, new technologies have to be invented and applied, meaning that invention and 
innovation become the primary drivers behind technological progress.133 In 1860, the technological leader was 
Great Britain, with Finland having 34 % of Great Britain’s GDP per capita, while Sweden had 43 % (all figures are 
based on Bolt and van Zanden, 2013). In 1960, the technological leader was the US, with Indonesia having 9 % of 
US’s GDP per capita while Malaysia had 14 %. As Finland/Sweden were closer to the frontier than 
Indonesia/Malaysia, innovation likely became an important source of technological progress. In contrast, 
Indonesia/Malaysia can rely longer on learning existing technologies as the gap is larger. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, foreign direct investments (FDI) was one of the main mechanisms for 
technological learning. There is little doubt that much of the economic growth in Indonesia/Malaysia has been 
driven by an increase from export-processing zones from mainly foreign-owned companies. It is therefore 
plausible that natural resources played a lesser relative role in generating economic growth in resource-abundant 
developing countries. 
A second difference, emphasised by De Long and Williamson (1994), are transportation costs. As 
transport costs were higher in the 19th century, having natural resources close to markets or close to where they 
were to be processed was more important. However, transport costs are still sufficiently high to affect trade. In 
addition, trade barriers can increase transaction costs a lot more than transportation can. This is exemplified by 
the disintegration of world trade in the interwar period (1918-1939), which had less to do with transportation 
costs and more with trade barriers. 
A third, and potentially more important difference, is the existence of entry barriers for resource-based 
manufacturing industries in the late 20th century. Sweden established itself in the international sawmill industry 
mostly without industrial policy. As mentioned, the paper industry in contrast was dependent on industrial policy 
for its establishment (Glete, 1989, Bohlin, 2005). 
However, the Malaysian industrial policy was far more extensive than that of Sweden. The establishment 
of the palm oil refinery sector involved investment incentives, export taxes and reducing foreign ownership of 
palm oil plantations. The cause for the need for more industrial policy are the higher entry barriers in the 
international market in the late 20th century compared to the late 19th century. 
There are numerous reasons for these higher barriers. First, food-processing companies, especially from 
advanced economies, were already present in 1960. Competition was therefore fiercer from the outset. Second, 
the technology lag was huge.  Already present food processing companies had superior technology and had 
already achieved considerable economies-of-scale prior to Malaysia’s entry. Finally, many companies received 
state support in various ways. In fact, the Malaysian government had to use an active industrial policy themselves 
for Malaysian refineries to be willing to establish themselves. Cramer (1999) and Gopal (2001) have made good 
overviews regarding the challenges developing countries face in establishing themselves in the food processing 
market. 
A fourth difference is the composition of world trade as trade in primary goods is lower in the late 20th 
century compared to the late 19th century. In 1910, primary products accounted for around 62.5 % of world 
                                            
133 The theoretical underpinning for the relationship of learning and innovation can be found in relationship to a country’s ‘absorptive capacity’. 
See for instance Gerschenkron (1962), Nelson and Phelps (1966), Ambramovitz (1986) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).  
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merchandise trade in value terms (Kenwood and Lougheed, 2002). In 2010, the comparable figure was around 
35 % (WTO, 2014). This emphasises the increasing role of manufacturing in the 20th century. These figures do not 
include services, which also have grown considerably in the latter period. In relative terms, the value of the 
trade in natural resources is less than a century ago, especially in their unprocessed form.134 
Another emerging trend is the splitting of the production process across countries, meaning that the 
trade in intermediate goods is increasing. Whereas this pattern makes international trade qualitatively different, 
it is less clear how these patterns affect the potential of resource-abundant countries. 
 
Conclusion 
The present paper sets out to answer the question of whether natural resources affect the economy in the same 
way today as in the past. This paper is limited as it only assesses two case studies from each period. Still, there 
were some interesting similarities and differences between these countries. Finland/Sweden in the 19th century 
and Indonesia/Malaysia in the 20th century did in general behave as Wright and Czelusta (2006) predicted. This 
meant that successful natural resource sectors were dependent on: (i) Institutions; (ii) State support; and (iii) 
Human capital. In addition, the countries that succeeded the most in promoting their natural resource sectors, 
Malaysia and Sweden, managed to improve productivity and the linkages between the natural resource sectors 
to other sectors in the economy. 
Still, natural resources played a lesser role in the economic growth process for Indonesia/Malaysia than 
they did for Finland/Sweden. I believe this effect is largely explained by the catch-up potential to the 
technological leader. Manufacturing exports financed by foreign direct investment was highly important for both 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and clearly more so than for Finland and Sweden. In addition, the world market has 
changed, as primary commodities constitute a lesser share of world trade compared to manufacturing, which 
might limit the possibility for resource-led growth for some countries. 
This study only focused on four countries, and its conclusions might therefore not be generalizable. 
Potential future research can explore the differences between periods even more extensively, using more 
advanced time-series techniques and increase the coverage of countries to test the nature of resource-led growth 
in the two periods. 
 
 
  
                                            
134 There is a danger of thinking of manufacturing exports as panacea for high growth. However, Norway, ranked as number 1 on the Human 
Development Index, is a primary exporting country with manufacturing products constituting only 18.2 % of total merchandise exports (UNDP, 
2013, WDI, 2014). 
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Appendix 1: Sources and descriptive statistics 
 
Table A1.1: Sources for the regressions analysis 
Variable Finland Sweden Indonesia Malaysia 
GDP per capita Hjerppe (1989) Schön and Krantz (2012) WDI (2014) WDI (2014) 
Natural resource value-added Smits et al. (2009) Smits et al. (2009) Timmer and de Vries (2009) Timmer and de Vries (2009) 
Investments Hjerppe (1989) Schön and Krantz (2012) UNSD (2014) UNSD (2014) 
Imports and exports Hjerppe (1989) Schön and Krantz (2012) UNSD (2014) UNSD (2014) 
Government consumption Hjerppe (1989) Schön and Krantz (2012) UNSD (2014) UNSD (2014) 
 
Table A1.2: Descriptive statistics Finland 1860-1910 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Δ ln(GDP-NR) 50 .0335326 .076735 -.1570829 .230495 
Δ ln(GDP) 50 .0137337 .0386899 -.0790038 .1483648 
Δ ln(NR) 50 .0030199 .0749202 -.1860676 .2198043 
Δ ln(Forestry) 50 .0063122 .0494946 -.1396259 .1187102 
Δ ln(NR-Forestry) 50 .0017858 .1001792 -.2474234 .2895837 
Δ (NR/GDP) 50 -.0066611 .0292354 -.0768266 .0496344 
Δ(Government Consumption/GDP) 50 .0003418 .0041926 -.0107005 .0113832 
Δ ((Exports + Imports)/GDP) 50 .0059631 .0300757 -.0689646 .0763379 
Δ (Investments/GDP) 50 .0000232 .0084099 -.0170905 .0231342 
 
Table A1.3: Descriptive statistics Sweden 1860-1910 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Δ ln(GDP-NR) 50 .0180797 .0387493 -.0779381 .1036654 
Δ ln(GDP) 50 .0147196 .0382944 -.0940337 .1200318 
Δ ln(NR) 50 .0071303 .0610437 -.1197047 .1439342 
Δ (NR/GDP) 50 -.0023167 .0130605 -.0283516 .0313216 
Δ(Government Consumption/GDP) 50 -.0004057 .0044638 -.0103076 .0084618 
Δ ((Exports + Imports)/GDP) 50 .0050672 .0202967 -.0472478 .0531251 
Δ (Investments/GDP) 50 .0005169 .0107275 -.0204619 .0290598 
 
Table A1.4: Descriptive statistics Indonesia 1970-2005 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Δ ln(GDP-NR) 35 .0559848 .0515748 -.1985755 .1171036 
Δ ln(GDP) 35 .0383673 .0389388 -.1553111 .0685744 
Δ ln(NR) 35 .0126921 .0281979 -.0623341 .0905967 
Δ (NR/GDP) 35 -.0099917 .0111086 -.0305661 .0315186 
Δ(Government Consumption/GDP) 35 -.0000361 .0085324 -.0250181 .0187911 
Δ ((Exports + Imports)/GDP) 35 .0104264 .094384 -.3003248 .3769682 
Δ (Investments/GDP) 35 .0031003 .0160118 -.0443933 .0324149 
 
Table A1.5: Descriptive statistics Malaysia 1970-2005 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Δ ln(GDP-NR) 35 .0539778 .0464916 -.1102352 .119112 
Δ ln(GDP) 35 .0397158 .0376803 -.1013174 .086484 
Δ ln(NR) 35 .004994 .0356957 -.0605021 .104465 
Δ (NR/GDP) 35 -.0096314 .0102041 -.0328989 .010083 
Δ(Government Consumption/GDP) 35 -.000993 .0129424 -.0325649 .0234509 
Δ ((Exports + Imports)/GDP) 35 .0378062 .0863878 -.1637959 .2205348 
Δ (Investments/GDP) 35 .0014349 .0421918 -.1752145 .0532511 
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Appendix 2: De-trending using a linear trend and regressing with fGLS 
Table A2.1: Finland linear de-trended GLS 
 (A2.1.1a) (A2.1.1b) (A2.1.2) (A2.1.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) -0.757***    
 (-8.69)    
     
ln (Forestry) (detrended)  0.411***   
  (5.12)   
     
ln (NR - Forestry) (detrended)  -0.607***   
  (-11.05)   
     
NR/GDP (detrended)   0.00758*** -0.0255*** 
   (5.26) (-16.87) 
     
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) 0.0110 -0.0243   
 (0.30) (-0.98)   
     
ln (Trade) (detrended) 0.422*** 0.231***   
 (7.12) (4.80)   
     
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.0381** 0.0412***   
 (2.46) (3.67)   
     
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)   -0.0411*** -0.0464*** 
   (-3.47) (-5.00) 
     
Trade/GDP (detrended)   0.000390 0.000925 
   (0.26) (0.61) 
     
Investments/GDP (detrended)   0.00190 0.000216 
   (0.48) (0.05) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 
R2 0.729 0.857 0.656 0.902 
Adjusted R2 0.705 0.841 0.626 0.894 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.715541 1.997795 1.841730 1.837487 
Note: All results were obtained using feasible GLS (Prais-Winsten regression). t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with 
* significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. None of the Durbin-Watson results are 
below the lower bound. 
Table A2.2: Sweden linear de-trended GLS 
 (A2.2.1) (A2.2.2) (A2.2.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per 
capita (detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) 0.220***   
 (3.10)   
    
NR/GDP (detrended)  0.00666* -0.00875** 
  (1.76) (-2.45) 
    
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) 0.000925   
 (0.33)   
    
ln (Trade) (detrended) -0.0121   
 (-0.20)   
    
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.00629***   
 (7.69)   
    
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)  -0.0560*** -0.0561*** 
  (-5.31) (-5.41) 
    
Trade/GDP (detrended)  -0.00683*** -0.00713*** 
  (-5.79) (-6.34) 
    
Investments/GDP (detrended)  0.0123*** 0.0124*** 
  (3.10) (3.16) 
Observations 51 51 51 
R2 0.582 0.565 0.672 
Adjusted R2 0.545 0.528 0.644 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.669759 1.671329 1.662570 
Note: All results were obtained using feasible GLS (Prais-Winsten regression). t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with 
* significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. None of the Durbin-Watson results are 
below the lower bound. 
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Table A2.3: Indonesia linear de-trended GLS 
 (A2.3.1) (A2.3.2) (A2.3.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per 
capita (detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) 0.519**   
 (2.34)   
    
NR/GDP (detrended)  -0.0126* -0.0333*** 
  (-1.84) (-5.03) 
    
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) -0.000450   
 (-0.37)   
    
ln (Trade) (detrended) -0.112*   
 (-1.70)   
    
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.00177***   
 (4.47)   
    
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)  -0.00719 -0.00480 
  (-0.82) (-0.56) 
    
Trade/GDP (detrended)  -0.00136 -0.000947 
  (-1.28) (-1.00) 
    
Investments/GDP (detrended)  0.00757* 0.00643 
  (1.93) (1.67) 
Observations 36 36 36 
R2 0.645 0.478 0.753 
Adjusted R2 0.599 0.411 0.721 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.484494 1.566505 1.543457 
Note: All results were obtained using feasible GLS (Prais-Winsten regression). t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with 
* significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. None of the Durbin-Watson results are 
below the lower bound. 
Table A2.4: Malaysia linear de-trended GLS 
 (A2.4.1) (A2.4.2) (A2.4.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per 
capita (detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) 0.212*   
 (1.93)   
    
NR/GDP (detrended)  -0.00324 -0.0177*** 
  (-0.53) (-2.97) 
    
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) 0.0000268   
 (0.21)   
    
ln (Trade) (detrended) 0.244***   
 (4.54)   
    
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.000145***   
 (6.82)   
    
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)  -0.0120*** -0.0119*** 
  (-3.30) (-3.28) 
    
Trade/GDP (detrended)  -0.0000408 -0.000162 
  (-0.08) (-0.33) 
    
Investments/GDP (detrended)  0.00564*** 0.00590*** 
  (3.41) (3.79) 
Observations 36 36 36 
R2 0.810 0.635 0.789 
Adjusted R2 0.785 0.588 0.761 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.559146 2.142171 2.040850 
Note: All results were obtained using feasible GLS (Prais-Winsten regression). t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with 
* significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. None of the Durbin-Watson results are 
below the lower bound. 
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Appendix 3: De-trending using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and regressing with OLS 
Table A3.1: Finland de-trending using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 6.25) 
 (A3.1.1) (A3.1.1a) (A3.1.2) (A3.1.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per 
capita (detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) -0.755***    
 (-9.09)    
     
ln (Forestry) (detrended)  0.367***   
  (3.49)   
     
ln (NR - Forestry) (detrended)  -0.629***   
  (-11.35)   
     
NR/GDP (detrended)   0.00766*** -0.0244*** 
   (6.60) (-16.76) 
     
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) -0.209 -0.147   
 (-1.35) (-1.46)   
     
ln (Trade) (detrended) 0.380*** 0.237***   
 (5.94) (3.45)   
     
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.175** 0.174***   
 (2.66) (3.17)   
     
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)   -0.0493*** -0.0505*** 
   (-6.03) (-6.70) 
     
Trade/GDP (detrended)   0.000490 0.00210 
   (0.44) (1.66) 
     
Investments/GDP (detrended)   0.00223 -0.00137 
   (0.64) (-0.33) 
     
Observations 49 49 49 49 
R2 0.741 0.842 0.726 0.905 
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.823 0.701 0.896 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.801 2.108 2.001 2.052 
Note: All results were obtained using OLS. t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with * significant at the 10 % level, ** 
significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels, and 
repeated Breusch-Godfrey test with different lags indicate that there is no autocorrelation. 
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Table A3.2: Sweden de-trending using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 6.25) 
 
 (A3.2.1) (A3.2.2) (A3.2.2+) (A3.2.3) (A3.2.3+) 
 ln non-resource GDP 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource 
GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource 
GDP per capita 
(detrended)) 
ln (NR) (detrended) 0.233***     
 (4.32)     
      
NR/GDP (detrended)  0.0109* 0.0123** -0.00467 -0.00314 
  (1.74) (2.24) (-0.75) (-0.57) 
      
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) -0.0434     
 (-0.59)     
      
ln (Trade) (detrended) 0.241***     
 (2.99)     
      
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.152***     
 (5.70)     
      
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)  -0.0520*** -0.0530*** -0.0519*** -0.0528*** 
  (-5.20) (-5.38) (-5.14) (-5.33) 
      
Trade/GDP (detrended)  -0.00188 -0.00186 -0.00223 -0.00211 
  (-1.10) (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.44) 
      
Investments/GDP (detrended)  0.00932 0.0105* 0.00910 0.0103 
  (1.27) (1.70) (1.24) (1.68) 
      
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 
R2 0.650 0.449 0.531 0.499 0.515 
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.399 0.489 0.454 0.471 
Durbin Watson test statistic 1.878514 1.466281 1.727959 1.460377 1.722712 
Note: Results in (A3.2.1); (A3.2.2) and (A3.2.3) were obtained by OLS; (A3.2.2+) and (A3.2.3+) through feasible GLS (Prais-Winsten regression). For (A3.2.2) and 
(A3.2.3) the Durbin-Watson test statistic is in the region of indecision, and the Breusch-Godfrey test indicated that aurocorrelation is present. Therefore, I ran 
regressions (A3.2.2) and (A3.2.3) with feasible GLS (Prais-Winsten regression) to obtain the results in (A3.2.2+) and (A3.2.3+). 
 
t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant 
at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. The Durbin-Watson results of (A3.2.1), (A3.2.2+) and (A3.2.3+) are within the accepted levels. 
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Table A3.3: Indonesia de-trending using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 6.25) 
 (A3.3.1) (A3.3.2) (A3.3.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP (detrended) ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) 0.644**   
 (2.61)   
    
NR/GDP (detrended)  -0.00992 -0.0297*** 
  (-1.12) (-3.86) 
    
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) -0.0239   
 (-0.28)   
    
ln (Trade) (detrended) -0.0942   
 (-1.54)   
    
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.328***   
 (4.67)   
    
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)  -0.00675 -0.00625 
  (-0.68) (-0.71) 
    
Trade/GDP (detrended)  -0.00178* -0.00151 
  (-1.83) (-1.70) 
    
Investments/GDP (detrended)  0.00527 0.00407 
  (1.29) (1.10) 
    
Observations 34 34 34 
R2 0.623 0.408 0.691 
Adjusted R2 0.571 0.327 0.648 
Durbin Watson test statistic 2.071597 1.718711 1.734105 
Note: All results were obtained using OLS. t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with * significant at the 10 % level, ** 
significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels, and 
repeated Breusch-Godfrey test with different lags indicate that there is no autocorrelation. 
Table A3.4: Malaysia de-trending using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 6.25) 
 (A3.4.1) (A3.4.2) (A3.4.3) 
 ln non-resource GDP (detrended) ln GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln non-resource GDP per capita 
(detrended) 
ln (NR) (detrended) 0.289***   
 (2.83)   
    
NR/GDP (detrended)  0.000362 -0.0150** 
  (0.06) (-2.58) 
    
ln (Gov.consum.) (detrended) -0.0293   
 (-0.51)   
    
ln (Trade) (detrended) 0.124**   
 (2.50)   
    
ln (Investments) (detrended) 0.211***   
 (5.66)   
    
Gov.consum./GDP (detrended)  -0.0141*** -0.0140*** 
  (-4.22) (-4.27) 
    
Trade/GDP (detrended)  -0.000212 -0.000185 
  (-0.66) (-0.58) 
    
Investments/GDP (detrended)  0.00652*** 0.00634*** 
  (4.17) (4.12) 
    
Observations 34 34 34 
R2 0.799 0.663 0.775 
Adjusted R2 0.771 0.616 0.744 
Durbin Watson test statistic 2.011903 2.369814 2.361163 
Note: All results were obtained using OLS. t statistics in parentheses based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with * significant at the 10 % level, ** 
significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Constant term is not shown. All of the Durbin-Watson results are within the accepted levels, and 
repeated Breusch-Godfrey test with different lags indicate that there is no autocorrelation. 
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Essay 4: Natural Resources, Technology and Production 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the link between natural resources, technology and GDP per capita. The 
difference between resource abundance and resource dependence is analysed in order to 
understand the different impacts natural resources have when a country is rich in them, or 
just simply dependent on them. The paper finds no evidence of the resource curse, but 
rather a positive effect of natural resources on GDP per capita. However, this effect is lower 
for higher levels of technology. No such relationship exists for resource dependence. In 
addition, the contribution of the level of technology to GDP per capita lowers with higher 
levels of resource abundance. 
 
Introduction 
The fate of resource-abundant countries varies. The past 50 years has seen a number of success stories. Botswana, 
rich in diamonds, has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Malaysia, with a multitude of 
natural resources, has managed to achieve high growth rates. Oil-rich Norway has used its considerable resource 
wealth to become one of the richest countries in the world and regularly ranks 1st on the Human Development 
Index. Other countries have not been as fortunate. Diamonds in Ivory Coast have been the source of ethnic and 
political conflict crippling its economy. Oil-rich Nigeria has seen multiple political coups, several failed attempts 
at industrialisation and a decrease in living standards over the past 30 years. Ragnar Torvik (2009) has summarised 
these contrasting experiences with the question: ‘Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while 
others do not?’ 
One potential mechanism is technology, which is the topic of the current paper. My research question 
is: ‘How does the level of technology affect production in a country abundant in natural resources?’ Other studies 
have also explored the link between technology and natural resources. One of them is Sachs and Warner (1995). 
They argue that the larger the natural resource sector, the less labour and capital would be diverted to the 
tradable (non-resource) sector. As the traded sector generated learning-by-doing, while the non-traded did not, 
a larger natural resource sector would reduce technological progress, and thereby reduce economic growth.  
An alternative perspective is provided by Torvik (2001) who uses a Dutch disease model in which learning 
occurs in both the traded and the non-traded sectors. The result of the model is that economic growth is 
dependent on the productivity in both sectors and the spill-over effects between the two. Building on this 
argument, Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006) construct a two-sector endogenous growth model with one of 
the sectors being a natural resource sector. They claimed that a high stock of human capital, which is an indicator 
of a high level of technology, could offset a resource curse.  In addition, Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006) 
also provided some empirical support for their model using the Sachs and Warner (1995) indicator to measure 
resource abundance. 
Economic historians suggested another link between natural resources and technology. Habakkuk (1962) 
argues that the high productivity in the US was linked to the country’s resource abundance, as the US became 
the world’s leading manufacturer at the same time as the country became the leading producer of coal, copper, 
petroleum, iron ore, zinc, phosphate, molybdenum, lead, and tungsten. Wright (1990) proves that these two 
                                            
 I am grateful for comments from Stig Tenold, Elias Braunfels, Tunç Durmaz, Ola Honningdal Grytten, Erik Sørensen, Frode Martin Nordvik, 
Ingelin Orten, Karl Rolf Pedersen and Hans Martin Straume. I also wish to thank Christina Norman for providing data. All remaining errors are 
solely mine. 
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processes were linked as the factor content of US manufacturing exports increased from 1870 until the onset of 
the Great Depression in 1929. David and Wright (1997) claimed that the increased productivity and linkages from 
the mineral sectors to the manufacturing sectors caused the successful resource-led growth in the US. 
Findlay and Lundahl (2004), extending the analysis beyond the US, analysed the experience of fifteen 
resource-abundant countries in the 1870-1914 period. They found that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
US used their natural resources as a catalyst to achieve resource-led industrialisation. For the other economies 
in the study, there was a large degree of heterogeneity. For instance, Argentina and Brazil managed to promote 
some linkages between the primary sector and manufacturing, allowing for the development of early 
industrialisation, while other primary exporting countries such as Costa Rica and Siam (Thailand) failed to 
establish strong linkages between the primary and manufacturing sectors.135 The central message of the study 
on 19th century resource-abundant countries is that the link between natural resources and technology is vital. 
The literature on resource-based industrialisation claims that current developing countries can process 
their own natural resources in the same manner as current developed countries did in the 1870-1914 period 
(Roemer, 1970; Lewis Jr, 1989; Cramer, 1999). The feasibility of resource-based industrialisation is largely linked 
to the interrelationship between natural resources and technology. 
However, the literature has thus far produced few stylized facts on this relationship. It is possible that 
there are negative synergies between the two, as a higher level of natural resources is linked with a lower level 
of technology (Sachs and Warner, 1995 and Gylfason, 2001). Such a negative link implies that resource abundance 
potentially might harm economic growth in the long run, and therefore a resource-based industrialisation might 
not be a desired strategy. 
It is also plausible that there are positive synergies between natural resources and technology, as these 
reinforce each other. Natural resource abundance would then be linked with a higher level of technology, which 
might benefit long-term economic growth (Stijns, 2006; Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2006). If so, a resource-
based industrialisation strategy might be a desirable strategy for current developing countries. Obviously, it is 
also possible that there is no link between natural resources and the level of technology. Alternatively, that the 
relationship between resource abundance and technological progress is not deterministic, but depends on policy 
choices (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). 
This paper aims to find out more on the relationship between natural resources and technology. It does 
so through an explorative empirical study, by focusing on the contribution of natural resources and technology 
on GDP per capita. The period 1980-2009 is investigated, which is more relevant for current developing countries 
than the pre-1914 period, and more data is available for the latter years.136 In addition, this study focuses solely 
on fuel and minerals, which are those resources most commonly associated with the resource curse.137 First, the 
paper outlines some theoretical predictions on the link between natural resources and technology. Second, the 
data used in the study is outlined. Third, the empirical approach is explained. The final three sections of the 
paper conduct the empirical analysis. 
 
1. Natural resources and technology 
There is a consensus among economists that long-term economic growth is determined by technological 
improvements.138 If natural resource abundance affects these improvements, it will therefore affect long-term 
                                            
135 Findlay and Lundahl (2004) also found that initial income and the type of resource produced played a major part in determining its effect on 
the economy. 
136 It is common to compare the period 1850-1914, often referred to the first era of globalisation, and the period following 1945, the second era 
of globalisation. The reason for focusing on the period following 1980 is both data driven and to focus on the more recent period.  
137 Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham et al. (2005) indicated that geographically concentrated natural resources (so called ‘point 
sources’ which were defined as minerals and plantation crops) affect economic growth negatively. 
138 See for instance Acemoglu (2009). 
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economic growth. I am interested in two interrelated questions. First, is the impact of natural resources on GDP 
per capita affected by technology? Second, is the impact of technology on GDP per capita affected by natural 
resources? The potential correlations that correspond to these questions are illustrated in figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of Natural Resources on GDP Dependent on Technology 
 
Figure 2: Impact of Technology on GDP Dependent on Natural Resources 
 
The first possibility is for negative synergies between natural resource and technology, what I call a technology 
‘penalty’ in figure 1 and a resource ‘penalty’ in figure 2. Such links imply that the level of technology contributes 
less to GDP in resource-abundant countries and vice versa. Sachs and Warner (1995) suggested such negative 
synergies. They divided the economy into two sectors, a ‘growth’ sector (which has technological progress) and 
a ‘backward’ sector (with little or no technological progress). Resource abundance in turn increases the 
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production of the backward sector at the expense of the growth sector through, for instance, factor demand, 
thereby lowering the level of technology. 
Another mechanism, proposed Gylfason (2001) is that increased resource abundance would lead to a 
decrease in education. The argument is similar to the one for the Dutch disease models. Manufacturing 
experiences learning-by-doing and the sector has a higher demand for human capital than the natural resource 
sectors. One reason could be that human capital investments are more necessary for resource-poor countries as 
they are more reliant on other non-resource exports for their export income. These non-resource exports can 
become more competitive with higher levels of human capital as productivity and learning increases. If the 
natural resource sectors expand, it would lower demand for human capital, and as increased human capital 
causes economic growth, it would mean that economic growth decreases. 
Other mechanisms might also cause a negative correlation. One such mechanism is fiscal policy 
irresponsibility; revenues generated from natural resources can be misused through corruption or excessive social 
benefit schemes (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). Fiscal policy irresponsibility might also be caused by increased 
rent-seeking associated with resource booms which might reduce the institutional quality (Leite and Weidmann, 
2002). This decrease might in turn cause increased corruption and decreased investments in growth-enhancing 
areas such as infrastructure and human capital. 
The second possibility is that there are positive synergies between natural resources and technology, 
what I have chosen to call a technology ‘bonus’ in figure 1 and a resource ‘bonus’ in figure 2. This implies the 
opposite from above in that the contribution of technology on GDP is higher in resource-abundant countries and 
vice versa. One possibility is that natural resource sectors have a higher increase in productivity than 
manufacturing. In fact, Martin and Mitra (2001) concluded that total factor productivity growth had been higher 
for agriculture than for manufacturing for the period 1967 to 1992, which is consistent with the results from 
other studies. However, these studies focused on the difference between agriculture and manufacturing, not the 
fuel and mining sectors. To my knowledge, no cross-country research has explicitly compared productivity 
between manufacturing and mining. 
Another possibility is that a high degree of human capital could prevent the resource curse as suggested 
by Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006). According to Glaeser et al. (2004), the accumulation of human capital 
predates an improvement in institutional quality, and an improved institutional quality can in turn positively 
affect economic growth. 
Fiscal spending might also cause a positive synergy. Natural resource-abundant countries might receive 
additional revenues compared to resource-poor countries and these can be used to invest in human capital, 
research and development, or other areas that improve technological progress (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). 
Stijns (2006) found that the accumulation of human capital was higher in resource-abundant countries.139 
One potential problem with the positive synergy argument can be the demand conditions for human 
capital in resource-abundant countries. Large natural resource sectors might crowd-out non-resource sectors 
that would benefit from increased human capital and technological progress at large. Therefore, it is possible 
that the positive synergies are not linear, but take the shape of an inverted U in which these effects are strongest 
for a medium level of resource abundance, or to borrow the phrase from Matsen and Torvik (2005), there might 
exist a level of ‘optimal Dutch disease’. 
The final possibility is that there is no correlation and that the production of natural resources has little 
bearing on technological improvements. The Torvik (2001) model claimed that the impact of natural resources 
on economic growth is not given, whether natural resources contribute to economic growth depends on (i) The 
                                            
139 Stijns (2006) differed from the already mentioned Gylfason (2001) in that the former used more direct measures of resource abundance than 
the latter. 
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degree of learning by doing in both the traded and non-traded sectors; and (ii) The extent of spill-over effects 
between the sectors.  If correct, it could imply that the mechanisms vary between countries, and resource-led 
growth could depend on a government’s ability and/or willingness to promote technological progress in all sectors 
in the economy. Measurements of the link between resources and technology might turn up as statistically 
insignificant, despite being economically significant as countries differ in their ability to promote technological 
progress in the resource sector. 
The direction of causality is unknown. As there are three variables to take into account, natural 
resources, technology and GDP, the direction of causality is potentially complex. Figure 3 illustrates six potential 
links. The first link is the direct impact of natural resources on GDP, as increased natural resource production 
increases value-added. The second link is the direct impact of technology on GDP as a higher level of education 
for instance can improve technological learning and labour productivity, which in turn increases GDP. 
 
 
Figure 3: Links between natural resources, technology and GDP 
 
Technology and natural resources can also affect each other. The third link in figure 3 is between natural 
resources and technology. Increased revenues from natural resources can increase investments in technology 
such as human capital and research and development. In addition, if natural resource sectors are technology-
intensive they can generate spillover effects to other sectors in the economy. Increased production in the natural 
resource sectors would then increase the level of technology in other sectors, which would give a technology 
‘bonus’. The fourth link is between technology and natural resources. Natural resources can potentially increase 
its economic value when a country has a higher level of technology. Better technology improves exploration of 
resource deposits, extraction and transportation can become more efficient and cost effective and more forward 
linkages to resource-intensive manufacturing products can increase the usage of natural resources in other goods 
in the economy can increase the demand for natural resources. Most likely, there is a bi-directional relationship, 
since links three and four work simultaneously. 
There are also two indirect effects, mainly predicted by the Dutch disease literature. The fifth link in 
figure 3 is the indirect effect of natural resources (through technology) on GDP. This is the classical Dutch disease 
argument from above. Increased resource abundance leads to a crowding-out effect of the growth sector. As the 
growth sector generates learning-by-doing (and the other sectors do not), the technological progress will 
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decrease when natural resource abundance increases. The sixth and final link is an indirect effect of technology 
(through natural resources) on GDP. This effect could be the Dutch disease effect in reverse. Technological 
progress can be so large in the growth sector, that it dominates the contribution of natural resources. 
Alternatively, the technological progress in the natural resource sector is so large that it becomes the growth 
sector in the economy, which is a possibility in the Torvik (2001) model. This paper will only tentatively consider 
causality by analysing the links from figure 3 at the end of the analysis.140 
 
 
2. Measuring Natural Resources and Technology 
2.1 Natural Resource Indicators 
No universally accepted indicator of resource abundance exists. I considered five indicators, each with their own 
strengths and weaknesses. The indicators considered are shown in table 1, and their sources are discussed when 
elaborating on each of the indicators. 
 
Table 1: Different resource indicators considered 
Primary resource exports Rents Natural wealth Natural resource 
income per capita 
Stock 
Fuel and ores, and metals 
exports (often measured as 
a share of GDP) 
The difference between 
the price of a commodity 
and the cost of producing it 
(including opportunity 
costs) 
The sum of present 
value of rents from 
extraction of remaining 
reserves 
Total natural resource 
income per capita 
 
Resource stocks 
1970 by adding past 
production data to 
current reserves 
Source: WDI (2014) Source: WDI (2014) Source: WDI (2014) Source: Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) 
Source: Norman 
(2009) 
 
The first measure considered, which has been the most common used indicator in the literature, is primary 
exports as a share of GDP. Sachs and Warner (1995) used this indicator as a proxy for natural resource abundance. 
The main advantages of this indicator are that it is easily observable for many countries, and it gives a good 
indication of the importance of unprocessed resource exports for a given economy. 
However, there are many problems with this indicator. First, it is probably not a good proxy for resource 
abundance as it measures the degree of unprocessed exports. Natural resources that are processed and 
subsequently exported as manufacturing are not measured, leading to the false impression that resource-
abundant countries that use natural resources as inputs in their manufacturing exports are resource-poor. Hence, 
it is a good estimation of resource dependence rather than resource abundance. 
The second problem is that Sachs and Warner (1995) only used the 1971 observation to measure resource 
abundance for the entire period. In December 1969 Norway discovered oil, but production and exports were still 
limited in 1971. However, oil played a major part in the Norwegian economy for the entire 1970-1990 period and 
probably did have a major effect on economic growth. 
The third problem is the reliance on the export figures themselves. Using data from WDI (2014), the 
degree of natural resource exports from Singapore in 1971 was 51.5 % as a share of GDP, while the same figure 
for Norway that year was 7.3 %. Taken literally, it would lead to the absurd conclusion that the city-state 
Singapore was more than seven times as resource-abundant as Norway. It is obvious that the problem is caused 
by the amount of re-export from Singapore. To counter this problem Sachs and Warner (1995) measured the net 
exports for Singapore. This creates a consistency problem, since a few observations are measured differently, 
                                            
140 The descriptive statistics in appendix 2, as shown in figure A2.1, indicate that there might be a relationship between human capital and 
resource abundance. Figure A2.2 indicate the relationship appears to be weaker for resource dependence. 
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making inferences less reliable. One could, as suggested by Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006), use the average 
for a given period. 
The second and third measures are rent and wealth data. As the wealth data are based on rents, I treat 
these together. Rents (a flow variable) is calculated as the resource income minus the estimated extraction costs 
(if actual are not available) and the alternative costs of resource production (which is the social discount rate 
taken to be 4 %). Natural wealth data is a stock variable calculated as the sum of the remaining rents available 
given the estimated resource stocks for extractive resources (if stock figures are not available, it is assumed that 
resources will be depleted in 20 years). The main advantage of the rent data is its availability for many years 
and coverage of numerous of countries for cross-country comparisons. The main advantage of the wealth data is 
that it is a stock variable and can measure the accumulated resource wealth. 
There are, however, many problems associated with rent and wealth data. The first problem, for wealth 
data only, is that there are only three observations (1995, 2000 and 2005), which limit the coverage over time.  
The second problem, also only for wealth data, is the estimation used calculating resource stocks. For missing 
observations, the World Bank assumes that the resource is depleted within 20 years, regardless of country and 
type of resource (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010).141 
The third problem, which goes for both rents and for wealth data, is the estimation of the cost of 
extraction. The costs of extraction for missing observations are assumed to be the same as for the Malaysian oil 
fields, whose cost figures are based on a study from Vincent (1997). It is likely that the costs of extraction are 
far higher for other developing countries, as Malaysia in relative terms is an efficient oil producer (Van der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke, 2010). The estimates would therefore overestimate resource rents in many developing countries. 
A final problem is the social discount rate to measure opportunity costs. These are unknown and probably 
not uniform across time or for different countries. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) claim that the social 
discount rates are too low for high growth economies and too low high for low growth countries. Given the 
number of assumptions that are used when calculating rents and wealth data, there is uncertainty about whether 
these figures actually show the extent of resource abundance. 
The fourth indicator considered is natural resource income per capita, which is quickly becoming a new 
standard in the literature.142 Natural resource income per capita has the advantage of being straightforward 
because few assumptions are made. The resource income is the production multiplied by the commodity price, 
with no deductions for costs. This paper uses the data from Haber and Menaldo (2011).  
The Haber and Menaldo (2011) data gave primacy to internal consistency of the data; therefore they 
gathered their data from as few sources as possible. The data gathered was for 168 countries, and even though 
the time-series went back all the way until 1900, I am only interested in the period 1980-2006. 
Natural resource income per capita consisted of four individual natural resources; (i) Oil; (ii) Natural 
Gas; (iii) Coal and (iv) Minerals (meaning antimony, bauxite, chromium, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, manganese, 
mercury molybdenum, nickel, silver, tin, tungsten, and zinc). To find per capita values, the population data for 
1980-2006 was gathered from the World Development Indicators.  
Production and price data on oil for 1980-2006 were gathered from three sources. Oil production data 
was collected from the ‘The Oil and Gas Journal’, which has been petroleum industry’s leading trade journal 
since 1902. For the few countries with missing observations the data was obtained from the other main leading 
journal of the petroleum industry ‘World Oil’. Nominal prices on oil were gathered from British Petroleum’s, 
‘Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008’ and the same source was used to deflate nominal prices. 
                                            
141 Different natural resources have widely different depletion rates. For instance, the median years until depletion (given current production) 
is 192 years for soft coal and 178 years for bauxite but only 16 years for copper and 17 years for zinc deposits. 
142 See for instance Dunning (2008), Aslaksen (2010), Ramsay (2011) and Bjorvatn et al. (2012). 
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For the other natural resources the production and nominal price data came from the same source. For 
natural gas, production and nominal price data were gathered from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
‘International Energy Annual’. For coal, the production and nominal price data were gathered from U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, ‘Energy Information Annual’. For minerals, the production and nominal price data 
was gathered from the U.S. Geological Survey, ‘Historical Statistics for Mineral and Material Commodities in the 
United States’. All nominal prices were deflated the same way as for oil prices using British Petroleum’s 
‘Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008’. 
The data gathered relied on relatively few sources for each natural resource, which means that 
production data across countries is comparable. Haber and Menaldo also cross-referenced their production data 
with other sources as a robustness check. They also published an online appendix which goes into detail on how 
the database was constructed which can be accessed online for more information.143 The obvious disadvantage 
of this indicator is that by omitting extraction and other costs, natural resources are valued the same in different 
countries despite different profit margins. Natural resource income does not measure ‘excess profits’ or rents in 
the traditional economic sense. 
The final indicator considered is the natural resource stock, meaning the value of the reserves available. 
Reserve data has some nice properties. First, reserves are exogenous to GDP, which none of the other indicators 
mentioned above are. However, reserves can only be partly exogenous, as reserves are a function of searching 
activity for resources, which again is a function of both income and technology. Thus, one would expect more 
exploration to have been conducted in developed countries (Cust and Harding, 2013). This might be problematic 
as it might overestimate the positive effects of resource abundance on technology because technologically more 
advanced countries have explored more oil, creating an upward biased estimate. However, reserves cannot be 
‘created’. In this respect, reserves are exogenous. Second, as a stock measure, it measures the absolute 
accumulated natural resource wealth, which gives a clearer picture than flow variables. 
The Norman (2009) reserve data is estimated by summing-up current reserves and production data for 
oil, gas, coal and various minerals since 1970, and adding known reserves. Data on 35 different minerals were 
gathered with the production, reserve and price data taken from various publications of the US Geological Survey. 
For coal, reserve, production and price data was mainly gathered the International Energy Annual.144 Gas and oil 
reserve, production and price data was gathered from the International Energy Annual, the Energy Information 
Agency and the US Geological Survey. 
By constructing the estimated 1970 reserve data, it reflects the ‘true stock’ of natural resources, which 
in part was an unknown quantity at the time. The main weakness of the natural resource stock is that reserves 
in part are unknown to economic actors. If these actors are not aware of the resources present, it is difficult to 
act upon them and thereby have an effect on the economy. 
The concept ‘resource abundance’ relates not only to the extent that a country is abundant in natural 
resources, but there is also the implicit assumption that the population of the country should benefit from 
abundance. If a country has a large resource base which is never discovered, the resources will never affect the 
economy. An indicator of resource abundance should therefore (i) give a good proxy of the extent of natural 
resources; (ii) be observable so it can be acted upon; and (iii) be exogenous to the dependent variable measured, 
in this case GDP. I compare how each of the five indicators of resource abundance mentioned above fare in table 
2. 
  
                                            
143 Available at https://iriss.stanford.edu/sshp/datasets. 
144 The exception is the production data 1971-77 which are gathered from US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines; and the 1978-1979 
data which had to be estimated 
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Table 2: Resource indicators and the three criteria 
 Primary resource 
exports 
Rents Natural wealth Natural resource 
income 
Stock 
      
Good proxy of the 
extent of natural 
resources 
Not fulfilled Reasonably fulfilled Reasonably fulfilled Fulfilled Fulfilled 
      
Observable so it can 
be acted upon 
Fulfilled Reasonably fulfilled Not fulfilled Fulfilled Not fulfilled 
      
Exogenous to GDP 
per capita 
Not fulfilled Not fulfilled Not fulfilled Not fulfilled Reasonably 
fulfilled 
 
My preferred measurement of natural resource abundance is natural resource income per capita, as it relies on 
few assumptions, and because natural resources most likely affect the economy the most when used in production. 
The main disadvantage is that natural resource income is not exogenous to GDP. I do not use rent and wealth 
data, as these rely on too many assumptions, making inferences based on these more difficult. Natural resource 
exports are an inadequate indicator for measuring natural resource abundance, but give a good indication of 
natural resource dependence. As natural resource exports are a standard measure in the literature, I use this in 
some regressions for the sake of comparison. Stock measurement is the only measure that can, at least partially, 
be considered as exogenous to GDP per capita. However, as mentioned, unknown reserves cannot affect the 
decision making of economic agents, and will therefore not be used. 
To differentiate between resource abundance and resource dependence, I use two versions of the 
resource income indicator. The first version is the natural resource income per capita (2005 USD) in order to 
measure the absolute level of resource abundance per person. The second version is the natural resource income 
as a share of GDP measuring the degree of resource dependence.  
Table 3 compares these two measures for the 15 highest values for each indicator. In per capita terms, 
Qatar is the country with the largest resource income, but ranks only 14th in terms of resource dependence. 
Norway has the second largest income per capita, but ranks only 28th of most dependent countries. Kuwait, 
ranking third in resource abundance, ranks only 15th in terms of resource dependence. Iraq, the most resource-
dependent country according to these figures, does not even feature among the top 15 resource-abundant 
countries. The point is that the type of measurement matters. Resource-dependent countries are more likely to 
be countries with a low GDP, as this would increase the relative share of natural resources. Most of the literature 
uses resource dependence rather than resource abundance as a measure of natural resources, thereby biasing 
the results in favour of a resource curse. 
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Table 3: Resource Abundance vs. Resource Dependence 2004-2006 (Three-Year Average) 
Country Resource abundance: 
Resource Income per capita 
(2005 USD) 
Country Resource Dependence: 
Resource Income Share 
( % share of GDP) 
1. Qatar 24.525 1. Iraq 83 
2. Norway 15.930 2. Equatorial Guinea 80 
3. Kuwait 15.461 3. Gabon 77 
4. United Arab Emirates 12.667 4. Congo, Rep. 71 
5. Equatorial Guinea 9.908 5. Papua New Guinea 65 
6. Oman 7.645 6. Libya 62 
7. Saudi Arabia 7.171 7. Oman 62 
8. Trinidad and Tobago 6.994 8. Trinidad and Tobago 55 
9. Bahrain 6.460 9. Saudi Arabia 54 
10. Libya 4.876 10. Angola 53 
11. Gabon 4.784 11. Mongolia 51 
12. Canada 2.872 12. Chad 48 
13. Australia 2.832 13. Iran 47 
14. Venezuela 2.042 14. Qatar 46 
15. Chile 1.698 15. Kuwait 45 
Source: Calculated from the Haber and Menaldo (2011) database converted to 2005 USD using BP (2008) historical oil price figures; 
GDP figures from WDI (2014). 
 
2.2 Technology Indicators 
By technological progress, I mean the process by which an economy learns or develops more advanced 
technologies that improve productivity, generate new products or increase the quality of the products already 
being produced. For developing countries far from the technological frontier, the primary driver behind 
technological progress is often the learning of already existing technologies from advanced economies. When a 
country is close to or even at the technological frontier, new technologies have to be invented and applied 
meaning that invention and innovation become the primary drivers behind technological progress.145 The level 
of technology is the accumulated technological progress. In this paper, I chose to use three different indicators 
as they cover different aspects of technology. 
The first indicator is the stock of human capital. Human capital, according to economic theory, increases 
labour productivity and learning. Using stock data also gives an indication of the level of technology rather than 
just educational inputs. The source chosen is from the latest version of the Barro and Lee database.146 I have 
chosen this database for a number of reasons. First, the database is the most commonly used in the literature, 
making comparisons with other research easier. Second, the latest version of the database is improved as much 
of the criticism of the earlier versions of the Barro and Lee databases have been taken into account.147 Finally, 
the data covers many countries, which increases the number of observations. 
In the empirical literature, there is no uniform way of measuring human capital. The most common way 
is to measure the average years of education to measure the returns to education.148 This approach works well 
with studies that explicitly want to measure the effect of an additional year of education. However, I use human 
capital as a proxy for the level of technology. Therefore, I construct the following measure of the stock of human 
capital: 
 
 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 (1) 
 
                                            
145 The theoretical underpinning for the relationship of learning and innovation can be found in relationship to a country’s ‘absorptive capacity’. 
See for instance Gerschenkron (1962), Nelson and Phelps (1966), Ambramovitz (1986) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).  
146 See Barro and Lee (2013) for a detailed description of the data. 
147 For a criticism of previous versions of the Barro and Lee database see De La Fuente and Doménech (2006); and Cohen and Soto (2007). To see 
how this critique affected the human capital estimates see Barro and Lee (2013). 
148 Benhabid and Spiegel (1994) were the first to measure human capital as the average number of years of education, which still is a common 
measure in the literature. 
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This indicator captures the learning and productivity effects to a greater degree than total years of education. 
Secondary and tertiary education have higher returns, indicating that they have a greater effect than primary 
education.149 
The second indicator I use is the number of patents per capita. Patents are highly useful for measuring 
technological progress, as they are an output variable (as opposed to input) that measures innovation more than 
learning. In addition, the data coverage is large as the information is freely available. However, there are many 
pitfalls in using patents as an indicator. 150 First, not all innovations are patented as the choice to apply for a 
patent depends on the industry, the cost of the application and the strength of the intellectual property rights. 
Second, countries that did not have patent systems such as the Netherlands and Switzerland in the 19th century 
did not experience a lower degree of innovation or economic growth. Nevertheless, I still choose to use patents 
as an indicator because the data coverage is large, and it does serve as an indicator for innovative activities. If 
one assumes that the ratio of patented innovations relative to non-patented innovations is constant in the time-
period 1980-2006, patents still provide a good indicator for innovation. 
The third indicator I use is research intensity, which is measured as expenditures on research and 
development (R&D) as a share of GDP. R&D captures both learning and innovation effects, as a considerable 
amount of R&D expenditures focuses on learning and improving already existing technologies in addition to being 
used to invent new technologies. Griffith et al. (2004) confirm that R&D is significant both for learning and 
innovation purposes. However, one disadvantage with R&D is that it is a flow variable, not a stock variable.151  
R&D therefore does not measure the level of technology, directly but gives an indication of the investments in 
research, which is assumed to be correlated with the level of technology. Another disadvantage is that R&D is 
an input measure, which says little of actual effects. R&D expenditure can be used efficiently as well as 
inefficiently depending on the quality of the research conducted. Still, the indicator captures investments which 
are aimed at increasing both learning and innovation.  
Both the patent and the R&D data is taken from the Castellacci and Natera (2011) database. The 
database collected the patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, while the R&D data 
were collected from three main sources.152 One advantage of this dataset is that missing observations are 
estimated using a multiple imputation methodology giving more reliable estimates, which is also confirmed in a 
number of reliability tests (Castellacci and Natera, 2011). Another advantage is the dataset coverage, as the 
database has observations for 134 countries for the patent data and 94 countries for the R&D data during 1980-
2006, including many developing countries, which are important for the current study.153 
 
3. Empirical approach 
To test the effect of natural resources and technology on a country’s GDP per capita, I divide the analysis in two 
parts. In the first part, I employ a cross-sectional analysis for the time period as a whole. In the second part, I 
use a panel data analysis to analyse whether the conclusions change. 
 
  
                                            
149 Barro and Lee (1996) discussed various measures of schooling and found no significant relationship between primary education and economic 
growth. Only secondary and tertiary education were found to be significant. 
150 For a discussion of the usage of patents as indicators of innovation, see Basberg (1987), Griliches (1990) and Moser (2013). 
151 One could potentially construct a R&D stock measure using an inventory method with assumptions regarding depreciation (or technology 
obsolescence). However, this is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
152 The three sources for R&D data were (i) OECD: Science, Technology and R&D Statistics; (ii) Red Iberoamericana de Indicadores de Ciencia y 
Tecnología (RICYT); and (iii) UNESCO online database. For more details see Castellacci and Natera (2011). 
153 For a more detailed description, reliability tests compared to other datasets and potential shortcomings see Castellacci and Natera (2011). 
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3.1 Cross-sectional data analysis 
In the cross-country analysis, I will test the importance of natural resources and technology in 1980 for GDP per 
capita in 2009. I therefore use the following equation: 
 
 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅1980 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻1980 + 𝛽3(𝑁𝑅 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻)1980 + 𝛽4𝑍1980 + 𝜀 (2) 
 
Countries are indexed by i (1, .., 110). GDP per capita figures are from the World Development Indicators (2014) 
and measured in constant 2005 dollars.154 This paper uses the level of the logarithm of GDP per capita rather 
than the growth rate. This is a common approach in the literature and there are two reasons for why I have 
chosen levels in the present paper.155 First, the impact of natural resources on economic growth is difficult to 
determine as the period of analysis is only 30 years, from 1980 to 2009. Most deposits of natural resources were 
discovered prior to 1950, and the impact of natural resources should be measured from discovery to commercial 
exploration and to depletion. It is possible that natural resources increase economic growth in the early stages 
of production, but slow growth when deposits mature (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009).156 To able to capture the total 
effect of natural resources on the economy, levels are therefore more appropriate rather than growth rates. The 
second reason is that the level of GDP per capita captures more information about the accumulated growth 
process than does the growth rate (Brückner, 2010). 
The variable NR stands for ‘natural resources’ indicators. The ones I use are resource income and 
resource exports. TECH stands for ‘technology indicators’. The ones I will use are human capital, patents and 
research and development expenditure. All the natural resource and technology indicators have been explained 
in part 2. 
Z denotes a set of control variables, the ones I have chosen are based on two criteria. The first criteria 
is their usage in the resource curse literature in general as well as their intuitive appeal. The second criteria is 
the data coverage. The control variables need to be available for many countries, preferably from the same 
source. In fact, for each individual control variable all observations came from the same source. This means that 
they are comparable across countries. 
The control variables used cover important causes for economic growth mentioned in the literature. The 
first control variable is the age dependency ratio, which controls for the demographic burden of a country.157  If 
a country has a relatively high share of people under 15 compared to the working population, this will be a fiscal 
burden on the working population which could decrease savings, and thereby investments. 
The second control variable is government consumption as a share of GDP, measuring the degree of 
government expenditures on non-investment activities, which, according to Barro (1991), is negatively correlated 
with economic growth. It is argued that government consumption (as opposed to government investment) does 
not contribute to long-term economic growth, and is a proxy for government wastefulness. 
The third control variable is trade as a share of GDP, measuring the degree of openness. The degree of 
openness is often assumed to be positively correlated with higher GDP as sectors engaging in international trade 
are more productive than sectors producing for the domestic market. 
                                            
154 An alternative would be to use the Penn World Tables 7.1, which provides a measurement of GDP per capita in constant 2005 PPP, which in 
many ways is a preferred method for comparing living standards across countries. Differences in measurement of GDP from various sources might 
potentially lead to different results, as highlighted by Sørensen (2008). However, a number of the variables in the regression are measured not 
by PPP, but in 2005 USD and for the sake of consistency I use the same measure. I also estimate the same regressions as I did in the analysis (but 
did not report the results) using the Penn GDP per capita data, but the results were not noteworthy different. 
155 See for instance Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004), Alexeev and Conrad (2009) and Bjorvatn et al. (2012). 
156 See also Boyce and Emery (2005) for a general equilibrium model in which such an exploitation pattern is optimal. 
157 The age dependency ratio is given by ((population aged 0-14 + population aged 65 and over)/population aged 15-64). It measures the share of 
the young and old population as a share of the population that is most likely of working-age. 
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The fourth control variable is investments as a share of GDP, which measures the effect of investments 
on GDP. Increased investments are thought to an enhancement the productive capacity of the economy which 
would lead to improved long-term economic growth. 
The final control variable has to do with institutions. As a proxy of institutions, I have included the 
Transparency International Index, which ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). Recent research 
has stressed the importance of institutions for long-term economic growth.158 For more information on the 
variables and their sources, see appendix 1. 
A number of control variables were not included in this study, despite their potential relevance. Three 
of these deserve a special mention. The first control variable dropped was domestic credit to the private sector. 
This control is a proxy for the quality of the financial sector, which is an important determinant for economic 
growth. The reason for dropping the variable was mainly the lack of observations for a number of countries, 
which would have decreased the sample size considerably. However, the category of investments partly captures 
this effect. 
The second control variable dropped is price fluctuation. Fluctuations in prices might have adverse 
effects for how natural resources affect the economy as fiscal policy becomes less predictable and countries 
might be tempted toward excessive borrowing during price booms (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010). The first 
reason for dropping this variable is a lack of observations. The second reason is the inappropriateness given the 
natural resource indicator chosen. As I have chosen resource income per capita, it means that not all natural 
resources are exported, since some natural resources are either consumed or processed domestically. Therefore, 
an international price index might not capture the effect natural resources have domestically other than a 
potential opportunity cost. 
A final control variable dropped was public debt as a share of GDP. The reason for dropping this variable 
was mainly that I had already included government consumption, which is a proxy for government wastefulness. 
As the correlation between government consumption and debt is high, and because government consumption 
came from the same source as other control variables, while debt did not, I chose not to include public debt. 
Equation (2) states that GDP per capita is affected by natural resources and technology directly, and 
through an interaction effect between the two. The marginal effect of natural resources on GDP per capita is 
therefore the partial derivate of equation (2) on natural resources: 
 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009
𝜕𝑁𝑅1980
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻1980 (3) 
 
Equation (3) states that the effect of natural resources in 1980 on GDP per capita in 2009 is dependent on β1 and 
the level of technology in 1980 times β3. The value of β1 can be negative, positive or not significant, as different 
empirical studies find different effects of natural resources on the level of GDP per capita. The coefficient β3 is 
the one of interest in the present study, as it shows whether the level of technology affects the effect of natural 
resources on GDP. As explained in part 1, little is known about the expected sign of this coefficient. 
I also wish to explore the marginal effect of technology on GDP per capita, which is given by the partial 
derivative of equation (2) on technology: 
 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009
𝜕𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻1980
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅1980 (4) 
 
                                            
158 See for instance Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2005), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Mehlum et al. (2006). 
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Equation (4) shows that the marginal effect of technology in 1980 on GDP per capita is β2 plus natural resources 
in 1980 times β3. The conditional effect of technology, β2, is expected to be positive as a higher level of 
technology is assumed to be correlated with a higher level of GDP per capita. The coefficient β3 is the same as 
the one in equation (3) and gets an additional interpretation in equation (4), as it measures how the level of 
natural resources affects the effect of technology on GDP. As mentioned above, little is known about the sign of 
this coefficient.  
 
3.2 Panel data analysis 
The panel data equation estimated is: 
 
 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑁𝑅 ∙ 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
 
As above, countries are indexed by i (1, .., 112). All the independent variables are the same as above. One 
difference in the panel data set-up is the time lag introduced to reduce endogeneity problems.159 I have included 
country-fixed effects, denoted by μ to test for changes within countries over time. The time-fixed effects are 
given by δ and are used as a robustness check for whether time-specific events affect the result. The error term 
is clustered at the country level. In the empirical analysis, I use pooled OLS and fixed effects (to remove any 
unobserved cross-country heterogeneity).160 
I categorise the years from 1980-2009 into six five-year time periods with t (1 = 1980-1984, …, 6 = 2005-
2009), and use five-year averages for each observation. As the independent variables are lagged by one period, 
there will be five time periods in the analysis. There are two main reasons for using five-year averages, one 
based on economic intuition and the other being more practical. First, it is intuitive that the variables included 
in the regression affect GDP per capita with a considerable time lag. An increase in the level of education from 
1980 to 1981 is unlikely to have any real impact in the short-run. It is more likely that a higher average level of 
human capital from 1980-1984 has an effect on the average level of GDP per capita in 1985-1989. This also goes 
for the other independent variables included. Second, it is more practical to operate with five time-periods 
rather than twenty-six (which is the maximum number of time periods I have observations for). The simple reason 
being that a large number of countries and a long time-period gives rise to problems associated with nonstationary 
panels.161 
As in the case of the cross-sectional analysis, I am interested in the marginal effects of natural resources 
and technology. In the panel data analysis, the marginal effect of natural resources on GDP per capita is the 
partial derivate of equation (5) on natural resources: 
 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 (6) 
 
The interpretation of (6) is slightly different from the cross-sectional case. It states that the marginal effect of 
natural resources in period t affects GDP per capita in the period t+1 by β1 and the level of technology in period 
t times β3. As for the cross-sectional case, the expected signs of the coefficients β1 and β3 are unknown. 
Finally, I also wish to explore the marginal effect of technology on GDP per capita, which is given by the 
partial derivative of equation (5) on technology: 
                                            
159 See Mehran and Peristiani (2010); and Bjorvatn et al. (2012) for a similar approach.  
160 I do not use random effects as it assumes that the unobserved country characteristics are uncorrelated with the independent variables, which 
is implausible in the current study. 
161 For an introduction to potential problems with nonstatioanry panels and tests for detecting these, see Baltagi (2008 pp.273-308). 
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 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 (7) 
 
Again, the interpretation of the panel data marginal effect differs slightly from the cross-sectional analysis. 
Equation (7) measures the marginal effect of technology in period t on GDP per capita in period t + 1 which is 
dependent on β2 plus natural resources times β3. Equation (4) shows that the marginal effect of technology on 
GDP per capita is β2 plus natural resources in period t times β3. As in the cross-sectional case, the coefficient β2 
is assumed to be positive while the sign of the coefficient β3 is unknown. 
The main question in the context of the panel data analysis is whether to rely on the pooled OLS or the 
fixed effect estimations to evaluate the effects of resource abundance on the economy. Research has at times 
chosen the fixed effects estimation by default as it corrects for unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, there is 
little doubt that fixed country effects are present. However, the fixed effects estimation also assumes that the 
data generating process is similar in all economies once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. In other 
words, fixed effects estimation assumes that oil affects the Norwegian economy in the same way as oil affects 
the Indonesian economy. This is a strong assumption. The oil sector in Norway is a human capital-intensive 
industry, has generated spill-over effects in terms of increased technological learning and Norway is managing 
its oil revenues conservatively through a resource income fund. The evidence from Indonesia indicates that its 
oil sector has been plagued with inefficient production, government intervention and a high degree of corruption 
(Hertzmark, 2007). It is safe to say that oil has had a different effect on the Indonesian economy than on the 
Norwegian one, which goes against the assumptions of fixed effects estimation. 
The pooled OLS instead measures each observation without considering country effects. The 
disadvantage is that one has to assume that natural resources affect all observations in the same way. The 
potential advantage of pooled OLS is when there is reason to believe that each five-year period can be viewed 
as a single observation and not to consider the country-fixed effects. In the present case, the fixed effects are 
preferable, but pooled OLS estimates also provide important information as the number of observations increase 
and it allows us to treat each period as a single observation. 
 
4. Empirical results cross-sectional analysis 
4.1 Cross-sectional regression results 
The results of the cross-sectional analysis for 1980-2009 are presented in tables 4 and 5. The reason for including 
the latter years, and potentially measuring a ‘financial crisis’ effect, is because I use the same period in the 
panel data analysis. I also ran the regression for 1980-2006, both with the WDI and the Penn estimates of GDP, 
and got similar results as for 1980-2009. The control variables in tables 4 and 5 do have signs that are mostly 
intuitive, but not all of these are statistically significant. Institutions and the age dependency ratio are clearly 
the two indicators that affect the level of income the most, as these are statistically significant at the 1 % level 
in all results. Government consumption and investments have a varying degree of significance level, and do have 
a positive sign when they are significant. Trade is only significant in result (5-3), albeit with a low negative 
coefficient. 
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Table 4: Dependent variable: Logarithm GDP per capita 2009 (2005 USD) 
 (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) (4-4) (4-5) (4-6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Logarithm Resource Income per capita (RI) 0.198***  0.143***  0.136***  
 (5.27)  (4.42)  (2.88)  
       
Resource Income Share of GDP (RIS)  0.00237  0.00742**  0.00874** 
  (0.42)  (2.55)  (2.46) 
       
Sec and Tet Education (STE) 0.679*** 0.348***     
 (4.98) (3.11)     
       
Patents (P)   0.00713*** 0.00217   
   (4.03) (1.12)   
       
Research and Development (RD)     0.707*** 0.400*** 
     (3.78) (3.26) 
       
RI*STE -0.0632***      
 (-3.28)      
       
RIS*STE  0.00356     
  (0.98)     
       
RI*P   -0.000676**    
   (-2.21)    
       
RIS*P    0.000351   
    (0.69)   
       
RI*RD     -0.0877***  
     (-2.75)  
       
RIS*RD      -0.0238** 
      (-2.52) 
       
Institutions 0.137** 0.159*** 0.171*** 0.209*** 0.181*** 0.227*** 
 (2.45) (2.79) (3.55) (4.28) (3.05) (4.09) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0366*** -0.0433*** -0.0490*** -0.0566*** -0.0408*** -0.0415*** 
 (-4.97) (-5.48) (-7.10) (-7.95) (-4.49) (-4.60) 
       
Government consumption 0.00938 0.00720 0.0212** 0.0171 0.0109 -0.0000678 
 (0.94) (0.57) (1.99) (1.45) (0.72) (-0.00) 
       
Investment 0.0211* 0.0287** 0.0199* 0.0233* 0.0149 0.0227 
 (1.81) (2.39) (1.66) (1.85) (1.01) (1.57) 
       
Trade 0.000841 0.000964 0.000612 0.000365 0.000650 0.000198 
 (0.48) (0.55) (0.27) (0.17) (0.32) (0.11) 
       
Observations 103 103 110 110 75 75 
R2 0.839 0.803 0.799 0.769 0.805 0.790 
Adjusted R2 0.825 0.786 0.783 0.751 0.782 0.764 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the cross-section analysis using resource income.  The first interesting result is that 
the coefficient for resource income per capita is positive and highly significant in results (4-1), (4-3) and (4-5). 
For instance, for (4-1) the conditional effect of a 1 % higher resource income per capita in 1980 would lead to a 
0.198 % higher GDP per capita in 2009 (this effect would be unconditional if human capital = 0). This means that 
countries with a low level of technology have a strong positive correlation between natural resource abundance 
and GDP per capita. The positive correlation between natural resources and GDP per capita contradicts Sachs 
and Warner (1995), and is more in line with Alexeev and Conrad (2009). The most likely cause is that the 
dependent variable is in level terms, as in Alexeev and Conrad, and not in growth terms as in Sachs and Warner. 
I will return to its economic interpretation when I am discussing the marginal effects.  
The conditional effect of resource dependence, measured in (4-2), (4-4) and (4-6) is less statistically 
significant compared to resource abundance. The interpretation of the coefficient of resource dependence is as 
a semi-elasticity as the specification is a semilog model (meaning that the coefficient is multiplied with 100 to 
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show the % effect on GDP per capita). For instance, for (4-4), a one percentage point increase in natural resource 
income as a share of GDP in 1980 is correlated with a 0.742 % higher GDP per capita in 2009. As mentioned, the 
statistical robustness of the resource abundance results are stronger than for resource dependence. This is caused 
in part by a bias in the resource dependence indicator, as countries with a high resource dependence will have 
a relatively lower income level. The resource dependence coefficient is, however, still positive. As mentioned, 
for the true effect of natural resources, the marginal effect has to be considered which will be done below. 
All technology coefficients, apart from patents in (4-4), are positive and significantly correlated with 
GDP per capita. The coefficients are semi-elasticities. For (4-1) this means that the conditional effect of a 1 year 
higher average years of secondary and tertiary education in 1980 is correlated with a 67.9 % higher GDP per 
capita in 2009 (for the effect to be unconditional the natural resource indicator needs to = 0). The size of the 
coefficient is remarkably high, and is probably a result of (i) the length of the time-period, from 1980 to 2009; 
and (ii) the skewedness of the educational data, with approximately 80 % of observations being for 3 years of 
education or less (see appendix 2 table A2.4). The results indicate that technology is positively correlated with 
GDP per capita, which is line with most economic theory and empirics. 
The interaction term is negative and statistically significant in results (4-1), (4-3) and (4-5); indicating 
that resource abundance lowers the effect of the level of technology and vice versa. For instance, for (4-1) the 
interaction term is -0.063. This means that if people in a country have an average of 1 year of secondary and 
tertiary education (human capital = 1), the unconditional effect of a 1 % higher natural resource income per 
capita in 1980 leads to a (0.198 – 0.063 =) 0.135 % higher GDP per capita in 2009. 
If true, a higher level of technology lowers natural resources correlation with GDP per capita. Numerous 
potential mechanisms could explain these results. The first potential mechanism is reduced demand for human 
capital as proposed by Gylfason (2001). He claimed that a larger resource abundance lowered the demand for 
human capital in countries with a large natural resource sector. One could also argue that the quality of education 
in resource-abundant countries lowers the competitive pressure to generate a labour force with good quality 
education. 
A second potential explanation for a negative interaction might be adverse policies, which is a non-
deterministic cause. It might reflect government misspending in resource-abundant countries as growth 
enhancing policies such as investing in human capital have not been pursued (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). 
However, the converse might be true as well in that the results are caused by ‘policy successes’. 
Resource abundance has a conditionally positive coefficient indicating that resource-abundant economies have 
a higher GDP per capita. The negative coefficient of the interaction term can be caused by a ‘maturity’ effect. 
As an economy expands, the level of technology gets higher, and the economy increasingly diversifies. The 
diversification in turn causes the relative (but not necessarily the absolute) contribution of natural resources to 
decline. The economic policies that promote diversification might therefore potentially lower the effect of 
natural resources on GDP. 
Resource exports as a share of GDP is the most common used indicator in the early literature on the 
resource curse. To test how resource exports fare, compared to resource income, I redid the same analysis as in 
table 4, but for resource exports, as shown in table 5. For instance, (5-1) shows that the conditional effect of a 
1 % higher resource exports per capita in 1980 leads to a 0.294 % higher GDP per capita in 2009. The results 
obtained are different from Sachs and Warner (1995), for instance, in that the coefficients for resource exports 
(absolute values in (5-1), (5-3) and (5-5)) are positive and significant and the coefficients for resource exports as 
a share of GDP (relative values in (5-2), (5-4) and (5-6)) are mixed. In none of the specifications did I find a robust 
negative coefficient, meaning that I found no evidence of a resource curse. 
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Table 5: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 2009 (2005 USD) 
 (5-1) (5-2) (5-3) (5-4) (5-5) (5-6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
Logarithm Resource Exports per capita (RE) 0.294***  0.222***  0.235***  
 (5.72)  (6.65)  (4.53)  
       
Resource Exports Share (RIS)  -0.00372  0.0162***  0.0152* 
  (-0.32)  (2.77)  (1.90) 
       
Sec and Tet Education (STE) 0.584*** 0.254**     
 (3.13) (2.39)     
       
Patents (P)   -0.00184 0.00238   
   (-0.13) (1.22)   
       
Research and Development (RD)     0.469 0.285** 
     (1.61) (2.47) 
       
RE*STE -0.0753**      
 (-2.42)      
       
RES*STE  0.0123**     
  (2.26)     
       
RE*P   0.000387    
   (0.17)    
       
RES*P    -0.000830   
    (-0.80)   
       
RE*RD     -0.0572  
     (-1.15)  
       
RES*RD      -0.0145 
      (-0.65) 
       
Institutions 0.144** 0.137** 0.174*** 0.223*** 0.127** 0.188*** 
 (2.50) (2.32) (3.67) (4.45) (2.21) (3.15) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0467*** -0.0481*** -0.0516*** -0.0601*** -0.0455*** -0.0475*** 
 (-6.53) (-5.89) (-7.81) (-8.01) (-5.63) (-4.96) 
       
Government consumption -0.00127 0.0204 0.00882 0.0222 0.00407 0.0112 
 (-0.09) (1.34) (0.73) (1.65) (0.25) (0.65) 
       
Investment 0.00944 0.0331** 0.0122 0.0253* 0.00608 0.0181 
 (0.71) (2.53) (1.02) (1.86) (0.41) (1.16) 
       
Trade -0.00246 -0.00135 -0.00329** -0.00303 -0.00154 -0.000780 
 (-1.53) (-0.76) (-2.09) (-1.44) (-0.99) (-0.35) 
       
Observations 84 86 89 91 64 65 
R2 0.865 0.823 0.856 0.804 0.862 0.811 
Adjusted R2 0.850 0.805 0.842 0.785 0.842 0.784 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
 
Again, this is probably caused by the choice of dependent variable. In addition, the Sachs and Warner findings 
were for the period 1970-1990, a period with much macroeconomic instability. My findings are for the 1980-2009 
period, which for the most part was a more stable period. Finally, the difference might also be caused by the 
difference in specification. Sachs and Warner measured the unconditional effect of natural resource exports, 
whereas I only measure the conditional effect. 
Possibly the most interesting finding is result (5-2), which shows an interaction term with a positive 
statistically significant coefficient. Taken literally, human capital in 1980 contributed more to GDP per capita in 
those countries with a higher share of natural resource exports (of GDP) in 1980. The study by Bravo-Ortega and 
De Gregorio (2006) claimed to find a positive link between natural resources and technological progress. As in 
result (5-2), their measure of resource abundance was natural resource exports as a share of GDP and their 
technology indicator was the level of human capital. The Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006) result might 
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therefore have been caused by their choice in resource and technology indicator, rather than reflecting a true 
relationship. 
Overall, to summarise, the cross-section analysis indicated three things. First, the conditional effect of 
natural resources was positively correlated with GDP per capita. Second, the conditional effect of technology 
was also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Finally, the coefficient of the interaction term was negatively 
correlated with GDP, indicating that natural resources lowers the effect of technology on GDP per capita and 
vice versa. 
 
4.2 Cross-sectional marginal effects 
4.2.1 Marginal effect of natural resources 
Equation (3) showed the marginal effects of natural resources. I only consider the marginal effects of table 4, as 
I believe that natural resource income is a more reliable indicator than natural resource exports. For result (4-
1) from table 4 the marginal effect of resource income per capita is: 
 
 𝜕 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009
𝜕 ln(𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)1980
= 0.198 − 0.0632𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙1980 (8) 
 
The effect of the level of natural resource income on GDP lowers with the level of education. Figure 4 shows this 
effect with the corresponding 95 % levels of confidence. The marginal effect of natural resources remains positive 
for countries with a low level of human capital. For higher levels of human capital, natural resources are no 
longer statistically significant at the 95 % level. These results indicate that natural resource abundance is not 
significantly correlated with GDP per capita in 2009 for countries with high levels of human capital in 1980. 
The confidence intervals in figure 4 can potentially be explained by the distribution of observations. As 
shown in table A2.4 in appendix 2, more than 80 % of the observations have less than two years of combined 
secondary and tertiary education. It also means that the marginal effects are statistically significant for the 
majority of countries. 
 
 
Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Resource Abundance using Equation (8) 
Note: the middle line shows the marginal effects of a 1% higher natural resource income per capita on real GDP per capita at different 
levels of human capital. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
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Equation 8 and figure 4 therefore indicate that natural resource abundance is positively correlated with the level 
of income. This can be explained through a number of potential mechanisms. The first potential mechanism is 
through government investments. Higher resource income can increase government income, which increases 
government savings and investments. These investments can improve infrastructure, schooling or other project 
that might benefit the economy in the long-run. Developing countries could potentially use these investments to 
finance a big-push industrialisation through a number of complementary investments. 
The second potential mechanism is through reduced tax. If the government receives more resource 
revenues, it could reduce the tax rate for the rest of the economy. This could potentially increase private savings 
and in turn private investments, which again could increase economic growth. 
A third potential mechanism could be through increased imports, especially if most of the natural 
resources are exported. If more foreign currency is generated, natural resources can increase the imports of 
more technologically advanced goods which could be used to upgrade the level of technology, which in turn can 
improve economic growth. 
A final mechanism mentioned is that the natural resources themselves contribute through increased 
productivity and linkages (David and Wright, 1997). Increased productivity means that natural resources 
contribute to economic growth through direct production and through the release of labour and capital to other 
sectors. Resource sectors can also generate increased economic activity by increasing linkages to other sectors, 
thereby potentially increasing value-added. 
If patents or R&D were used as the technology indicator, instead of human capital (in effect, results (4-
3) and (4-5) from table 4), the results remain similar, see figure A3.1 and A3.5 in appendix 3. The distribution of 
both patents and R&D is also skewed, as can be seen in table A2.5 and A2.6 in appendix 2. For patents, 88 % of 
the countries had a score of 25 patents (as patents per capita are multiplied with 1,000,000 it means 0.000025 
patents per capita); while 98 % of the countries had a score of less than 100 patents (meaning 0.0001 patents 
per capita). For R&D, 59 % of the countries had less than and R&D expenditure of 0.5 % of GDP; while 80 % of the 
countries had a R&D expenditure less than 1 % of GDP. In other words, the pattern is similar as for human capital, 
with the economic interpretation also being broadly similar. 
For resource dependence, I analyse result (4-2) from table 4. The marginal effect with respect to 
resource dependence is: 
 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009
𝜕𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1980
= 0.00237 + 0.00356𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙1980 (9) 
 
This equation is interesting as the resource income share is predicted to have a higher correlation with GDP the 
higher level of human capital. However, as figure 5 shows, the marginal effects associated with equation (9) are 
largely insignificant, apart from some intermediate values of human capital. The bulge in the confidence interval 
is likely to be a fluke because no evidence of a similar effect can be found when using the other technology 
indicators (see figures A3.2 and A3.6 in appendix 3). This means that resource dependence in 1980 is unlikely to 
be statistically significantly correlated with GDP per capita in 2009. The result therefore indicates that resource 
dependence is largely uncorrelated with levels of GDP, while resource abundance is positively correlated with 
higher levels of GDP. 
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Resource Dependence using Equation (9) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects (needs to multiplied by 100) of a one percentage point higher natural resource income 
share of GDP on real GDP per capita at different levels of human capital. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
 
 
4.2.2 Marginal effect of technology 
To consider the effect of technology, I only consider the marginal effects associated with (4-1) and (4-2) from 
table 4. For result (4-1) the marginal effect of resource abundance is: 
 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009
𝜕𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙1980
= 0.679 − 0.0632ln (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)1980 (10) 
 
An increase in the number of years of education (secondary and tertiary) is thereby less correlated with GDP per 
capita the higher the resource abundance. Figure 6 indicates that there is a positive, but declining correlation. 
This correlation only becomes insignificant for a logarithm natural resource income of around 8. More than 90 % 
of the countries have a lower level of resource abundance than 8, see table A2.2. A feature of resource abundance 
is its relatively smooth distribution of data (compared to the technology indicators), see table A2.2. A smoother 
distribution, and thereby more natural variation in the data, might actually give a truer effect than some of the 
above equations. 
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Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Human Capital using Equation (10) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects (needs to multiplied by 100) of a 1 year higher human capital on real GDP per capita at 
different levels of resource abundance. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
 
The results indicate a positive effect of human capital that is lower the higher resource abundance. The positive 
impact of human capital is expected, as increased education increases labour productivity and learning. The 
relationship exhibited in figure 6 could potentially be explained by the mechanisms I mentioned before: (i) 
Decreased demand for human capital; (ii) Policy failures; and (iii) Increased diversification with increasing 
maturity. 
There might be an element of truth in all of these, since the direction of causality is therefore difficult 
to differentiate. However, one result does seem clear. There is no evidence that resource abundance and human 
capital have positive synergies, meaning that a higher level of technology does not increase the effect of natural 
resources on GDP and vice versa. 
The evidence is not dependent on measuring technology as human capital. When patents and R&D are 
the technology indicators, the results are the same (see figure A3.3 and A3.7 in appendix 3). If anything, the 
evidence for patents and R&D shows an even greater ‘penalty’ of resource abundance, as the marginal effects 
of these two technology indicators becomes insignificant for lower levels of resource abundance than for human 
capital. However, this might also be caused by selection bias, the differences between developing and advanced 
is likely to be larger for patents and R&D then for human capital. 
For equation (4-2), the marginal effect of human capital is: 
 
 𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)2009
𝜕𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙1980
= 0.348 + 0.00356𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1980 (11) 
 
An increase in the number of years of education (secondary and tertiary) is therefore positively correlated with 
GDP per capita, the higher the resource dependence (see figure 7). The results are statistically significant up 
until a resource dependence of a 100 %. In fact, 96 % of all countries (all but two countries) have a resource 
dependence in 1980 of less than a 100 %, see table A2.3 in appendix 2. 
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Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Human Capital using Equation (11) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects (needs to multiplied by 100) of a 1 year higher human capital on real GDP per capita at 
different levels of resource dependence. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
 
Figure 7 indicates a positive and statistically significant effect of human capital, which rises for higher levels of 
resource dependence. If true, it would be consistent with the findings of Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2006), 
who predicted that a high level of human capital could offset the resource curse. It would also be in line with 
economic historians that claim that there are increasing returns to natural resources, and that the level of 
technology determines the impact resources have on the economy (Wright and Czelusta, 2006). It would also be 
in line with the research of Stijns (2006), who claimed that human capital increases with natural resources. 
The problem with these findings is that they are not in line with the results when using patents and R&D 
as technology indicators instead (see figures A3.4 and A3.8 in appendix 3). I already mentioned that there might 
be a selection bias in patents and R&D, but it does indicate that the relationship between the effect of various 
technology indicators and resource dependence might differ. One regression result does not constitute sufficient 
evidence of a relationship. If true, one should be able to find corresponding evidence from the panel data 
specifications.  
 
5. Empirical results panel data analysis 
5.1 Panel data results 
The panel data analysis analyses GDP per capita for two natural resource indicators (resource abundance and 
resource dependence) and three technology indicators. Table 6 provides an overview of where the different 
indicators are presented. 
 
Table 6: Panel Data Analysis Overview Table 
 
Technology Indicators 
Human Capital Patents Research and Development 
Natural Resource 
Indicators 
Resource Abundance: 
Natural Resource Income 
Table 7 Table 9 Table 11 
Resource Dependence: 
Natural Resource Share 
Table 8 Table 10 Table 12 
 
All results (tables 7 through 12) have similar signs and significance for the coefficients of the control variables. 
Institutions, government consumption and the age dependency ratio are all highly significant when using pooled 
OLS, but the effect for institutions and government consumption disappears when using fixed effects as there is 
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little variation over time in these variables. In contrast, investments and trade are not statistically significant 
when pooled OLS is used, but become statistically significant when fixed effects are used as the estimation allows 
for variation within the countries. 
 
5.1.1 Resource Abundance and Human Capital 
Table 7 presents the panel data results when resource income per capita is the resource indicator and human 
capital is the technology indicator. Pooled OLS results (7-1), (7-2), (7-3), give a strong positive coefficient for 
conditional effect of resource income. In (7-3) the conditional effect of a 1 % higher five-year average of resource 
income per capita is an 0.208 % higher five-year average GDP per capita the subsequent period (being 
unconditional if human capital = 0). Time trends and time dummies do not affect the pooled OLS results 
noteworthy. For the fixed effects, the interpretation of the resource income coefficients are the same in (7-4), 
(7-5) and (7-6), but the coefficients are less statistically significant. 
These results are similar to those with cross-sectional data; the economic interpretation is also similar. 
This means that natural resources potentially have a positive effect on GDP per capita, which, as mentioned, 
could potentially be caused by (i) Government investments; (ii) Reduced tax; (iii) Increased imports; or (iv) 
Increased productivity and linkages in the resource sector. To examine the robustness of the finding, one needs 
to consider the marginal effects that will be done below. 
The conditional effect of human capital is similarly positive and statistically significant for pooled OLS. 
As the coefficient in (7-3) is a semi-elasticity, a 1 year higher secondary and tertiary education (five-year average) 
is correlated with a 38.4 % higher GDP per capita in the subsequent five-year period (again, this effect is 
unconditional if resource income = 0). For fixed effects, human capital also has a positive and statistically 
significant conditional effect. 
These results are the same as for the cross-sectional analysis, and indicate that human capital has a 
positive impact on GDP per capita as expected. The most likely explanation is that a higher level of human capital 
increases labour productivity and learning in the economy. Again, the marginal effects will assess whether these 
conditional effects are sufficiently strong to generate a net positive impact of human capital. 
The interaction term is in each case negative and statistically significant, thereby lowering the effect 
of both natural abundance and human capital on GDP. For (7-3) (assuming that years of schooling = 1) the 
unconditional effect of a 1 % higher level of natural resource income will be a (0.208 % – 0.048 % =) 0.16 % higher 
GDP per capita the subsequent five-year period. Also for (7-3) (assuming that the logarithm of resource income 
per capita = 1), the unconditional effect of a 1 year higher level of secondary and tertiary education is correlated 
with a (38.4 % - 4.8 % =) 33.6 % higher GDP per capita in the subsequent five-year period. For fixed effects, the 
interaction term remains negative and statistically significant, but only at the 10 % level when controlling for 
time trend and time fixed effects. The potential economic interpretation of the pooled OLS is similar to the 
cross-sectional case. 
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Table 7: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 (7-1) (7-2) (7-3) (7-4) (7-5) (7-6) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
       
Logarithm Resource Income per capita (RI) 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.0414* 0.0412* 0.0374 
 (5.44) (5.11) (5.09) (1.85) (1.73) (1.55) 
       
Years of Schooling (YS) 0.383*** 0.385*** 0.384*** 0.197*** 0.0968** 0.0958** 
 (4.38) (4.27) (4.26) (5.59) (2.39) (2.34) 
       
RI*YS -0.0483*** -0.0476*** -0.0476*** -0.0116** -0.00981* -0.00968* 
 (-3.68) (-3.48) (-3.47) (-2.06) (-1.70) (-1.68) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0339*** -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.00876*** -0.00561** -0.00549** 
 (-5.73) (-5.69) (-5.66) (-3.39) (-2.41) (-2.35) 
       
Government consumption 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.00198 0.00318 0.00317 
 (3.15) (3.13) (3.11) (0.95) (1.57) (1.58) 
       
Investment -0.00212 -0.00242 -0.00248 0.00603*** 0.00594*** 0.00588*** 
 (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.29) (2.65) (2.90) (2.86) 
       
Trade 0.000712 0.000781 0.000786 0.00337*** 0.00283*** 0.00268*** 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.54) (3.98) (3.31) (3.16) 
       
Institutions 0.260*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.00323 0.0264 0.0252 
 (7.94) (6.38) (6.36) (0.13) (1.11) (1.04) 
       
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations (countries) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 
R2 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.513 0.555 0.558 
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.506 0.547 0.548 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
 
Table 8: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 (8-1) (8-2) (8-3) (8-4) (8-5) (8-6) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Resource Income Share (RIS) 0.0189* 0.0175* 0.0177* 0.00462 0.00556 0.00527 
 (1.92) (1.70) (1.68) (1.27) (1.48) (1.38) 
       
Years of Schooling (YS) 0.236*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.153*** 0.0544* 0.0565* 
 (3.85) (3.63) (3.62) (4.79) (1.68) (1.69) 
       
RIS*YS -0.00645 -0.00604 -0.00608 -0.00289* -0.00264* -0.00283* 
 (-1.11) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.86) (-1.72) (-1.85) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0419*** -0.0425*** -0.0425*** -0.00970*** -0.00664*** -0.00643*** 
 (-7.62) (-7.70) (-7.68) (-3.90) (-2.95) (-2.83) 
       
Government consumption 0.0264*** 0.0264*** 0.0263*** 0.000210 0.00187 0.00166 
 (2.76) (2.77) (2.75) (0.10) (0.91) (0.81) 
       
Investment 0.000374 -0.000764 -0.000757 0.00636*** 0.00616*** 0.00614*** 
 (0.04) (-0.09) (-0.09) (2.77) (3.00) (3.00) 
       
Trade 0.000246 0.000500 0.000508 0.00333*** 0.00263*** 0.00252*** 
 (0.17) (0.33) (0.33) (4.04) (3.35) (3.17) 
       
Institutions 0.261*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.00265 0.0257 0.0246 
 (7.38) (5.90) (5.88) (0.10) (1.00) (0.94) 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations (countries) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 520 (104) 
R2 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.515 0.561 0.564 
Adjusted R2 0.816 0.817 0.816 0.507 0.553 0.554 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
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Table 9: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 (9-1) (9-2) (9-3) (9-4) (9-5) (9-6) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Logarithm Resource Income per capita (RI) 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.0128 0.0285 0.0237 
 (4.97) (4.92) (4.91) (0.67) (1.54) (1.25) 
       
Patents (P) 0.00953*** 0.00957*** 0.00960*** 0.00336*** 0.00209* 0.00191* 
 (6.33) (6.45) (6.42) (2.75) (1.76) (1.68) 
       
RI*P -0.000948*** -0.000943*** -0.000943*** 0.0000145 -0.000151 -0.000148 
 (-3.71) (-3.64) (-3.64) (0.06) (-0.76) (-0.78) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0432*** -0.0434*** -0.0434*** -0.0155*** -0.00761*** -0.00725*** 
 (-9.71) (-8.95) (-8.91) (-7.05) (-3.36) (-3.16) 
       
Government consumption 0.0282*** 0.0282*** 0.0281*** 0.000738 0.00292* 0.00297* 
 (3.74) (3.74) (3.71) (0.39) (1.67) (1.70) 
       
Investment -0.00501 -0.00526 -0.00533 0.00469** 0.00513*** 0.00502*** 
 (-0.64) (-0.66) (-0.67) (2.16) (2.85) (2.78) 
       
Trade 0.00187 0.00192 0.00193 0.00365*** 0.00231*** 0.00213*** 
 (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (5.04) (3.01) (2.78) 
       
Institutions 0.217*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.00551 0.0300 0.0287 
 (6.89) (6.12) (6.09) (0.22) (1.30) (1.22) 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations (countries) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 
R2 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.451 0.538 0.544 
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.836 0.836 0.443 0.531 0.534 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown. 
 
5.1.2 Resource Dependence and Human Capital 
Table 8 repeats the analysis of table 7, but uses resource dependence rather than resource abundance as its 
resource indicator. The results for human capital are similar for both pooled OLS ((8-1), (8-2) and (8-3)) and fixed 
effects ((8-4), (8-5) and (8-6)). However, the conditional effect of resource income share is only significant at 
the 10 % level of significance for pooled OLS and not significant for fixed effects. The coefficient associated with 
resource income share can be interpreted in a similar manner as resource income per capita could in table 7. 
The coefficient for resource dependence is a semi-elasticity. For (8-3), the conditional effect a 1 % higher level 
of resource income share of GDP (five-year average) is associated with a 1.77 % higher GDP per capita in the 
subsequent five-year period (unconditional if years of schooling = 0). 
The results indicate that resource dependence is less important for GDP per capita compared to resource 
abundance. If true, simply being reliant on natural resources does not lower nor improve GDP per capita. This is 
intuitive, as countries with high resource dependence often have low growth rates and subsequently low levels 
of GDP per capita. This means that, in relative terms, the natural resource income has a larger share of GDP. 
Again, these findings need to be checked with the statistical significance of the marginal effects below. 
The coefficients of the interaction terms are not significant for the pooled OLS and are significant at 
the 10 % level for fixed effects. These results are not in line with the findings in the cross-sectional case, as the 
positive coefficient between human capital and resource dependence (result (4-2) in table 4) is not statistically 
significant for most results (and negative for those that are significant). This means that the positive relationship 
found between resource dependence and human capital is probably false. However, it is difficult to give an exact 
interpretation without considering the marginal effects and its standard deviation, as will be done below. 
 
  
Page | 135  
 
 
5.1.3 Resource Abundance and Patents 
Table 9 repeats the analysis of table 7, but replaces human capital with patents as the technology indicator. 
Results for the coefficients of resource abundance, associated with conditional effects, are relatively similar to 
those in table 7. The interpretation of the patents coefficient is again as a conditional effect. Result (9-3) implies 
that an increase in one patent (= patents per capita * 1,000,000) is correlated with a 0.96 % higher level of GDP 
per capita in the subsequent five-year period (again this effect is unconditional if RI = 0). The coefficients of the 
interaction term are negative and statistically significant for pooled OLS, but not for fixed effects. For (9-3), this 
implies that the unconditional effect of one patent (= patents per capita * 1,000,000) (given RI = 1) is a (0.96 % 
- 0.09 % =) 0.87 % higher level of GDP per capita in the subsequent five-year period. Again, a clearer interpretation 
of the statistical significance would need to consider the marginal effects. 
The negative coefficient of the interaction term in the pooled OLS case might indicate less innovative 
activity in resource-abundant countries, as suggested by Matsen and Torvik (2005). This might be caused by 
increased rent-seeking as entrepreneurs seek profits in the natural resource sector, rather than enterprises which 
require more innovation. As mentioned, one should be cautious to interpret patent data as an indicator of 
technology, since it measures innovation more than the level of technology per se. As patents are more numerous 
in advanced economies and because the same economies are more diversified, resource abundance might 
therefore naturally have a relatively lower impact. 
 
5.1.4 Resource Dependence and Patents 
Table 10 repeats the same analysis as in table 9, but replaces resource abundance with resource dependence as 
the natural resource indicator. The coefficient associated with resource income share, measuring the conditional 
effect, becomes positive and significant for pooled OLS ((10-1), (10-2) and (10-3)), but not for fixed effects ((10-
4), (10-5) and (10-6)). In addition, the coefficient associated with patents, its conditional effect, is significant 
for both pooled OLS and fixed effects. The interaction term is, however, no longer significant for any of the 
specifications in table 10. 
 
5.1.5 Resource Abundance and Research and Development 
Table 11 repeats the same analysis as in tables 7 and 9, but instead of human capital or patents, uses research 
and development as the technology indicator. The coefficients associated with research and development are 
positive and significant for pooled OLS ((11-1), (11-2) and (11-3)), but not for fixed effects when time trend and 
time fixed effects are controlled for in (11-5) and (11-6). These coefficients show the conditional effect of 
research and development on GDP per capita. For (11-3), a one percentage point increase in research and 
development (share of GDP, five-year average) is correlated with a 57.5 % higher GDP per capita, subsequent 
five-year average (this conditional effect is again unconditional if the logarithm of resource income per capita = 
0). The size is large, which is probably a reflection of data skewness as close to 90 % of observations have R&D 
expenditures of 2 % or less in GDP (see appendix 2 table A2.12). 
This result is not surprising as a higher spending on R&D is correlated with more learning and innovation, 
both of which are associated with a higher level of GDP. Countries that invest more in R&D therefore tend to 
have higher income levels. 
The interaction terms are positive and significant for the pooled OLS specification, but not for fixed 
effects. For (11-3), it would imply that the unconditional effect of a 1 % higher level of research and development 
(given that the logarithm of resource income per capita = 1) is correlated with a (57.5 % - 6.5 % =) 51 % higher 
level of GDP per capita the subsequent five-year period. A higher degree of resource abundance seemingly lowers 
the effect of research and development on GDP per capita, and vice versa. 
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One needs to consider the unconditional effect to pass judgement on the truely statistically significant 
relationship. However, this negative coefficient in the interaction term is similar to the effect on human capital 
and patents. This effect can be a reflection of a lower R&D, and could reflect an increase in fiscal irresponsibility 
or the need to invest in R&D when resource abundance is higher. Alternatively, it can be a natural consequence 
in that countries with more natural resources, R&D contributes less relatively to GDP as natural resources 
relatively contribute more. 
 
Table 10: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 (10-1) (10-2) (10-3) (10-4) (10-5) (10-6) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Resource Income Share (RIS) 0.0125*** 0.0125*** 0.0127*** 0.000416 0.00258 0.00200 
 (2.77) (2.69) (2.66) (0.17) (1.05) (0.77) 
       
Patents (P) 0.00451*** 0.00453*** 0.00456*** 0.00328*** 0.00128** 0.00117** 
 (4.13) (4.06) (4.07) (5.44) (2.37) (2.17) 
       
RIS*P -0.000355 -0.000352 -0.000348 0.0000486 -0.0000218 -0.0000608 
 (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.44) (0.30) (-0.23) (-0.60) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0504*** -0.0505*** -0.0505*** -0.0155*** -0.00798*** -0.00754*** 
 (-12.05) (-11.18) (-11.16) (-7.35) (-3.53) (-3.26) 
       
Government consumption 0.0316*** 0.0316*** 0.0315*** 0.000599 0.00309 0.00303 
 (3.73) (3.73) (3.70) (0.30) (1.65) (1.59) 
       
Investment -0.00364 -0.00373 -0.00376 0.00491** 0.00521*** 0.00508*** 
 (-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.44) (2.15) (2.68) (2.63) 
       
Trade 0.000849 0.000868 0.000890 0.00364*** 0.00219*** 0.00208*** 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (4.88) (2.94) (2.79) 
       
Institutions 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.00591 0.0285 0.0274 
 (7.70) (6.82) (6.80) (0.22) (1.14) (1.09) 
       
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations (countries) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 560 (112) 
R2 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.449 0.538 0.544 
Adjusted R2 0.813 0.812 0.811 0.441 0.531 0.534 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
  
Page | 137  
 
 
Table 11: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 (11-1) (11-2) (11-3) (11-4) (11-5) (11-6) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Logarithm Resource Income per capita (RI) 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** -0.00911 0.0140 0.00754 
 (3.25) (3.24) (3.22) (-0.32) (0.60) (0.32) 
       
Research and Development (RD) 0.572*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.244** 0.123 0.115 
 (3.93) (3.92) (3.91) (2.22) (1.65) (1.57) 
       
RI*RD -0.0647** -0.0647** -0.0646** -0.00926 -0.00401 -0.00258 
 (-2.38) (-2.37) (-2.36) (-0.49) (-0.31) (-0.20) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0396*** -0.0397*** -0.0397*** -0.0149*** -0.00449** -0.00439** 
 (-7.19) (-6.70) (-6.67) (-6.29) (-2.12) (-2.05) 
       
Government consumption 0.0240** 0.0241** 0.0241** 0.00120 0.00234 0.00218 
 (2.62) (2.61) (2.59) (0.50) (1.09) (1.04) 
       
Investment -0.0163* -0.0165* -0.0167* 0.00702** 0.00743*** 0.00760*** 
 (-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.81) (2.44) (2.97) (3.03) 
       
Trade 0.000858 0.000897 0.000915 0.00431*** 0.00222*** 0.00205*** 
 (0.51) (0.52) (0.53) (5.35) (3.17) (2.74) 
       
Institutions 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.230*** -0.0117 0.00108 0.0000179 
 (5.44) (4.75) (4.71) (-0.43) (0.05) (0.00) 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations (countries) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 
R2 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.590 0.727 0.731 
Adjusted R2 0.827 0.826 0.825 0.582 0.720 0.722 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
 
Table 12: Dependent variable: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 (12-1) (12-2) (12-3) (12-4) (12-5) (12-6) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Resource Income Share (RIS) 0.00993 0.00988 0.00986 -0.00303 -0.00137 -0.00188 
 (1.30) (1.28) (1.26) (-1.18) (-0.51) (-0.65) 
       
Research and Development (RD) 0.259*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.228*** 0.0924* 0.0936* 
 (2.85) (2.78) (2.76) (3.36) (1.81) (1.80) 
       
RIS*RD -0.0204 -0.0204 -0.0203 -0.00421 0.00637 0.00522 
 (-1.01) (-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.67) (1.63) (1.28) 
       
Age Dependency Ratio -0.0453*** -0.0454*** -0.0454*** -0.0136*** -0.00412** -0.00391* 
 (-8.35) (-7.83) (-7.80) (-6.50) (-2.06) (-1.92) 
       
Government consumption 0.0264*** 0.0264*** 0.0264*** 0.000628 0.00219 0.00193 
 (2.67) (2.67) (2.65) (0.22) (0.93) (0.82) 
       
Investment -0.0123 -0.0124 -0.0126 0.00767** 0.00702*** 0.00726*** 
 (-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.36) (2.48) (2.66) (2.72) 
       
Trade -0.000449 -0.000418 -0.000411 0.00455*** 0.00227*** 0.00213*** 
 (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.28) (5.54) (3.12) (2.85) 
       
Institutions 0.269*** 0.267*** 0.267*** -0.00554 0.00132 0.00109 
 (6.62) (5.73) (5.70) (-0.20) (0.06) (0.05) 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Time fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations (countries) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 385 (77) 
R2 0.812 0.812 0.813 0.599 0.729 0.733 
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.808 0.807 0.590 0.722 0.725 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses based on clustered standard errors proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), see Angrist and Pischke (2008) pp.231-240. 
* Significant at the 10 % level, ** Significant at the 5 % level, *** Significant at the 1 % level. Resource income measured in 2005 USD and the logarithm was used 
in the regression. Constant term is not shown 
 
5.1.6 Resource Dependence and Research and Development 
Table 12 repeats the analysis of table 11, but replaces resource abundance with resource dependence. The 
conditional effect of research and development is significant for both pooled OLS and fixed effects, but only at 
the 10 % level when time trend and time fixed effects are controlled for in (12-5) and (12-6). Both the resource 
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income share and the interaction term are statistically insignificant for all specifications in table 12. R&D again 
contributes to GDP per capita, which again is potentially caused by increased learning and innovation through 
R&D investments. 
 
5.2 Panel data marginal effects 
5.2.1 Marginal effect of natural resources 
It is not necessary to assess the marginal effects for all equations above; I only consider the pooled OLS and fixed 
effects specification that control for time fixed effects. I also only report a few results in this section, as the 
other results follow similar patterns. However, appendix 4 shows the marginal effects for all equations with time 
fixed effects not reported in this section. 
First, I consider resource abundance conditional on human capital. Results (7-3) and (7-6) in table 7 
showed the coefficients associated with pooled OLS and fixed effects respectively. The associated marginal 
effects of these two specifications are: 
 
Pooled OLS Result (7-3): 
𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡
𝜕ln (𝑁𝑅 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡−1
= 0.208 − 0.0476𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 (12) 
   
Fixed Effects Result (7-6): 
𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡
𝜕ln (𝑁𝑅 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡−1
= 0.0374 − 0.00968𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 (13) 
 
Figure 8 shows the graph associated with equation (12), and shows the marginal effect of natural resource 
abundance (five-year average) on GDP per capita in the subsequent five-year period. The results for the pooled 
OLS are similar as for the cross-sectional analysis. Natural resource abundance has a positive effect on GDP per 
capita (but is lower the higher level of human capital), but this relationship is only significant for low levels of 
human capital. This result is similar for the marginal effect of natural resource abundance conditioned on patents 
and research and development (see appendix 4 tables A4.5 and A4.13). The findings for resource abundance are 
similar as for the cross-sectional case, and so is the economic interpretation. Natural resource dependence in all 
pooled OLS is insignificant and therefore not treated here. 
 
 
Figure 8: Marginal Effects of Resource Abundance for Pooled OLS using Equation (12) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects of a 1% higher natural resource income per capita on real GDP per capita at different 
levels of human capital. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
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Figure 9 shows the effect associated with equation (13). The marginal effect is, as shown, not statistically 
significant at the 5 % level of significance. In other words, the fixed effect specification shows no relationship 
between resource abundance and GDP per capita. In fact, fixed effects for both natural resource abundance and 
natural resource dependence show up as statistically insignificant for all marginal effects specifications.162  
 
 
Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Resource Abundance for Fixed Effects using Equation (13) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects of a 1% higher natural resource income per capita on real GDP per capita at different 
levels of human capital. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
 
5.2.2 Marginal effects of technology 
The analysis of the marginal effects of technology is done in the same manner as for the marginal effects of 
natural resources. I will consider the marginal effects for human capital conditioned on resource abundance for 
both the pooled OLS and the fixed effects results, in effect results (7-3) and (7-6) from table 7: 
 
Pooled OLS Result (7-3): 
𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
= 0.384 − 0.0476ln (𝑁𝑅 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡−1 (14) 
   
Fixed Effects Result (7-6): 
𝜕𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
= 0.0958 − 0.00968ln (𝑁𝑅 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑖𝑡−1 (15) 
 
Both equations predict that the effect of human capital on GDP per capita lowers with higher natural resource 
income per capita. Figure 10 shows the marginal effects for equation (14) and its corresponding levels of 
confidence. Human capital has a statistically significant impact on GDP at the 5 % level of significance for low 
levels of resource abundance. However, there are many observations for resource abundant countries above this 
level. The interpretation is that human capital only affects GDP per capita positively when resource abundance 
is low. 
 
                                            
162 For the results of the other specifications, in effect for results (8-6), (9-6), (10-6), (11-6) and (12-6), see figures A4.2, A4.6, A4.10, A4.14 and 
A4.18 in appendix 4. 
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Figure 10: Marginal Effects of Human Capital for Pooled OLS using Equation (14) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects (needs to multiplied by 100) of a 1 year higher human capital on real GDP per capita at 
different levels of resource abundance. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
 
For patents and R&D, the effects are in many ways similar, but are significant for higher levels of resource 
abundance (see appendix 4 figures A4.7 and A4.15). The direct interpretation is that patents and R&D keep 
contributing at higher levels of resource abundance than does human capital. The economic interpretation is 
that technology is more important for GDP per capita when a country is resource poor. 
Figure 11 shows the marginal effects using equation (15). The effect is statistically significant for low 
levels of resource abundance, as above. However, the fixed effects results are somewhat weaker than for pooled 
OLS for two reasons. First, the level of resource abundance for which the marginal effect of human capital 
becomes insignificant is lower than for pooled OLS. Second, patents and R&D show no similar pattern as human 
capital; meaning that the results might be caused by the choice of technology indicator rather than technology 
itself, see figures A4.8 and A4.16 in appendix 4. 
 
 
Figure 11: Marginal Effects of Human Capital for Fixed Effects using Equation (15) 
Note: The middle line shows the marginal effects (needs to multiplied by 100) of a 1 year higher human capital on real GDP per capita at 
different levels of resource abundance. The upper and lower lines are 95 % confidence intervals 
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6. Comparison 
In part 1, two questions were asked. The first being: ‘Is the impact of natural resources on GDP per capita 
affected by technology?’ The second being: ‘Is the impact of technology on GDP per capita affected by natural 
resources?’ 
Starting with the first question, the effects of natural resources conditional on technology is summarised 
in table 13. There are four results that are important to take from this analysis. First, no specification showed a 
negative statistically significant result. In other words, there is no evidence for a resource curse. In that respect, 
the results of the paper are in line with a growing number of studies such as Stijns (2006) and Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009). 
 
Table 13: Marginal Effects of Natural Resources on the logarithm of GDP per capita 
 Cross-sectional analysis 
 Human Capital Patents Research and Development 
    
Resource Abundance Positive and declining with human 
capital 
Positive and declining with patents Positive and declining with R&D 
    
Resource Dependence Not significant Not significant Not significant 
    
 Pooled OLS 
 Human Capital Patents Research and Development 
    
Resource Abundance Positive and declining with human 
capital; Not significant for high 
levels of human capital 
Positive and declining with patents; 
Not significant for high levels of 
patents 
Positive and declining with R&D; Not 
significant for high levels of R&D 
    
Resource Dependence Not significant Not significant Not significant 
    
 Fixed Effects 
 Human Capital Patents Research and Development 
    
Resource Abundance Not significant Not significant Not significant 
    
Resource Dependence Not significant Not significant Not significant 
    
 
Second, the fixed effects showed no significant relationship between natural resources and GDP per capita. This 
means that resource production within a given country is not strong enough to be positively correlated with GDP 
per capita. Alternatively, the processes in the different countries were diverse and cancelled each other out 
given the false impression of no significant relationship. This interpretation obviously depends on whether one 
trusts the fixed effects estimation over pooled OLS as mentioned before. 
Third, for OLS and pooled OLS, resource abundance is positive and significantly correlated with GDP per 
capita. The correlation is lower for higher levels of technology, regardless of the measure of technology. As 
mentioned, the effect of technology could potentially be caused by (i) A Dutch disease effect; (ii) Poor policies; 
or (iii) Reflect increased diversification. 
Finally, for OLS and pooled OLS, there is evidence for a positive effect of resource abundance, but no 
growth effect for resource dependence. Regardless of specification, resource dependence is not significant. This 
means that the degree of natural resource abundance is more important than being dependent on natural 
resources, which is intuitive. Highly resource dependent countries often have a low GDP, and the relative size of 
the natural resource sector might give the false impressions that they are, in fact, resource abundant. 
In short, there is no evidence to support the presence of a technology ‘bonus’, as depicted in figure 1 
Being cautious, one can argue that the middle alternative, the no correlation is the most likely as this was the 
result from the fixed effects estimation. However, the OLS and pooled OLS found evidence of a technology 
‘penalty’, but only for low levels of technology. 
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The second question of part 1 asked: ‘is the impact of technology on GDP per capita affected by natural 
resources?’ Table 14 shows the effects of technology conditioned on natural resources. There are three results I 
find important from this analysis. First, the effect of human capital is positive and declining with resource 
abundance regardless of specification. It is also the case that the effect is strongest for lower levels of resource 
abundance. There might therefore be similar mechanisms to the ones mentioned, namely caused by (i) A Dutch 
disease effect; (ii) Poor policies; or (iii) Increased diversification of the production structure. 
 
Table 14: Marginal Effect of Technology on the Logarithm of GDP per capita 
 Cross-section analysis 
 Resource Abundance Resource Dependence 
   
Human Capital Positive and declining with human capital; Not 
significant for high levels of resource abundance 
Positive and increasing with human capital; Not 
significant for high levels of resource abundance 
   
Patents Positive and declining with patents; Not 
significant for high levels of resource abundance 
Not significant 
   
Research and Development Positive and declining with R&D; Not significant 
for high levels of resource abundance 
Negative and declining with resource 
dependence; Only significant at high levels of 
resource dependence 
   
 Pooled OLS 
 Resource Abundance Resource Dependence 
   
Human Capital Positive and declining with resource abundance; 
Not significant for high levels of resource 
abundance 
Positive and declining with resource dependence; 
Only significant for very low levels of resource 
dependence 
   
Patents Positive and declining with resource abundance; 
Not significant for high levels of resource 
abundance 
Not significant 
   
Research and Development Positive and declining with resource abundance; 
Not significant for high levels of resource 
abundance 
Not significant 
   
 Fixed Effects 
 Resource Abundance Resource Dependence 
   
Human Capital Positive and declining with resource abundance; 
Only significant for low levels of resource 
abundance 
Not significant 
   
Patents Positive and declining with resource abundance; 
Only significant for intermediate levels of 
resource abundance 
Not significant 
   
Research and Development Not significant Positive and increasing for resource dependence; 
Only significant at a low level resource 
dependence 
   
 
Second, the effects of patents and R&D are strongest for OLS and pooled OLS. For fixed effects, R&D is not 
significant and patents only for intermediate levels. The reason might be that these indicators are flow rather 
than stock, or it might be explained by the higher degree of both patents and R&D in advanced countries. 
A final result is that natural resource abundance plays a more important role in determining the effect 
of technology than does resource dependence. While the resource abundance results are relatively consistent, 
the resource dependence results vary from one specification to the next. This indicates that resource dependence 
has little real significance, and that the absolute amount of natural resources is more important than the resource 
dependence. 
Figure 2 stipulated three possibilities for the impact of technology conditioned on natural resources. 
There is no clear evidence of a resource ‘bonus’, as only two results indicated this, which were not robust given 
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that the other specifications failed to replicate these results. The strongest evidence for a resource ‘penalty’ is 
when human capital is used as the technology indicator. 
Figure 3 described a number of potential causal links. The best evidence is for the direct links, meaning 
from natural resource abundance on GDP and from human capital on GDP are strong, especially the latter. For 
low levels resource abundance, the growth effect of human capital is high. The evidence for the other potential 
causal relationships (from the third to the sixth link in figure 3) are harder to differentiate. The combined effect 
is most likely negative, but the exact cause is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the evidence that is 
presented, a Dutch disease explanation is not likely as both natural resources and technology have positive 
correlations with GDP per capita, and no resource curse was found. The failed policy explanation is also unlikely, 
since no resource curse was present, and resource abundance has likely contributed to a higher GDP per capita. 
The most plausible explanation is that the lower effect of resource abundance conditioned on technology 
and vice versa is a by-product of economic growth. As economies get more advanced and more diversified, the 
relative contribution of natural resources declines. Appendix 2 figure A2.1 shows a scatterplot between resource 
abundance and human capital, in which there is a positive correlation between the two. 
Indonesia and Malaysia are two resource-abundant countries that experienced high economic growth 
and an improvement in the level of technology. Resource abundance, though important, plays a lesser role as 
these economies mature indicating that technology increasingly becomes more important the more advanced the 
economy. In addition, I also ran some unreported regressions of the logarithm of GDP per capita on the interaction 
term as the sole independent variable for all the different interactions terms, and all were highly positive 
significant. This means that economies, which are both resource abundant and have a high level of technology, 
have a higher GDP per capita than those that do not. 
There are several possibilities to extend this analysis, which could be topics for future research. First, 
is to conduct more case studies on resource abundant countries to better understand the evolution of the level 
of technology within individual countries. This could be done through qualitative or quantitative studies using 
time-series econometrics. Case studies have the potential to be able to go more in depth into the causal 
mechanisms present in the different economies. 
Second, I ran some unreported regressions on different types of natural resources and GDP per capita. 
Reporting these is beyond the scope of the study, but I did find some interesting results. Oil has a strong positive 
correlation with GDP per capita, while minerals have a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Exploring this 
link further is a promising avenue of research. 
Third, I only considered linear marginal effects in this paper. There is no theoretical reason why the 
relationship between natural resources and technology should be linear. Understanding the true mechanics of 
this link is also a promising avenue of research. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper explored the link between natural resources, technology and production by analysing the question: 
‘How does the level of technology affect production in a country abundant in natural resources?’ The first finding 
was that the contribution of human capital to GDP per capita is lower the higher the level of natural resources. 
As no evidence of a resource curse was found, these findings are most likely caused by a declining relative (but 
not necessarily absolute) contribution of human capital to GDP as natural resources is another factor that is 
correlated with a higher GDP. Countries that are maturing, in general, will most likely find that they will become 
less dependent on their natural resources relative to other determinants of growth. 
Second, these effects were found to be robust for resource abundance but not for resource dependence. 
Countries rich in natural resources, in general, had a higher level of GDP, and the contribution of human capital 
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declined with the extent of natural resources. This effect was not present for countries that are highly dependent 
on natural resources. One problem in the literature is that most studies measure resource abundance using a 
measure of resource dependence, thereby understating the true positive effect of natural resources. 
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Appendix 1: Sources 
 
Table A1: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description and source 
  
GDP per capita Logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD prices). Source: World Development Indicators (2014) 
  
Natural resource income per capita Logarithm of natural resource income + 1 (sum of fuel and metals) per capita (constant 2005 USD prices). 
Source: Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
  
Natural resource income share Natural resource income (sum of fuel and metals) share (% of GDP). Source: Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
  
Natural exports per capita Logarithm of natural exports (sum of fuel and metals) per capita (constant 2005 USD prices). Source: 
Calculated using data from WDI (2014) 
  
Natural exports share Exports resource income (sum of fuel and metals) share (% of GDP). Source: Calculated using data from 
WDI (2014) 
  
Years of Schooling Sum of years of secondary and tertiary education. Source: Barro and Lee (2013) 
  
Patents US Patents by Country of Origin per millionth inhabitant. Source: CANA dataset: Castellacci and Natera 
(2011) based on USPTO 
  
Research and Development R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Source: CANA dataset: Castellacci and Natera (2011) based on 
UNESCO, OECD and RICYT 
  
Age Dependency Ratio Age dependency ratio (% of working population). Source: World Development Indicators online (2014) 
  
Government Consumption Government consumption (% of GDP). Source: UN Data National Accounts online (2014) 
  
Investment Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). Source: UN Data National Accounts online (2014) 
  
Trade Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP). Source: UN Data National Accounts online (2014) 
  
Institutions Transparency International Index, ranging from 0 (High Corruption) to 10 (Low Corruption). Source: CANA 
dataset: Castellacci and Natera (2011) based on Transparency International figures 
 
Table A2: Countries Included in the Study 
Albania El Salvador Lebanon Qatar 
Algeria Ethiopia (panel data only) Lesotho Romania 
Angola Fiji Liberia Rwanda 
Argentina Finland Madagascar Saudi Arabia 
Australia France Malawi Senegal 
Austria Gabon Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Bahrain Gambia, The Mali Singapore 
Bangladesh Germany Mauritania South Africa 
Belgium Ghana Mauritius Spain 
Benin Greece Mexico Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia (panel data only) Sudan 
Botswana Guyana Morocco Swaziland 
Brazil Haiti Mozambique Sweden 
Bulgaria Honduras Nepal Switzerland 
Burkina Faso Hungary Netherlands Tanzania 
Burundi India New Zealand Thailand 
Cameroon Indonesia Nicaragua Togo 
Canada Iran, Islamic Rep. Niger Trinidad and Tobago 
Chad Ireland Nigeria Tunisia 
Chile Israel Norway Turkey 
China Italy Oman Uganda 
Colombia Jamaica Pakistan United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Japan Panama United States 
Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Paraguay Uruguay 
Denmark Kenya Peru Venezuela, RB 
Dominican Republic Korea, Rep. Philippines Vietnam 
Ecuador Kuwait Poland Zambia 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Lao PDR Portugal Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Part 2.1: Scatterplot Natural Resources and Human Capital 
 
Figure A2.1: Scatterplot Resource Abundance 2000-2004 (average) and Human Capital 2000-2004 (average) 
 
Figure A2.2: Scatterplot Resource Dependence 2000-2004 (average) and Human Capital 2000-2004 (average) 
 
Part 2.2: Data Used in the Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics Data Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Logarithm of GDP per Capita 2009 110 8.155953 1.656434 5.012124 11.0835 
Logarithm of Natural Resource Income per Capita 1980 110 4.205667 2.949041 0 11.10751 
Natural Resource Income Share of GDP 1980 110 18.39017 30.16241 0 149.3993 
Years of Secondary and Tertiary Education 1980 103 1.353559 1.221261 .0349255 6.062339 
Patents 1980*1,000,000 110 10.07818 28.53786 0 200.3481 
Research and Development Share of GDP 1980 75 .6056889 .704169 0 2.73721 
Institutions (Corruption Perception Index) 1980 110 4.792694 2.287033 .331566 9.644138 
Age Dependency Ratio 1980 110 78.7265 17.53843 46.57348 112.7663 
Government Consumption Share of GDP 1980 110 16.25207 7.32312 4.277165 45.41698 
Investments Share of GDP 1980 110 22.64553 7.725499 2.412204 41.43435 
Trade Share of GDP 1980 110 67.16735 48.21751 11.09835 412.1636 
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Table A2.2: Distribution of the Logarithm of Resource Income per Capita 1980 
Resource Abundance Countries Share Cumulative Share 
0-0.99 24 22 % 22 % 
1-1.99 6 5 % 27 % 
2-2.99 8 7 % 35 % 
3-3.99 12 11 % 45 % 
4-4.99 11 10 % 55 % 
5-5.99 14 13 % 68 % 
6-6.99 18 16 % 85 % 
7-7.99 8 7 % 92 % 
8-8.99 5 5 % 96 % 
9-9.99 1 1 % 97 % 
10 and above 3 3 % 100 % 
Total 110 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.3: Distribution of Natural Resource Income as a Share of GDP 1980 
Resource Dependence Countries Share Cumulative Share 
0-9.9 69 63 % 63 % 
10-19.9 12 11 % 74 % 
20-29.9 4 4 % 77 % 
30-39.9 7 6 % 84 % 
40-49.9 1 1 % 85 % 
50-59.9 4 4 % 88 % 
60-69.9 4 4 % 92 % 
70-79.9 4 4 % 95 % 
80-89.9 1 1 % 96 % 
90-99.9 0 0 % 96 % 
100 and above 4 4 % 100 % 
Total 110 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.4: Distribution of Average Years of Secondary and Tertiary Education 1980 
Human Capital Countries Share Cumulative Share 
0.00-0.49 24 23 % 23 % 
0.50-0.99 26 25 % 49 % 
1.00-1.49 20 19 % 68 % 
1.50-1.99 13 13 % 81 % 
2.00-2.49 5 5 % 85 % 
2.50-2.99 5 5 % 90 % 
3.00-3.49 2 2 % 92 % 
3.50-3.99 2 2 % 94 % 
4.00-4.49 4 4 % 98 % 
4.50-4.99 0 0 % 98 % 
5.00-5.49 0 0 % 98 % 
5.50-5.99 1 1 % 99 % 
6.00-6.49 1 1 % 100 % 
Total 103 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.5: Distribution of Patents 1980 * 1,000,000 
Patents Countries Share Cumulative Share 
0-24.9 97 88 % 88 % 
25-49.9 8 7 % 95 % 
50-74.9 2 2 % 97 % 
75-99.9 1 1 % 98 % 
100 and above 2 2 % 100 % 
Total 110 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.6: Distribution of Research and Development as a Share of GDP 1980 
R&D Countries Share Cumulative Share 
0.00-0.49 44 59 % 59 % 
0.50-0.99 16 21 % 80 % 
1.00-1.49 7 9 % 89 % 
1.50-1.99 0 0 % 89 % 
2.00-2.49 7 9 % 99 % 
2.50-2.99 1 1 % 100 % 
Total 75 100 % 100 % 
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Part 2.3: Data Used in the Panel Data Analysis 
Table A2.7: Descriptive Statistics Panel Data Analysis Five-Year Averages 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Logarithm of GDP per Capita 560 7.886438 1.682152 4.536734 11.10468 
Logarithm of Natural Resource Income per Capita 560 3.759929 2.62898 0 10.55898 
Natural Resource Income Share of GDP 560 8.509861 14.06692 0 100.6234 
Years of Secondary and Tertiary Education 520 1.941025 1.443419 .0349255 7.064361 
Patents*1,000,000 560 14.8116 38.092 0 300.2491 
Research and Development Share of GDP 385 .7426906 .8226598 0 4.577112 
Institutions (Corruption Perception Index) 560 4.466476 2.191217 .8239715 9.8 
Age Dependency Ratio 560 72.753 19.33401 38.05759 112.6323 
Government Consumption Share of GDP 560 16.53533 7.546532 3.783005 72.70576 
Investments Share of GDP 560 20.7962 7.154 2.359344 63.15103 
Trade Share of GDP 560 67.5387 43.53405 7.65095 378.361 
 
Table A2.8: Distribution of the Logarithm of Resource Income per Capita Five-Year Averages 1980-2004 
Resource Abundance Observations Shares Cumulative Share 
0-0.99 128 22.9 % 22.9 % 
1-1.99 44 7.9 % 30.7 % 
2-2.99 51 9.1 % 39.8 % 
3-3.99 51 9.1 % 48.9 % 
4-4.99 76 13.6 % 62.5 % 
5-5.99 92 16.4 % 78.9 % 
6-6.99 59 10.5 % 89.5 % 
7-7.99 26 4.6 % 94.1 % 
8-8.99 22 3.9 % 98.0 % 
9-9.99 10 1.8 % 99.8 % 
10 and above 1 0.2 % 100.0 % 
Total 560 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.9: Distribution of Natural Resource Income as a Share of GDP Five-Year Averages 1980-2004 
Resource Dependence Observations Shares Cumulative Share 
0-9.9 413 73.8 % 73.8 % 
10-19.9 62 11.1 % 84.8 % 
20-29.9 35 6.3 % 91.1 % 
30-39.9 25 4.5 % 95.5 % 
40-49.9 11 2.0 % 97.5 % 
50-59.9 8 1.4 % 98.9 % 
60-69.9 2 0.4 % 99.3 % 
70-79.9 2 0.4 % 99.6 % 
80-89.9 1 0.2 % 99.8 % 
90-99.9 0 0.0 % 99.8 % 
100 and above 1 0.2 % 100.0 % 
Total 560 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.10: Distribution of Average Years of Secondary and Tertiary Education Five-Year Averages 1980-2004 
Human Capital Observations Shares Cumulative Share 
0.00-0.49 68 13.1 % 13.1 % 
0.50-0.99 92 17.7 % 30.8 % 
1.00-1.49 82 15.8 % 46.5 % 
1.50-1.99 66 12.7 % 59.2 % 
2.00-2.49 65 12.5 % 71.7 % 
2.50-2.99 42 8.1 % 79.8 % 
3.00-3.49 30 5.8 % 85.6 % 
3.50-3.99 15 2.9 % 88.5 % 
4.00-4.49 24 4.6 % 93.1 % 
4.50-4.99 16 3.1 % 96.2 % 
5.00-5.49 6 1.2 % 97.3 % 
5.50-5.99 8 1.5 % 98.8 % 
6.00-6.49 2 0.4 % 99.2 % 
6.50 and above 4 0.8 % 100.0 % 
Total 520 100 % 100 % 
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Table A2.11: Distribution of Patents * 1,000,000 Five-Year Averages 1980-2004 
Patents Observations Shares Cumulative Share 
0-24.9 478 85.4 % 85.4 % 
25-49.9 29 5.2 % 90.5 % 
50-74.9 19 3.4 % 93.9 % 
75-99.9 13 2.3 % 96.3 % 
100-124.9 3 0.5 % 96.8 % 
125-149.9 2 0.4 % 97.1 % 
150-174.9 7 1.3 % 98.4 % 
175-199.9 4 0.7 % 99.1 % 
200-224.9 2 0.4 % 99.5 % 
225-249.9 0 0.0 % 99.5 % 
250 and above 3 0.5 % 100.0 % 
Total 560 100 % 100 % 
 
Table A2.12. Distribution of Research and Development as a Share of GDP Five-Year Averages 1980-2004 
R&D Observations Shares Cumulative Share 
0.00-0.49 220 57.1 % 57.1 % 
0.50-0.99 67 17.4 % 74.5 % 
1.00-1.49 30 7.8 % 82.3 % 
1.50-1.99 24 6.2 % 88.6 % 
2.00-2.49 21 5.5 % 94.0 % 
2.50-2.99 17 4.4 % 98.4 % 
3.00-3.49 4 1.0 % 99.5 % 
3.50-3.99 1 0.3 % 99.7 % 
4.00 and above 1 0.3 % 100.0 % 
Total 385 100 % 100 % 
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Appendix 3: Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
Figure A3.1: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Abundance Using Result (4-3) from Table 4 
 
Figure A3.2: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (4-4) from Table 4 
 
Figure A3.3: Marginal Effect of Patents Using Result (4-3) from Table 4 
 
Figure A3.4: Marginal Effect of Patents Using Result (4-4) from Table 4 
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Figure A3.5: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Abundance Using Result (4-5) from Table 4 
 
Figure A3.6: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (4-6) from Table 4 
 
Figure A3.7: Marginal Effect of R&D Using Result (4-5) from Table 4 
 
Figure A3.8: Marginal Effect of R&D Using Result (4-6) from Table 4 
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Appendix 4: Marginal Effects Panel Data Analysis 
 
Figure A4.1: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (8-3) from Table 8 
 
Figure A4.2: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (8-6) from Table 8 
 
Figure A4.3: Marginal Effect of Human Capital Using Result (8-3) from Table 8 
 
Figure A4.4: Marginal Effect of Human Capital Using Result (8-3) from Table 8 
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Figure A4.5: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Abundance Using Result (9-3) from Table 9 
 
Figure A4.6: Marginal Effect of Natural Resource Abundance Using Result (9-6) from Table 9 
 
Figure A4.7: Marginal Effect of Patents Using Result (9-3) from Table 9 
 
Figure A4.8: Marginal Effect of Patents Using Result (9-6) from Table 9 
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Figure A4.9: Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (10-3) from Table 10 
 
Figure A4.10: Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (10-6) from Table 10 
 
Figure A4.11: Marginal Effects of Patents Using Result (10-3) from Table 10 
 
Figure A4.12: Marginal Effects of Patents Using Result (10-6) from Table 10 
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Figure A4.13: Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Abundance Using Result (11-3) from Table 11 
 
Figure A4.14: Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Abundance Using Result (11-6) from Table 11 
 
Figure A4.15: Marginal Effects of R&D Using Result (11-3) from Table 11 
 
Figure A4.16: Marginal Effects of R&D Using Result (11-6) from Table 11 
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Figure A4.17: Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (12-3) from Table 12 
 
Figure A4.18: Marginal Effects of Natural Resource Dependence Using Result (12-6) from Table 12 
 
Figure A4.19: Marginal Effects of R&D Using Result (12-3) from Table 12 
 
Figure A4.20: Marginal Effects of R&D Using Result (12-6) from Table 12 
